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Abstract 	  
In the mid 1990s, the European Union (EU) abandoned its legal defence of the 
Lomé Convention, which had governed EU relations with European former 
colonies in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (the ACP countries) since 1975. 
In its place, the EU proposed a series of comprehensive regional free trade 
agreements – the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) – which went far 
beyond the requirements of WTO rules in their scope. In this thesis, I aim to add 
to existing understandings of the EPAs by explaining (a) why the EU sought to 
recast the EU-ACP relationship in the form of ambitious interregional free trade 
agreements; and (b) why the EU was able to achieve only limited and uneven 
success in reaching agreements that matched these aims. 
 
In order to address these questions, I develop a theoretical approach that 
combines insights from constructivist and historical institutionalisms. I aim to 
contribute to existing constructivist approaches by (a) investigating the 
emergence of complexity and contradiction within policy outputs over time; and 
(b) exploring the role of strategic appeals to institutional constraints in persuasive 
discourse. I use this theoretical approach to draw analytical linkages between the 
internal processes through which EU external economic projections are formed 
and their external reach. Specifically, I highlight the emergence of a range of 
contradictions within the EU’s approach to the EPA negotiations and explore the 
role of these contradictions in facilitating the contestation of the EPAs by actors 
from across the ACP regions and particularly from the case study region, SADC-
minus. 
 
Overall, I argue that the EU’s external economic policy aims and tools are the 
product of the strategic actions of purposive actors working within the context of 
path-dependent institutional structures and patterns of past relations with the 
outside world. In this context, the reach and limitations of EU external economic 
actions are contingent upon the historical processes through which they are 
constructed and the understandings, strategies and alternatives that external 
partners bring to the table. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
 
 
1.1 Research Puzzles 
 
The empirical starting point for this thesis is the dramatic transformation of 
European Union (EU) trade and development policy towards former European 
colonies in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (the ACP countries) in the 
1990s. This radical policy shift marked the end of the previous regime, which 
had been enshrined under the Lomé Convention (1975) and based on the 
supposedly politically neutral post-colonial provision of non-reciprocal trade 
preferences to the ACP countries. The Cotonou Agreement of 2000 proposed the 
replacement of this regime with a series of complex region-wide reciprocal free 
trade agreements (FTAs), known as Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). 
These agreements were in part designed to satisfy multilateral trade rules. More 
significantly, they marked an ambitious attempt by the EU to export an entire 
development model premised on regionalism, a comprehensive free trade agenda 
and ACP exposure to the competitive pressures of regional and global markets. 
 
In October 2008, the Caribbean Forum (CARIFORUM) became the first region 
to sign a comprehensive EPA. Elsewhere in the ACP, though, the EPAs have 
been dogged by long and difficult negotiations, missed deadlines and perceived 
ACP intransigence. By 2011 – four years after the original deadline for the 
conclusion of the negotiations – only 34 out of 79 ACP states had signed even 
the more limited ‘goods only’ interim EPAs and still fewer had begun 
implementation (Bilal and Ramdoo 2011). In mid 2014, the EU secured the 
signatures of two more of the seven ACP regions – Southern Africa and West 
Africa – but only after it had made considerable concessions on a number of key 
issues and jettisoned much of its more ambitious negotiating agenda. 
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The thesis addresses two central puzzles in relation to these events. The first 
puzzle relates to the EU’s dramatic about-face with regard to the legal defence of 
the Lomé regime in the 1990s and the ambition of the trade and development 
prospectus that EU policymakers proposed in its place. For much of the post-war 
period, the EU had defended the legality of the non-reciprocal trade preferences 
that it granted under the Lomé Convention. It was surprising, then, that in the 
mid 1990s the EU gave in to a series of challenges to its relationship with the 
ACP countries under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and 
World Trade Organisation (WTO). In the wake of these challenges, EU 
policymakers declared that wholesale change to EU-ACP trade relations was 
needed in order to render them compatible with multilateral rules. What is even 
more surprising, however, is that the EU proposed and has since pursued a set of 
agreements with the ACP countries – the EPAs – that went far beyond the 
requirements of WTO rules in terms of their content and regional scope. What is 
more, this ambitious attempt to export regional integration and a comprehensive 
free trade agenda through the EPAs came in the context of marginal and 
declining EU commercial and strategic interest in the ACP countries. The 
diplomatic efforts required by the complex and difficult EPA negotiations 
appeared significantly out of proportion with the EU’s material interests in the 
ACP countries. 
 
The second central research puzzle relates to the apparent disjuncture between 
the structural power of the EU and its limited success in shaping outcomes in the 
EPA negotiations. Over the course of the Lomé Convention, many ACP 
countries had accumulated a heavy dependence on preferential trade access to the 
EU market. Because of the non-reciprocal nature of this preferential relationship, 
the ACP countries had little leverage over the EU with which to counteract this 
dependence. This was particularly the case in the light of the ACP countries’ 
declining position as an EU export market and supplier of raw materials since the 
1970s. Furthermore, the EU is the world’s largest trading entity (European 
Commission 2014), the world’s largest donor of official development assistance 
(European Commission 2013), and has a diplomatic machinery that dwarfs that 
of the mostly very small and poor ACP countries. It would be sensible to assume, 
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then, that the recasting of the Lomé relationship in the form of EPAs was entirely 
in the EU’s hands. In practice this was not the case. The EU encountered 
considerable opposition and contestation from the ACP countries and ultimately 
only reached one agreement – in the Caribbean – which matched the scope of its 
early ambition for the EPA negotiations. 
 
In relation to these puzzles, I aim to address the following research questions: 
 
1) Why in the mid 1990s did the EU undertake to recast its trade and 
development relationship with the ACP countries in the form of 
ambitious, comprehensive and contested interregional EPAs? 
2) Why has the EU achieved only limited and uneven success in persuading 
the ACP countries to adopt its ambitious and comprehensive trade and 
development prospectus under the EPAs? 
 
1.2 The Argument 
 
The central findings of this thesis can be summarised as follows. I explain the 
puzzling shift in and expansion of EU policy ambitions towards the ACP 
countries by reference to an emergent consensus amongst EU policymakers 
about the most appropriate and effective aims and tools of EU external 
development policy. The new orthodoxy in this context was that ACP 
development would be best served by promoting the exposure of ACP countries 
to the competitive demands of regional and international markets. The 
emergence of this consensus was more to do with European policymakers’ 
changing ideas about how best to promote development than the oft-cited 
challenges under the GATT and WTO to the existing EU-ACP regime. Whilst 
the neoliberal thrust of this agenda has been identified in the existing literature 
(Brown 2000; Faber and Orbie 2009b; Gibb 2000; Hurt 2003), the thesis extends 
this insight by exploring the particular character of this consensus, its 
embeddedness within the history of EU-ACP relations, and its articulation 
through the aims and tools deployed by the EU in the EPA negotiations. 
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With regard to the limited and uneven success of the EU’s comprehensive 
agenda for the EPAs, I argue that this was largely the result of the way in which 
European policymakers constructed and mobilised the aims and policy tools 
associated with the EPA project. Specifically, the way in which EU policymakers 
developed and projected their emerging preference for the promotion of a liberal 
and regional model of development in the ACP countries was to invoke and 
mobilise a particular interpretation of WTO rules as the external imperative for 
recasting the EU-ACP relationship.  
 
In reality, a range of options existed for rendering EU-ACP trade relations WTO 
compatible. These included the integration of the ACP countries into the EU’s 
Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) or the negotiation of a multilateral 
waiver for the continuation of unilateral trade preferences. However, the EU 
chose to base the recasting of the Lomé relationship on Article XXIV of the 
GATT, which stipulated that preferential trading arrangements must be based 
upon the liberalisation of ‘substantially all trade’ between contracting parties. By 
giving particular significance to Article XXIV, EU policymakers were able to 
insist that the only way in which existing trade preferences could be preserved 
was if they were recast in the form of reciprocal FTAs that would open a 
significant portion of ACP markets to exports from the EU. 
 
The EU deployed a range of policy tools in pursuit of the EPAs, including this 
invocation of WTO rules, material leverage associated with the downgrading of 
ACP countries’ preferential market access, and a norm-based argument that 
comprehensive EPAs would support ACP development aims. By hitching their 
wagon to a particular interpretation of WTO compatibility, however, the EU’s 
strategy for reaching agreement on the EPAs became vulnerable to 
inconsistencies. I highlight three tensions within the EU’s EPA strategy in 
particular. These were: (a) the lack of any clear way in which the EU’s 
commitment to differentiation could be incorporated within WTO-compatible 
EPAs; (b) the difficulty of reconciling WTO-compatible interregional FTAs with 
the existing historical patterns of regional organisation in the ACP group; and (c) 
the emerging preference of EU policymakers for the inclusion of various ‘WTO-
plus’ issues in the EPAs while the same issues were being jettisoned from WTO 
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negotiations. The effect of these inconsistencies was to both limit the reach of the 
EU’s material leverage and expose its norm-based case for the EPAs to 
damaging criticism from many ACP countries and a group of transnational anti-
EPA activists. 
 
The dynamics of this contestation were crucial in determining the process and 
outcome of the EPA negotiations on the ground in the ACP sub-regions. I argue 
that the outcome of the EPA negotiations cannot be ‘read off’ as simply a 
reflection of the EU’s uneven material leverage. Rather, within the different ACP 
regions the EU’s trade and development prospectus came up against different 
sets of historically embedded regional initiatives and development strategies. In 
this context, the tensions within the EPAs opened up space for a range of 
different critical responses and negotiating positions pursued by reflexive and 
historically situated ACP agents. 
 
The specificity of the process of contestation that met the EPAs in different 
regions is well demonstrated by the case study chosen for this thesis: the 
Southern African Development Community EPA group (known as SADC-
minus). In this region, the EU’s ambitious plans for the EPAs came up against a 
complex and deeply embedded set of regional initiatives and varied development 
strategies. In this context, responses to the EPAs from national elites were 
informed by very different interpretations of the choice set on offer. For a long 
time, EPA negotiations looked set to create lasting political division within the 
region. Ultimately, however, South African negotiators successfully deployed a 
rhetorical strategy that played on tensions within the EU’s own discursive case 
for the EPAs to bring about a significantly watered-down final regional 
agreement. 
 
1.3 Theoretical Contributions 
 
In this thesis I aim to make two sets of specific theoretical contributions that shed 
light on and underpin this empirical story. These relate, on the one hand, to 
historical and constructivist institutionalisms, and on the other, to existing 
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literatures on the EU’s global role and processes of European policy transfer and 
diffusion. 
 
Constructivist and Historical Institutionalism 
 
Rational choice logics of explanation dominate existing approaches to the 
analysis of EU external economic policy. I argue that these approaches struggle 
to provide a convincing explanation of complex processes of policy change over 
time. This is because they tend to read off the behaviour of policymakers from 
incentive structures in a direct and structuralist manner whilst neglecting issues 
of agency and choice. Instead they rely on exogenous variables to drive 
processes of change and risk rendering reflexive and institutionally embedded 
agents as mere ciphers of structural impulses. 
 
My approach here adds to a small but growing literature that challenges the 
dominant rationalist understandings of the making of EU external economic 
policy (Orbie and De Ville 2014; Parker and Rosamond 2013; Siles Brügge 
2013; 2014a) and adds weight to claims about the centrality of ideas in 
contingent processes of political change. I propose an alternative to rational 
choice approaches that combines insights from both historical and ideational 
branches of institutionalist thought.  
 
In so doing I put forward a logic of explanation in which institutions – broadly 
defined – are created by human agents to lend order to a world of fundamental 
uncertainty. These institutions exhibit path-dependent logics that derive from 
past practices, policies and norms. Dense institutional contexts structure the 
environment in which actors operate but they do so in ways that leave space for a 
variety of reflexive and purposive actions. Historically situated agents make and 
remake their institutional context through their actions and interpretations, in a 
world that is both constrained and amenable to change. 
 
The bearing of this theoretical insight on the real world encourages both analysts 
and practitioners to historicise the process of policy development. This 
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potentially sensitises actors and observers to the contingency, complexity and 
range of policy choices that can be built out of a particular institutional 
landscape. It is only by delving into the fine grain of the empirical reality of 
these changing and interlinked institutional worlds that we can tease out the way 
in which these subtle and complex processes operate over time. A large part of 
this thesis is focused on this empirical and analytical endeavour.  
 
This logic of explanation has much in common with and builds on constructivist 
political economy and institutionalism (for example, Blyth 2011; Hay 2002; 
Schmidt 2008). I aim to contribute to this literature by thinking through the 
implications of a constructivist ontology for complex processes of policymaking 
in two specific ways.  
 
First, I suggest that the interaction between reflexive agents and institutional 
structures over time can lead to contradictions within policy outputs. These stem 
from tensions between policymakers’ aims and preferences and the path-
dependent trajectory of embedded institutional practices, policies and norms. For 
example, EU policymakers felt constrained to build radical policy change on the 
foundations of existing EU-ACP relations rather than creating a new trade and 
development regime divorced from old colonial ties. As the thesis demonstrates, 
this had unintended consequences that contributed to the tensions that beset the 
EPA implementation process. 
 
My second contribution to constructivist literatures focuses on the nature and 
operation of the power relationships between actors and the role of discursive 
strategies in these. By discursive strategies, I mean those rhetorical practices that 
aim to persuade other agents of the desirability or necessity of a particular policy 
or action. Hay and Rosamond (2002; see also Siles-Brügge 2014a) discuss this 
type of discursive appeal in relation to external economic constraints that are 
presented as material and immutable. The empirical and theoretical work of the 
thesis examines the way in which such strategic discursive appeals can be 
deployed in relation to institutional as well as economic constraints. My 
contention is that purposive agents can make strategic discursive appeals to 
institutional constraints as a way of legitimising and rendering necessary their 
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particular policy preferences. The chances of success of such discursive appeals 
are dependent upon the compatibility between the institutional rules and norms to 
which appeal is made and the proposed policies or actions. 
 
With regard to the EPAs, EU policymakers tied the recasting of EU-ACP 
relations to a strong and exclusive appeal to the exigencies of particular WTO 
rules. In this case, there was a poor fit between existing and path-dependent 
institutional norms within international trade law and the comprehensive regional 
trade and development agenda advanced by the EU. This weakened the 
plausibility of the strategic discursive appeals on which the EU had based its case 
for the EPAs and made it vulnerable to contestation by both ACP states and a 
coalition of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and activists. 
 
The EU as a Global Actor and Processes of Policy Transfer and Diffusion 
 
With regard to the existing literature on the EU as a global actor, I take as a point 
of departure social constructivist accounts that explore the normative 
underpinnings of the EU’s external projections and their role in the construction 
of the EU as a ‘unique’ actor in international politics. In their more 
congratulatory mode, these accounts portray the EU as a superior and more 
progressive foreign policy actor than interest-driven nation states (and 
particularly the USA).  
 
While the majority of this literature focuses on the EU’s external projection of 
normative values such as good governance and democracy, a more limited 
literature has recently emerged that discusses the ideational underpinnings of the 
EU’s external promotion of regional economic integration (see Aggarwal and 
Fogarty 2004b; Söderbaum et al. 2005; Telò 2007a). In its more critical guise, 
this literature highlights the neoliberal ideational content of the model of 
economic governance that the EU promotes through its external actions and 
questions the extent to which this constitutes a universally applicable model 
(Orbie 2011; Parker and Rosamond 2013; Storey 2006). However, even this 
more critical literature has less to say about the articulation and embeddedness of 
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this consensus within the historical processes of European integration, or the 
contingent processes through which the EU’s norm-based preferences are 
deployed as concrete policy tools and agendas.  
 
Furthermore, the existing literature on the EU as a global actor says relatively 
little about the actual process and real world effects of the implementation and 
external reach of the EU’s global projections. In this vein, I aim also to 
contribute to a literature on EU policy diffusion and transfer. The latter provides 
useful insights about the external impact of different types of EU policy tools, 
both material and discursive. However, it tends to take these mechanisms for 
policy transfer as relatively fixed and given. Moreover, the policy transfer 
literature struggles to explain the surprisingly limited success of the EPA 
negotiations, given the high degree of trade power asymmetry in this case and 
the significant material incentives that the EU was able to offer the ACP 
countries. There is little room within this literature, then, to consider why the 
reach of the EU’s material leverage was ultimately limited or the reason that its 
discursive strategy enjoyed uneven success.  
 
I argue that by developing an analysis that problematises the origins, articulation 
and deployment of EU policy formulation and projection it is possible to 
generate new insights concerning not only the character of the EU’s external 
policies, but also the tools employed for their implementation. Through this, it is 
possible to begin to bridge the gap between the analysis of the internal drivers 
and the assessment of the external impacts of the EU’s activities as a global 
actor. An approach that emphasises this contingent process allows a more 
compelling and nuanced account of the process of policy construction to emerge. 
It also helps to reveal the tensions and contradictions that arise from this process 
and the ways that these can limit the impact of the EU’s material and discursive 
leverage on the ground. In the particular case of the EPAs, I argue that the 
development of a series of internal tensions within the EU’s policy agenda and 
tools made its strategy increasingly vulnerable to effective contestation by the 
materially weak ACP countries and their allies. 
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1.4 Methodological Reflections 
 
The influence of constructivist ontologies has grown steadily in international 
relations, political economy, and EU studies since the 1990s. Yet a good deal of 
scepticism remains, particularly focused around methodological issues and the 
challenges of translating constructivist theorising into empirical research that 
meets the standards of the political science community. In this section I offer 
some brief reflections on the epistemological controversies surrounding 
constructivist research before outlining the specific methods employed in this 
thesis. 
 
Alexander Wendt’s claim that ideational approaches can be successfully and 
consistently paired with a positivist epistemology has come under sustained 
criticism (see for example Fierke 2010; Smith 2000). In line with these critics, I 
take the view that it is difficult to make law-like generalisations about a world in 
which actors’ ideas have a crucial impact on the way that they interpret and 
respond to contextual variables. Hollis and Smith’s (1990) answer to this 
epistemological conundrum is to separate ‘understanding’ (what constructivists 
and interpretivists do) from ‘explaining’ (what positivists do). The implication of 
this is that the task for constructivists and others interested in ‘understanding’ is 
not to develop causal explanations of political phenomena but to uncover the 
meanings that inform people’s actions (Bevir and Rhodes 2008, p. 170; Bevir 
and Rhodes in Finlayson et al. 2004). Parsons (2007, p. 112), however, argues 
that this distinction is overstated and that all social theories contain elements of 
both explaining and understanding. For example, even rationalist approaches 
connect actors’ environment to their behaviour through a rationalist model of 
actor cognitions (Parsons 2007, p. 112).  
 
In this thesis I argue that rather than being part of a separate realm of political 
enquiry labelled ‘understanding’, constructivist approaches can make claims to 
explanatory modes of analysis and ideas can be considered causes of social 
phenomena. As Colin Hay (in Finlayson et al. 2004) contends, it is possible to 
develop genuinely causal, constructivist accounts of social phenomena by being 
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‘less concerned with the (process of) understanding per se, and more concerned 
with the role played by particular understandings in motivating the political 
conduct of particular actors’ (p. 147). 
 
Process Tracing and Historical Narrative 
 
The method I adopt in this thesis in order to construct such a casual constructivist 
analysis is informed by ‘process tracing’, which sits at the intersection between 
social scientific and historical analysis (Bennett and George 2004, p. 223). 
Political analysts have increasingly used process-tracing methodologies to 
uncover not only correlations between variables but also the ‘causal 
mechanisms’ by which independent variables produce outcomes (Bennett and 
George 2004; Checkel 2005; 2006). The basic principle of process tracing is to 
identify sequential processes within particular cases using a rich selection of 
(primarily qualitative) empirical data (Bennett and George 2004). The claim of 
several advocates of this approach is that hypotheses derived from predictive 
causal models can be tested against qualitative empirical evidence in this way 
(Bates et al. 1998; see, for example, Büthe 2002; Checkel 2006; Hall 2003). For 
reasons expressed above – particularly that constructivist approaches imply 
complex and emergent causal processes (see Blyth 2011) – I eschew the 
positivist aim of generating and testing law-like hypotheses. 
 
Process-tracing approaches, however, can be deployed in a variety of ways and 
at the service of a variety of ontological and epistemological positions. The 
approach that I adopt here approximates what Bennett and George (2004) call 
‘analytic explanation’, in which historical narrative is ‘couched in explicit 
theoretical forms’ (p. 211). Where this approach differs from work in the 
historical tradition, and reflects a particular strength of the social sciences, is that 
it is explicit about the theoretical underpinnings of the narrative that is put 
forward (Bonnell 1980; Lupovici 2009), and specifically the assumed 
relationship between institutions, actors and ideas over time. Beyond these basic 
assumptions, I do not hypothesise a specific causal chain of events, but rather 
allow the stages of the empirical story to emerge in more inductive fashion. Hall 
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and Taylor (1996, p. 954) suggest that such an approach is common in the 
historical institutionalist tradition, in which researchers typically ‘scour the 
historical record for evidence about why historical actors behaved as they did’ (p. 
954).  
 
In this sense, I do not set out to ‘test’ the theoretical approach outlined earlier in 
this chapter. Indeed, Colin Hay (2002, p. 91) suggests that ontological 
assumptions about relationships between structure and agency over time shape 
our very observations of the world and as such are not amenable to empirical 
testing. The logic of explanation set out above, rather, informs the way in which I 
shape my narrative account of the changing contours of EU-ACP relations in the 
thesis. 
 
The type of narrative presented, in turn, reflects an ontological commitment to 
the central role of ideas and historical processes in political analysis. First, in 
order to capture the historical and path-dependent dynamics that have shaped 
EU-ACP relations, the analysis incorporates a substantial period of time (Pierson 
2004, p. 45), going back as far as the Treaty of Rome in 1957. In line with a 
recommendation by Bennett and George (2004, p. 213), I seek to avoid any 
assumption that path dependency at early points in the development of the 
longitudinal case determined later outcomes, stressing instead the range of 
available actions for purposive actors within the context of path-dependent 
institutions and the contingency of their choices about how to act. 
 
‘Showing ideas as causes’ (Parsons 2002) within the narrative is perhaps more of 
a challenge and in response I employ a range of methodological tactics. First, I 
attempt to gain access to the ideas that informed the decisions of those actors 
closest to the policymaking process (Wincott 2004, p. 356) through interviews 
and documentary analysis. There are, however, limitations to this approach both 
in terms of the availability of documents and interviewees (particularly with 
reference to the long-term historical register) and the difficulty of extracting the 
ideas that actually informed agents’ actions from these sources (see below). In 
addition, then, I aim to challenge competing materialist explanations in order to 
add weight to claims that the processes and outcomes that I describe are difficult 
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to explain without reference to the contingent interpretations and actions of 
particular agents. As Craig Parsons (2002) points out, such an approach can be 
employed to particular effect where ideas strongly crosscut lines of material 
interest. In the case study of the EPA negotiations in Southern Africa in 
particular, it is possible to add weight to the argument about the centrality of 
ideas by suggesting that material incentives alone do not seem to provide an 
adequate explanation of the observed outcomes.  
 
The theoretical approach that I employ in this thesis makes a distinction between 
‘reflexive’ discourse (those ideas that actors have genuinely internalised) and 
‘strategic’ discourse (ideas that are deployed in pursuit of ends-oriented 
strategies). This presents a further methodological challenge, since it is 
notoriously difficult to establish whether an actor really believes in the ideas that 
they express or is deploying them strategically (see Hay and Smith 2010). 
Gabriel Siles-Brügge (2014a, p. 47-54) has devised an analytical strategy for 
dealing with this conundrum, in which particular agents’ discursive actions in 
different settings (public versus private) are contrasted in order to uncover 
discrepancies that would indicate the strategic and conscious use of discourse. 
This analytical strategy, however, is dependent upon the availability of enough 
interview and documentary evidence to detect such discrepancies and on the 
assumption that agents would be willing to stray from the strategic use of 
discourse in private. While discrepancies between public and private discourses 
are highlighted in places in this thesis, I also employ other tactics to suggest that 
particular discourses are being deployed strategically.  
 
First, in the case of European policymakers’ strategic appeals to WTO rules as an 
external constraint on the future shape of EU-ACP relations, I aim to show that 
these rules have been acknowledged both in academic literatures and policy 
debates to be a good deal more ambiguous than EU policymakers made out. I 
suggest that it is implausible, then, that EU policymakers were not aware of such 
ambiguities and therefore that their rigid appeals to these constraints were likely 
made strategically. Second, I use the analysis of documentary evidence, 
secondary sources and policy developments in other areas at similar times to 
demonstrate that European Commission policymakers had already come to the 
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conclusion – independent of the GATT challenges – that EU-ACP relations 
needed to be recast in such a way as to encourage greater ACP trade openness 
and exposure to global markets. 
 
Since I reject the positivist emphasis on hypothesis testing and falsification, it is 
important to comment here on how one might make an assessment of the validity 
and reliability of the sort of narrative approach that I present here. I depart from 
interpretivist notions that we can only hope to uncover the meanings and 
narratives that political actors use to understand their own actions (Marsh and 
Furlong 2002, p. 26). Instead I suggest, following Bhaskar (1986, p. 72), that 
while the world can only be known through available discourses, this does not 
mean that it is impossible to adjudicate between contending theoretical accounts 
of that world.  
 
Ultimately, in order to provide a valid process-tracing narrative, the empirical 
account proposed must be supported by convincing evidence (Dunn 2006, p. 
377). The most common criteria for judging the validity of research that uses a 
narrative approach is not whether it produces singular ‘truth’, but whether it 
provides a coherent, plausible and hopefully incisive account of the available 
evidence that stands up in the face of competing explanations (Bennett and 
George 2004, p. 220; Büthe 2002, p. 488; Pouliot 2007, p. 378). In the following 
sections I provide an outline of the types of evidence and methods of data 
collection that I use to construct the narrative in this thesis. 
 
Interviews 
 
I conducted the field research for this thesis in three periods: an initial two weeks 
in Brussels in late 2011, 10 weeks in South Africa (plus eight days in Botswana) 
in early 2012, and a further 10 days in Brussels in May 2012. The fieldwork 
produced a series of semi-structured face-to-face interviews. The purpose of 
these encounters was both to glean information about a contemporary negotiating 
process about which full details are not yet on the public record and – as 
indicated above – to gain access to the ideas that informed EU approaches to 
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ACP relations and responses from elites in ACP countries. Richards (1996) 
suggests that this latter aim – ‘understanding the theoretical position/s of the 
interviewee; his/her perceptions, beliefs and ideologies’ (p. 199) – is central to 
any elite interviewing exercise. While the data produced by interviews is 
inevitably the product of a particular conversation at a particular time and place 
(Wengraf 2001, p. 1), I used only relatively brief prompts and questions in order 
to encourage interviewees’ subjective understandings to emerge from the 
interviews (May 2001, p. 124). In this sense, the aim of the interviews was to 
gain an insight into the ‘reflexive’ (Rosamond 2000a) dimension of 
policymakers’ ideas and their role within the EPA process. I combined this 
method for eliciting the ideas and interpretations that informed key decisions 
with document analysis by way of triangulation (see below). 
 
I consulted a total of 47 interviewees for this research. These included European 
Commission officials from Directorate General (DG) Trade and DG 
Development and Cooperation (DEVCO), officials from the European External 
Action Service (EEAS) central offices and delegations, ACP officials, national 
trade and foreign relations officials from Southern African countries, Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) officials, civil society 
representatives, and a range of experts on the EPAs and Southern African politics 
from think tanks and research organisations. I conducted the interviews 
anonymously and ‘off the record’ in order to allow interviewees to speak freely 
about the ongoing and sensitive negotiations that are the subject of this research.  
 
For the same reason, and after consultation with other researchers in this field, I 
took the decision not to record the interviews but rather to take handwritten 
notes, which I wrote up in more detail immediately following each interview.1 
Given these constraints, references to interview data are generally paraphrased 
rather than in the form of direct quotations. In a few cases, I interviewed two or 
three informants in a group.2 This was a reflection of interviewee preferences and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 I would like to thank Tony Heron, Gabriel Siles-Brügge and Matthew Bishop 
for their invaluable interviewing advice and for sharing their contacts with me. 
2 For this reason, while there were 47 interviewees in total, the interviews 
themselves are numbered 1 to 41.	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logistical issues rather than a methodologically driven decision, but did not seem 
to adversely affect the extent to which interviewees were able to be candid in 
their responses. Indeed, in some cases, group interviews threw up interesting data 
where interviewees disagreed or were encouraged to reflect further on particular 
issues by their colleagues. 
 
I encountered some problems of access (see Richards 1996), particularly in the 
Southern African context. First, time and budget constraints did not allow me 
travel to all seven of the countries in the case study region, SADC-minus. 
Second, in some cases – for example in Mozambique3 – there were only one or 
two officials involved in the EPA negotiations and these people were unavailable 
for interview. For this reason the interview data in relation to SADC-minus is 
skewed towards South Africa, Botswana and Namibia. To supplement this I draw 
on findings from a set of similar interviews conducted by Tony Heron in 
Swaziland and Lesotho in March 2010.4 Where further research would be 
necessary in order to draw firm conclusions this is indicated within the text. A 
full numbered list of interviews and brief interviewee descriptions is provided in 
an appendix and interviews are subsequently cited by numerical reference in the 
footnotes. 
 
Document Analysis 
 
In addition to interviews, I draw upon analysis of relevant documents. These 
include, Commission communications, texts of agreements, speeches made by 
key actors and documents produced by ACP governments. Whilst these 
documents are treated as ‘social facts’, they are not accorded the status of 
transparent reflections of reality (Atkinson and Coffey 2004, p. 58). For the 
purposes of the thesis, documents can reveal how rhetoric is deployed for 
particular aims (Gill 2000, p. 174) – the ‘strategic’ dimension of discourse 
(Rosamond 2000a) – but they are perhaps less useful for uncovering its reflexive 
dimension, that is what policymakers really think. Colin Hay and Nicola Smith 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Interview 29 (SADC). 
4 I would like to thank Tony Heron for discussing this data with me. 
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(2010) go so far as to suggest that documentary analysis alone is ‘simply 
incapable of providing [a] detailed picture of policymakers’ assumptions and 
understandings’ (p. 904).  
 
Within the thesis, my primary recourse to the analysis of documents aims to 
contribute to an understanding of key events in the changing contours of EU-
ACP relations and to add to an understanding of the way that European 
policymakers constructed their discursive case for of the EPAs. Similarly, 
documents produced by ACP governments are only used as evidence of elite 
responses to the EU’s normative case for the EPAs in conjunction with interview 
evidence that supports a similar reading of elite perceptions of the negotiations. 
While standard texts encourage those using documentary analysis to consider the 
representativeness of their documents (for example, Macdonald 2001, p. 205), 
here, I selected documents primarily based on their significance within the 
broader narrative. The reason for this is that my aim is not to produce any 
generalisable conclusions about the discursive output of the European 
Commission, but rather to understand a specific process of policy change and 
promotion in which certain documents played a key role. 
 
Trade Statistics 
 
The methods employed in this thesis are primarily qualitative, as befits my 
constructivist ontology. In some places – for example in developing a picture of 
the preference dependence of Southern African ACP countries or the trade 
relationship between South Africa and its neighbours – I make reference to trade 
statistics. These are illustrative of the context in which ACP elites had to make 
decisions about whether or not to sign an EPA. They are not intended to 
represent any straightforward variable on which the outcome of the EPA 
negotiation was dependent. In some cases, these statistics are taken from reliable 
secondary sources. I calculated other trade statistics using data from Trade Map, 
run by the International Trade Centre (2013), which provides yearly data based 
on UN COMTRADE – the world’s largest database of trade statistics – in an 
accessible online format. Since trade patterns in African countries often exhibit 
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significant annual fluctuations, where possible any data calculated using Trade 
Map statistics takes an average based on figures from several consecutive years. 
 
Case Study 
 
The empirical research for this thesis proceeds at two levels. First I address the 
changing contours of EU trade and development policy towards the ACP 
countries, assessing the drivers of this process of change and its impact across 
the ACP regions. Second, I offer a more fine-grained analysis of the EPA 
negotiating process and outcome in the case study region, SADC-minus. The aim 
of the case study is to add further weight to the argument that a series of tensions 
within the EU’s articulation and promotion of a liberal model of regional 
governance through the EPAs helps to explain their limited and uneven reach. I 
do this through a detailed analysis of the specificities of the way that these 
tensions were revealed within a particular set of negotiations.  
 
Southern Africa has one of the most complex patterns of overlapping regional 
integration of any of the ACP regions and is also characterised by the presence of 
a hugely dominant regional economic power in the shape of South Africa. For 
this reason, the SADC-minus region has been characterised as something of an 
outlier within the ACP group and these features of the regional political economy 
have been used to explain the difficult negotiating process that took place in this 
region.5 In this sense, SADC-minus represents a challenging case in which to 
examine the more general argument about the limited and uneven reach of the 
EU’s projection of a particular model of liberal regional governance through the 
EPAs. In other words, the fact that it is possible to trace the impact of the more 
general set of tensions in the EU’s EPA strategy even within this supposed 
outlier region, provides particularly strong support for the argument that these 
tensions played a key role in the unravelling of the EPA negotiations across the 
ACP regions. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Interviews 1 and 3 (DG Trade); Interview 29 (commentator). 
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The utility of single case study designs has been questioned by influential texts 
on methodology, such as King, Keohane and Verba’s Designing Social Inquiry 
(King et al. 1994, p. 208-11). However, my use of a single case study in the 
thesis can be justified in a number of ways. First, while the focus in the detailed 
analysis is on one particular region, this is located within a broader analysis of 
the EPA negotiations and their outcomes across the ACP regions. Studies of 
other ACP regions conducted by other researchers – for example, CARIFORUM 
(Bishop et al. 2013; Heron 2011) and West Africa (Trommer 2013) – provide 
important comparative context for the Southern Africa case (see Bennett and 
George 2004, p. 220). Second, it is possible to make a number of comparisons 
within this Southern African case. In particular, the region offers the opportunity 
to compare the responses of countries with various degrees of historical 
dependence on Lomé preferences and varying orientations towards the EPAs. 
Third, as already stated, I do not make any claim to positivist-type hypothesis 
testing. I hope, however, that this study does have a theoretical contribution to 
make that goes beyond the particular empirical narrative presented here. This is 
so with regard to the argument that historical and ideational institutionalist 
approaches can be combined in an ontologically consistent way and in pointing 
towards the role of institutional constraints in the strategic dimension of 
discourse. I present these theoretical insights less as hypotheses to be tested and 
more as a framework through which to design theoretically informed narrative 
accounts of complex processes of institutional and policy change.  
 
1.4 Outline of the Thesis 
 
Part I: Theoretical Framework 
 
Chapter Two 
My aim in this chapter is to review the dominant rational choice institutionalist 
literature on the EU’s external economic relations (particularly in the realm of 
trade) and to provide an alternative ‘logic of explanation’ that will inform the 
remainder of the analysis presented in this thesis. The central critique that I offer 
in relation to the rational choice institutionalist logic of explanation is that it 
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encounters difficulties in explaining specific and complex instances of policy 
change over time. This is primarily because of the latent structuralism that stems 
from the central assumption that human beings are rational utility maximisers 
with specified goals. The alternative logic of explanation that I outline combines 
insights from historical and ideational institutionalist approaches. The chapter 
explores the implications of this logic of explanation for accounts of complex 
processes of policy change as well as for the strategic use of discourse within 
institutional contexts. 
 
Chapter Three 
In this chapter, I review two additional literatures that are pertinent to the thesis’ 
research questions. These are, first, the literature on EU interregionalism and the 
EU as a global actor, and second, the literature on EU policy transfer and 
diffusion. My aim here is to situate the theoretical approach outlined in Chapter 
Two within these literatures and to suggest that such an approach can help to 
draw links between the internal drivers of the EU’s global projections and their 
external impact. My central claim is that an understanding of the contingent and 
historically situated process through which the EU articulates and deploys its 
external policy models and tools can provide not only a compelling and plausible 
account of the drivers of EU external relations, but also a bridge to understanding 
their particular and contested impact. 
 
Part II: The Construction and Reach of the Economic Partnership 
Agreements 
 
Chapter Four 
This is the first of four empirical chapters. In it, I take a long view of the EU-
ACP relationship in order to shed light on the historical embeddedness of the 
EU’s external trade and development policies. Specifically, I develop a 
chronological narrative from the birth of the EU-ACP relationship at the Treaty 
of Rome in 1957 to the end of the Lomé Convention and the signing of the 
Cotonou Agreement in 2000.  
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I take issue with claims that the break with the past represented by the Cotonou 
Agreement can be explained by reference to straightforward EU commercial 
interests, bureaucratic infighting within the European Commission or even the 
emergence of a monolithic neoliberal orthodoxy. Rather, I argue that the EU’s 
stance in the Cotonou negotiations was the product of a distinctive constellation 
of ideas that had become influential amongst European policymakers. These had 
begun to shape the Lomé Convention even before the recasting of the EU-ACP 
relationship had been proposed. The final contours of the Cotonou Agreement 
were shaped by these ideas, but also by the historical trajectory of the EU-ACP 
relationship and EU policymakers’ decision to deploy particular WTO rules as an 
imperative for the opening of ACP trade regimes. 
 
Chapter Five 
In Chapter Five I develop an analysis of the EPA negotiations that followed the 
Cotonou Agreement. Specifically, I identify three contradictions that stemmed 
from the design of the policy aims and tools associated with the EPAs and their 
linkage to a strategic appeal to the exigencies of particular WTO rules. I suggest 
that these idiosyncratic multilateral trade rules provided a poor match with the 
EU’s aim of negotiating comprehensive regional EPAs. Further, the aim of 
swiftly reaching WTO-compatible FTAs with ACP regions did not take account 
of historical trajectories of regional integration within the ACP regions and the 
problems that these posed. Finally, I trace the EU’s growing insistence that the 
EPAs be expanded to include trade in services, a range of ‘WTO-plus’ regulatory 
measures and other technical clauses. I demonstrate how this insistence on the 
expansion of the scope of the EPAs was at odds with the trajectory of 
multilateral negotiations in the WTO. My overall contention in this chapter is 
that the way in which strategic appeals to WTO rules were incorporated into the 
EU’s discursive case for the EPAs, and the tensions that this created, opened up 
space for successful contestation of the EPAs by ACP and other actors. 
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Part III: Case Study of the SADC-Minus EPA 
 
Chapter Six 
In Chapters Six and Seven my attention turns to negotiations for an EPA in the 
case study region, SADC-minus. In these chapters I explore more fully the 
contestation of the EU’s policy aims and tools for the EPAs by ACP actors. 
Through both of these chapters, I argue that the distinctive process and outcome 
of the SADC-minus EPA came about as the result of the specific way in which 
the tensions within the EU’s EPA strategy were revealed through the contingent 
and historically embedded responses of reflexive ACP agents. 
 
In Chapter Six I begin by offering some brief theoretical context for the case 
study. This takes the form of a set of reflections on the fit between the existing 
literature on Africa in international relations and the theoretical approach 
outlined in Chapter Two. Following this, the empirical focus of the chapter is on 
the historical context in which the process of EPA contestation in Southern 
Africa was embedded. I argue that the historical process of regional integration 
and development in Southern Africa represented a problematic fit with EU 
ambitions for the promotion of comprehensive intra- and inter-regional 
liberalisation through the EPAs. Specifically, the claimed link between 
regionalism, economic liberalism and development that underpinned the EU’s 
proposed model of regional development governance differed from the model 
that had historically underpinned regional initiatives in Southern Africa. 
Similarly at the national level, I highlight a lack of consensus within the region 
about the desirability or effectiveness of neoliberal development strategies. This 
was reflected in the diverse development strategies embedded within different 
countries in the region. 
 
Chapter Seven 
 
In Chapter Seven, I pick up the thread from Chapter Six and examine the way in 
which historically embedded SADC-minus agents interacted with the EU’s EPA 
strategy once the negotiations got under way. Here, my focus is on the way in 
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which the tensions within the EU’s discursive case for the EPAs opened up space 
for and, in some cases, provided tools for a range of critical responses and 
negotiating positions from SADC-minus agents. I argue that the responses of 
SADC-minus countries to the EPA could not be simply read off from an index of 
vulnerability to the loss of trade preferences. Rather, divergent responses to the 
EPA within the region were based on both the differing development strategies 
embedded within different country contexts and the various elite interpretations 
of the choice set on offer within the negotiations. In the context of divided 
preferences over the EPA, South African negotiators were eventually able to 
exploit tensions within the EU’s negotiating strategy to bring about regional 
agreement on a considerably watered-down EPA. 
 
Part IV: Concluding Remarks and Appendix 
 
Chapter Eight 
In Chapter Eight, I provide an outline of the conclusions of each chapter and a 
discussion of these in the context of the two research puzzles outlined at the 
beginning of this chapter. I conclude overall that while the EU occupies a 
position of structural power within the global economy, the way that it deploys 
this power and its external reach is highly contingent upon the actions and ideas 
of historically embedded agents. I finish the thesis by considering how future 
theoretical and empirical research might build upon and expand the insights that 
I have generated. 
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Chapter Two 
Ideas and Institutions in the Making of EU 
External Economic Policy 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter has two aims. The first is to review existing approaches to the 
analysis and theorisation of EU external economic policy output and critique the 
underlying logic of explanation that dominates these approaches. The second aim 
is to develop a distinctive logic of explanation that can be used to analyse and 
explain the research questions and empirical material that lie at the heart of this 
thesis. 
 
Existing approaches to understanding the drivers of EU external economic policy 
have been dominated by a rationalist ontology. Specifically, contributions to this 
literature more often than not adopt an institutionalist variant of rational choice 
theory that sees institutions as functional structures designed to improve policy 
outcomes by solving collective action problems or delegating policy 
responsibility to actors who are insulated from interest-group pressures. Within 
such a framework, the burden of explaining changes to EU external economic 
policy falls almost entirely upon changes within the institutional structures that 
govern processes of policymaking at the EU level. There are many reasons why 
the puzzles at the heart of this thesis – about the changing contours of EU 
relations with the ACP countries and the limited reach of EU attempts to promote 
neoliberal development norms through this relationship – are not amenable to 
such an explanation. Two of the most prominent concern the way in which 
rationalist approaches account for change and their limited scope. 
 
	   39	  
First, while rational choice institutionalist approaches emphasise policy 
continuity, punctuated by occasional shifts in the institutional rules that govern 
preference formation and aggregation, the changes that I analyse in this thesis 
exhibit a more complex and evolutionary pattern of development than such a 
model allows. Second, my aim in this thesis is to understand not just the output 
of EU foreign economic policy, but its external reach. Existing rationalist 
accounts contribute relatively little in this regard, beyond claims that the EU’s 
fractured institutional structure leads to incoherent external economic relations 
(Carbone 2008), or that divisions between the Commission and the member 
states may actually serve to strengthen the EU’s bargaining position in 
international negotiations (Meunier 2005). 
 
My central aim in this chapter is to develop a logic of explanation – or set of 
ontological assumptions about the relationships between agents, ideas and 
institutional structures – that will provide a basis upon which the puzzles at the 
heart of the thesis can be addressed. In order to do this, I build on attempts to 
create a synthesis between historical institutionalism and constructivist 
approaches. I do this by combining ‘institutional’ and ‘ideational’ logics of 
analysis (Parsons 2007). In so doing, I put forward a logic of explanation in 
which institutions are understood to be created by human agents with the purpose 
of lending order to a world of fundamental uncertainty and contingency. These 
institutions exhibit a path-dependent logic that structures the environment in 
which actors operate in both intended and unintended ways. While these 
institutions and their path-dependent effects shape the context in which agents 
operate, they do not fully determine agents’ interpretations, actions or responses. 
As such, agents continually make and remake the institutional context in which 
they are placed but not under circumstances of their own choosing.  
 
This logic of explanation is no radical departure from that put forward by a 
number of constructivist institutionalists, but it does aim to more clearly indicate 
the important place of path dependence in constructivist understandings of 
political processes. Further, I aim through this chapter to contribute to the 
existing body of constructivist literature by thinking through the implications of 
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this logic of explanation with regard to complex processes of policy change. 
These implications are twofold. 
 
First, the interaction between reflexive agents and path-dependent institutions – 
in the context of wider processes of change in the social system – can and often 
does lead to the emergence of tensions and contradictions within institutional 
structures over time. The second implication relates to the operation of power 
relationships between actors and the role of discursive strategies within these. 
Specifically, I argue that actors operating in an uncertain environment may and 
often will use appeals to external institutional constraints as a strategic discursive 
tool at the service of ends-oriented political strategies. These discursive tactics 
can be particularly successful when there is a plausible degree of convergence 
between actors’ desired policy outcomes and the path-dependent institution to 
which they appeal. They may also, however, become hostage to institutional path 
dependencies that undermine the effectiveness of such appeals. 
 
Finally, whilst putting forward a new and hopefully innovative logic of 
explanation I heed Colin Hay’s (2005a; see also Gofas and Hay 2010) warning 
against ‘ontological proselytising’. So, to be clear, the claim I make here is not 
that the logic of explanation put forward is superior to that advanced by rational 
choice institutionalists, but rather that it provides a more appropriate set of 
explanatory tools for understanding processes of complex and evolutionary 
policy change. 
 
The chapter is organised as follows. In the first section I examine rational choice 
institutionalist accounts of EU external economic policymaking by looking at 
liberal intergovernmentalism, multi-level games and principal-agent approaches 
to policy formation and change. I then turn to a literature that has argued the case 
for bringing economic interests back into the analysis of EU policymaking. 
Following this, I develop a short critique of the dominant rationalist logic of 
explanation of the EU’s external economic policies. In the second half of the 
chapter I construct an alternative logic of explanation by looking at literatures 
that address institutions and ideas in processes of historical change. In this 
section I examine existing historical and constructivist institutionalisms and put 
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forward a way of combining their underlying logics of explanation. I finish by 
considering the role of institutions and ideas in policy change and the importance 
of strategic appeals to institutional constraints within discursive action. 
 
2.2 Rational Choice Institutionalist Accounts of EU External 
Economic Policymaking  
 
A significant body of recent literature on the EU’s external economic policies 
has focused on the EU’s Common Commercial Policy – a core competence of 
the Union that implies uniform conduct of trade relations with third parties – 
rather than other dimensions of external economic policy (Young 2000, p. 95). 
Literature that focuses on the EU’s external development relations has tended to 
generate valuable normative conclusions and insightful descriptive accounts (see, 
for example Arts and Dickson 2004; Holland 2002; Lister 1997) rather than 
making particular contributions to theoretical understandings of the EU’s 
external economic policy (with the exception of the literature on policy 
coherence for development, discussed below). Existing literature on EU external 
monetary relations focuses primarily on the narrow question of the Euro’s failure 
to challenge the dollar as a global currency (see Bini Smaghi 2006; Cohen 2003; 
2009; McNamara 2009).6 Given this limitation, my focus in this section will be 
on the more established theoretical literature on the EU’s external trade relations.  
 
There have been contributions to the literature on the EU’s external economic 
policymaking from both the international relations and comparative politics 
traditions in EU studies. In these, the former emphasises the process of European 
integration, while the latter focuses on policymaking within the EU.7 Until 
recently, explanations of EU external economic relations in both of these 
traditions have tended to emphasise the explanatory power of the EU’s unique 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 A possible exception is the recent work of Lucia Quaglia (2014), which 
considers the EU’s relationship with global financial regulation and seeks to 
explain when and why the EU ‘uploads’ or ‘downloads’ regulations to/from the 
international regulatory arena. 
7 Here, I follow a distinction made by Gabriel Siles-Brügge (2014a) between the 
multi-level games and principal-agent approaches that dominate understandings 
of EU policymaking. 
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institutional structures and the relative depoliticisation of EU external economic 
policymaking (for a critique of this tendency, see Siles-Brügge 2014a). New 
approaches have attempted to repoliticise the way we think about EU external 
economic policy by ‘bringing economic interests back in’ (Dür 2008). However, 
all of these approaches to a greater or lesser extent adopt rationalist assumptions 
about the behaviour of human actors, the origins and roles of institutions and the 
nature of political change. I will argue that this underlying ‘logic of explanation’ 
(Parsons 2007) makes existing theoretical understandings of EU external 
economic policy unsuited to addressing the particular empirical puzzles that are 
the focus of this thesis. 
 
Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Multi-Level Games 
 
The early literature on the EU’s external economic dimension is closely linked to 
the ‘first debate’ in EU studies between neofunctionalists and 
intergovernmentalists. Neofunctionalists explained the process of European 
integration and the pooling of sovereignty by European states in the late 1950s 
and 1960s by reference to a process of ‘spillover’. Through this process it was 
claimed that regional integration generated its own momentum beyond the 
immediate control of state actors (Haas 1958; Lindberg 1963; Schmitter 1970). 
By contrast, following the stalling of the European integration process in the mid 
1960s, intergovernmentalists stressed the continued importance of European 
states and their self-interested control over the integration process (Hoffman 
1966).  
 
With the revival of the European project in the 1980s, this debate reignited over 
the question of the drivers of the Single Market programme. Those working in 
the neofunctionalist tradition stressed the spillover effects created by an activist 
European Commission (Sandholtz and Zysman 1989), while 
intergovernmentalists emphasised the importance of European states’ self-
interest in driving the integration process forward (Moravcsik 1993b). In the late 
1990s, the EU’s Common Commercial Policy became part of the debate over the 
drivers of European integration as scholars discussed whether and why 
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competence for the ‘new trade issues’ (services and intellectual property) would 
be granted to the European Commission (Meunier 2003; Meunier and Nicolaïdis 
1999; 2000; Woolcock 2000; Young 2000).  
 
An approach to understanding the making of the EU’s external economic policy 
has since grown out of the debate over European integration, and specifically out 
of Moravcsik’s (1991; 1993b; 1998) ‘liberal intergovernmentalism’. This 
approach – which has come to be known as the ‘multi-level games’ literature – 
reflects Moravcsik’s commitment to incorporating domestic preference 
formation and intergovernmental bargaining within a single theoretical model for 
explaining European integration.  
 
Approaches to the understanding of EU external economic policy in this vein 
have adopted Putnam’s (1988) metaphor of the ‘two-level game’. This was 
originally applied to international negotiations in Europe and beyond, and was 
further developed by Moravcsik and others in the early 1990s (see Evans et al. 
1993). Putnam (1988) argued that ‘janus-faced’ politicians negotiating 
international agreements must simultaneously engage in two ‘games’, one 
international and one domestic. That is, in international negotiations national 
representatives seek agreements at level I (the international level) that also meet 
with the preferences of interest groups and legislators at level II (the domestic 
level). Putnam argued that each of these games has a set of outcomes that are 
acceptable to the participants and that where there is overlap between these ‘win 
sets’ international agreement is most likely. The two-level games literature 
stresses the agency of those actors negotiating on behalf of nation-states and the 
skilful and creative strategies used to reconcile divergent preferences at the 
domestic and international levels (Putnam 1988; Moravcsik 1993a). 
 
A number of scholars have adapted the two-level games metaphor when applying 
it to the EU’s foreign economic relations by adding a third level to take into 
account the fact that the EU is itself an international body (Collinson 1999; 
Frenhoff Larsén 2007; Moyer 1993; Patterson 1997; Young 2000; Zartman 
1993). Conventionally, level I comprises the negotiation between the EU and a 
third party, level II is the negotiation that goes on within the EU, and level III is 
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political bargaining within member states (Collinson 1999, p. 217). Thus, in the 
negotiation of external economic agreements, European Commission officials 
must reach a deal with third parties at the international level that is acceptable to 
member state representatives in the Council, who in turn must ensure that the 
deal is acceptable to domestic interests.  
 
Young (2000) points out the tendency among scholars using this approach to pay 
little attention to processes of preference formation and aggregation within 
member states. They attempt instead to ‘reduce the significance of the political 
dynamics within the EU to just the impact of the decision rules on aggregating 
member government preferences’ (Young 2000, p. 95). Indeed much of the 
existing literature treats the external economic policy preferences of member 
states as background assumptions based on historical patterns (Siles Brügge 
2012, p. 19-20).8 
 
Policy outcomes, then, are explained by the way that institutional rules aggregate 
the assumed preferences of member states. Meunier (2000, p. 110), for example, 
argues that where unanimity is required to adopt a trade agreement the voice of 
the most protectionist member states will be amplified, whereas if voting is by 
qualified majority, extreme positions are mitigated. Hanson (1998) suggests that 
policymaking rules at the EU level since the completion of the Single Market 
have created a systematic bias towards trade liberalisation. These approaches 
place the explanatory burden on institutional rules at the EU level and therefore 
leave little room for the agency of negotiators that was emphasised in Putnam’s 
original two-level game framework.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 In this literature it is generally assumed that northern European states are more 
liberal in their trade policy stance while France and a group of southern 
European countries are more protectionist. A different set of stylised assumptions 
about member state preferences with regard to external development policy can 
also be identified. Former colonial powers are said to prefer the maintenance of 
special treatment for their ex-colonies; protectionist southern European states are 
assumed to be concerned about the expansion of market access for developing 
countries in agricultural goods; countries that joined the EU in 1995 (Austria, 
Finland and Sweden) are assumed to favour a move away from special treatment 
for former European colonies; while new accession states in central and eastern 
Europe are assumed to favour a reduced international development budget (Arts 
2004). 
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Magdalena Frenhoff Larsén (2007) suggests a functionalist way of deploying a 
three-level game framework to understand the EU’s external economic relations. 
She argues that a central dynamic of the EU’s trade policymaking process can be 
captured by replacing the member states at level II of the game with the 
Commission and its Directorates. In this model the preferences of the competing 
Directorates in the Commission are given by their bureaucratic function 
(Frenhoff Larsén 2007, p. 863). The assumption from this perspective is that 
Directorates will tend to work to expand their remit and therefore, for example, 
DG Trade tends to promote multilateralism, DG enterprise is broadly liberal, DG 
Agriculture acts as a break on trade liberalisation, DG Development supports 
market access for developing countries (Woolcock 2005a, p. 246). Here, again, 
the way that the assumed preferences of these actors are aggregated by 
Commission rules and structures provides the explanation for particular policy 
outcomes.  
 
Frenhoff Larsén (2007), for example, argues that placement of the EU’s 
negotiating team for its free trade agreement with South Africa within DG 
Development rather than DG Trade had a crucial impact on the EU’s stance in 
the negotiations. Scholarship on the ‘coherence’ of the EU’s development policy 
output has followed a similar logic. The argument here is that the fragmented and 
compartmentalised institutional structure of policymaking within the European 
Commission and the sectoral logic of Directorate preferences make policy 
coherence in external economic relations difficult to achieve (Carbone 2008; 
2011; Elgström and Pilegaard 2008). Here, again, it is the institutional structures 
at the European level that do most of the work in explaining external economic 
policy output. 
 
The Principal-Agent Approach 
 
A second set of literature on the EU’s external economic relations uses the 
principal-agent approach. This draws on political economy literature about the 
domestic determinants of external trade policy and originally emerged in relation 
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to the federal structure of the United States. Drawing on the comparative politics 
tradition in EU studies (see Hix 1994) this branch of literature treats policy 
processes within the EU as analogous to those in a federal state. However, its 
explanations of particular policy outcomes use the principal-agent approach to 
emphasise the institutional structures that make EU policymaking unique (Poletti 
and De Bièvre 2014, p. 5). In this model, member states are cast as the principals 
to the European Commission as agent.  
 
The assumption of the political economy literature on which the principal-agent 
approach is based is that elected politicians are rational actors whose primary 
aim is maximising their chances of re-election. They do this by responding to the 
demands of societal interest groups. Various theories seek to specify how 
societal groups will define their external economic preferences based on their 
economic attributes and their assumed rational desire to maximise utility (for 
example, see Alt et al. 1996; Casella 1996; Chase 2003, p. 95-6; for a summary, 
see Milner 1999). The relatively simplistic assumption often employed in 
understanding the domestic determinants of external economic policy is that 
‘special interests’ (assumed to be import-competing industries) will prefer 
protectionist policies, whereas the ‘median voter’ (whose primary identity is as a 
consumer) will prefer liberalisation. A number of scholars have explained the 
persistence of protectionist economic policies – in spite of the overall welfare 
gains for consumers that would come from trade liberalisation – by the fact that 
the benefits of protectionism are strongly concentrated amongst a small group of 
actors. By contrast, the beneficiaries from trade liberalisation are diffuse, and 
therefore face collective action problems in lobbying for liberalisation (Pareto 
1927; Schattschneider 1935; Olson 1965). These protectionist special interests, it 
is argued, hold an undue sway over the actions of the elected politicians at whom 
they target their lobbying. 
 
Building upon these insights, the so-called ‘collusive delegation thesis’ – 
originally associated with US trade policy – has been particularly influential in 
the study of the EU’s external economic policymaking. A number of scholars 
explain protectionist US trade policy up to 1934 by reference to the fact that 
trade policymaking was the exclusive responsibility of Congress, whose 
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members were beholden to protectionist special interests (Baldwin 1986; Destler 
1986; Haggard 1988). The argument goes that the protectionist Smoot Hawley 
Tariff (1930) was blamed by policymakers for contributing to the length and 
depth of the Great Depression. Following this, policymakers deliberately 
delegated authority for trade policymaking to the President, which seemed to 
encourage a liberalising trend in US external economic policy (Haggard 1988; 
Destler 1986). The logic of this argument is that moving the site of responsibility 
for trade policymaking from politicians representing electoral districts (Members 
of Congress) to an actor elected by a national constituency (the President) made 
it easier for trade policy to ignore geographically specific protectionist special 
interests (McKeown 1999, p. 30, fn 10; cited in Dür 2008, p. 29). 
 
This collusive delegation thesis has been at the centre of the EU studies literature 
on external economic policymaking in the form of the principal-agent approach.9 
The central feature of this argument is the claim that responsibility for trade 
policymaking in Europe has been deliberately delegated from the member states 
(the principals) to the European Commission (the agent) in order to insulate this 
issue area from protectionist societal interests. As Stephen Woolcock has it: 
 
In the EU as elsewhere, trade policy decision-making structures have 
been designed to limit the role of politicians and politics, because of the 
bad experience with politically determined [protectionist] trade policy in 
the interwar years (Woolcock 2005a, p. 247). 
 
The fundamental assumption of the principal-agent literature is that elected 
policymakers in member states prefer protectionism, whereas senior officials 
insulated from political pressure within the Commission favour liberalisation 
(Elsig 2007b; Meunier 2000; Woolcock 2005a). 
 
The claim of much of the principal-agent literature is that the delegation of trade 
policy competence to a supranational agent is what sets the EU apart from other 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 For advocates of this approach, see Elsig (2002), Kerremans (2004), Pollack 
(1997), Woolcock (2005b), Woolcock and Hodges (1996); for critiques see Dür 
(2008), Heron and Siles-Brügge (2012), Siles-Brügge (2014a). 
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polities. This makes its trade policy uniquely depoliticised, promotes a liberal 
bias in EU external economic policy, and ultimately prevents the EU from 
becoming the feared protectionist ‘fortress’ (Greenwood 2003; Hanson 1998; 
Woolcock 2005a). More recent principal-agent literature on the EU’s external 
economic policy has focused on particular shifts in the character of external 
economic policy or the outcomes of specific trade negotiations (da Conceição 
2010; Delreux and Kerremans 2010; Elgström and Frenhoff Larsén 2010; 
Meunier 2007; da Conceição-Heldt 2011; Elsig 2010; Elsig 2007b). These 
examples are explained through the analysis of the control mechanisms that exist 
between the principals and the agent and the amount of autonomy enjoyed by the 
Commission in different circumstances. The tenor of these arguments is that in 
circumstances where the Commission enjoys greater autonomy, particular trade 
policy outcomes will tend to be more liberal.  
 
2.3 Bringing Economic Interests Back In 
 
A range of scholars have reacted against the emphasis of the principal-agent 
approach on the depoliticisation of EU external economic policymaking and its 
insulation from political or economic interests by seeking to ‘bring economic 
interests back in’ (De Bièvre and Dür 2005; Dür 2007; 2008; 2010; Heron and 
Siles-Brügge 2012; Shaffer 2006; Siles-Brügge 2014a; Woll 2006; 2008). Of 
these contributions the closest to the principle-agent approach is that of De 
Bièvre and Dür (2005), which contends that while member state principals did 
indeed deliberately delegate policymaking competence in the area of external 
economic policy to an agent, they did not do this with the aim of protecting this 
policy area from the influence of special interests. Rather, their aim was to confer 
benefits on both exporters and import-competing industries in order to maintain 
flows of resources from lobbying.  
 
Other contributions go further, minimising the importance of the EU’s unique 
institutional arrangements and contending that interest groups are able to 
influence EU trade policymaking in much the same way as they do in other 
polities. Dür (2007) suggests that the recent EU decision to sign FTAs with 
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Mexico and Chile, in 2000 and 2002 respectively, was primarily driven by the 
defence of exporter interests. He also finds evidence that the EU’s positions in 
the Kennedy and Doha Rounds of GATT/WTO negotiations were broadly in line 
with the expressed preferences of European interest groups (Dür 2008). Heron 
and Siles Brügge (2012) seek to marry a theoretical approach that includes the 
role of domestic interest groups with an appreciation of the systemic context in 
which these groups operate.  
 
Implicit in these accounts of  the direct impact of lobbying on EU external 
economic policymaking is the assumption that Commission officials, like elected 
national representatives, are susceptible to interest-group lobbying. This is 
perhaps because they are interested in lucrative positions after leaving public 
office (Manger 2009, p. 32). According to these accounts, then, the key 
determinants of the EU’s external trade policy are the preferences of societal 
interest groups and the ability of these groups to overcome collective action and 
informational problems in order to lobby member-state and Commission 
policymakers for their desired policy outputs.  
 
2.4 A Critique of the Rational Choice Logic of Explanation 
 
The two dominant approaches to EU external economic policy – the principal-
agent and multi-level games approaches – place the stress of their explanatory 
emphasis on policymakers’ positions within the unique institutional structures of 
the EU. The literature that seeks to ‘bring economic interests back in’ explains 
policy preferences and outcomes by reference to policymakers’ positions in 
relation to domestic and regional interest groups and lobbyists. What each of 
these approaches has in common is that they follow a ‘logic of position’ (Parsons 
2007, p. 13). Each theory has at its centre a rational and goal-oriented actor or set 
of actors with specified and fixed preferences over outcomes and a set of 
contextual variables to which this actor must respond. These various approaches 
argue that by specifying a policy actors’ positioning within various aspects of the 
institutional or structural landscape we are able to predict their policy preferences 
and thus to predict the EU’s policy output.  
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This brief summary serves to reveal the assumptions and analytical moves that 
make up the essence of rational choice approaches as they have been applied to 
external economic policymaking in the EU. I now advance a critique of the 
rational choice approach and its institutionalist variant. This critique draws on 
the work of Colin Hay (2004b) and follows him in stressing the usefulness of 
rational choice assumptions as a heuristic device, but arguing that they lack 
explanatory power in analysing particular processes of complex and evolutionary 
policy change.  
 
A number of the assumptions on which rational choice approaches are based 
might be considered relatively implausible representations of the way that the EU 
external trade policymaking process really works. For example, a range of 
empirical studies suggests that European Commission officials are not the 
depoliticised technocratic experts they are claimed to be by the principal-agent 
literature, nor the passive bearers of interest-group pressure claimed by some of 
the interest-based literature. Rather these studies show that ideological 
commitments play an important role in the formation of Commission officials’ 
preferences (Döring 2007; Hooghe 2001; 2005; Thomson 2008; Wonka 2007). 
Proponents of rational choice approaches to political science suggest that this 
need not be a problem if these simplifying assumptions are used to generate 
hypotheses that can make predictions and generate useful insights across sets of 
empirical cases (see Friedman 1953, p. 14).10  
 
Hay suggests a more limited, yet potentially useful, role for models based on 
rationalist assumptions. He argues that rational choice approaches have been 
particularly successful at modelling the collective action and informational 
problems that lead to sub-optimal11 collective outcomes, even when individual 
actors behave in rational ways (Hay 2004b, p. 42). Their institutional variants 
have suggested ways that these problems can be overcome by adjusting the rules 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 For a critique of claims that rational choice produces useful predictive models, 
see Green and Shapiro (1994). 
11 The optimal outcome is usually considered to be a Pareto-efficient one. This is 
an outcome where no feasible reallocation can make an individual better off 
without making at least one individual worse off.	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that govern actors’ interactions. For example, the central theme of the collusive 
delegation argument is that the delegation of authority for trade policymaking 
from the member states to the European Commission is desirable. This is 
because it helps to avoid the sub-optimal (from a free trade perspective) 
protectionist trade policies that result from the disproportionate ability of 
protectionist societal interests to lobby elected national politicians. Similarly, 
Moravcsik’s (1998) liberal intergovernmentalism treats European Union 
institutions as functional solutions to collective action problems that facilitate 
cooperation between member states to their mutual benefit.  
 
The normative tilt of the multi-level games and principal-agent approaches is that 
the unique institutional structures of the EU are desirable because they promote 
greater economic openness than would otherwise be the case (a point made 
explicitly by Hanson 1998). Whether or not one agrees with this particular 
normative perspective, rational choice institutionalist approaches may provide 
useful heuristic devices for exploring hypothetical situations in which actors 
behave in goal-oriented and rational ways. Further, they may be able to suggest 
ways in which the outcomes of such situations might be improved by adjusting 
the institutional rules of the game (Hay 2005a; 2004b).  
 
However, in the existing rational choice institutionalist literature on the EU’s 
external economic policy, rational choice assumptions are cast not just as an 
analytical device for exploring particular hypothetical scenarios. Rather, they are 
used also as simplified theoretical models out of which general hypotheses 
applicable across different cases of EU external economic policymaking can be 
generated. Further, in a large number of cases, the multi-level games and 
principal-agent approaches have been deployed to explain particular instances of 
EU external economic policymaking in order to understand specific policy 
outputs (see, inter alia, da Conceição 2010; Delreux and Kerremans 2010; 
Elgström and Frenhoff Larsén 2010; Meunier 2007; da Conceição-Heldt 2011; 
Elsig 2010; Elsig 2007b).  
 
When these approaches are deployed in such a way, the implausible nature of 
their assumptions becomes more problematic. Hay (2004b) makes the germane 
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point that it is difficult to claim to have explained a particular outcome ‘by 
appealing to a stylized and formal model whose assumptions we freely admit are 
implausible or, worse still, demonstrably false’ (p. 48). However, while these 
implausible assumptions are problematic in themselves, the main line of criticism 
here is that an analytical framework based on rationalist assumptions has 
difficulties generating satisfactory responses to research questions that look at 
the emergence and evolution of particular policy outputs over time. There are 
two reasons for this. 
 
First, rational choice approaches rely on changes to a relatively narrow range of 
contextual variables to explain policy change. The principal-agent and multi-
level games approaches rely almost exclusively on changes to EU-level 
institutional structures to account for policy change. As a result, they struggle to 
deal with policy changes that cannot be directly linked to shifts in EU-level 
institutional rules. Scholars using principal-agent and multi-level games 
approaches are subsequently often forced to incorporate into their analysis 
variables that are exogenous to these theoretical models – such as ideational 
change within the Commission (Elsig 2007b, p. 942) or changes in the EU’s 
external environment (Meunier 2007, p. 920-1) – in order explain particular 
policy outputs or changes. Although they may appeal to a more complex range of 
explanatory variables, interest-based explanations of policy change follow a 
similar logic whereby policy change can only be explained by periodic changes 
in the context in which policymakers are placed. 
 
Second, because these approaches link policy outputs to a relatively narrow 
range of contextual variables, they make blunt tools when it comes to explaining 
the complexities and subtleties of specific policy outputs. Again, this is 
particularly the case in relation to the dominant rational choice institutionalist 
literatures. The institutional changes that these theoretical approaches invoke as 
explanatory variables – changes to the voting rules in the Council or to the 
degree of autonomy of the Commission – are primarily linked to the degree of 
liberalism or protectionism of the EU’s external economic policy. As such, these 
approaches struggle to explain aspects of EU external economic policy – such as 
the pursuit of bilateral trade agreements (see Heron and Siles-Brügge 2012), the 
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external promotion of regionalism, or the provision of development assistance – 
that cannot be easily linked back to broad liberal or protectionist dispositions. 
Similarly, these approaches have little to say about how the EU develops 
strategies for achieving its external economic aims, how contradictions in 
policies and strategies may develop over time, or how this might affect outcomes 
as policies are implemented. 
 
These problems with regard to explaining particular policy processes and 
changes stem from what Hay (2004b) refers to as rational choice theory’s 
‘ingenious, paradoxical, and seldom acknowledged structuralism’ (p. 39). In a 
nutshell, his argument is that although choice is supposedly at the centre of the 
rational choice ontology, there is no room for agency in an analysis informed by 
rationalist assumptions. Actors’ preferences over outcomes are treated as fixed 
and given and they are seen as reacting to the stimulus of the context in which 
they are placed in a strategic and goal-oriented fashion in pursuit of those 
preferences. In situations where there is only one ‘rational’ course of action – as 
is assumed in most contexts (Hay 2004b, p. 39) – actors’ behaviour can be read 
off as a mechanical, predictable and unproblematic reaction to the context in 
which they are placed. In such a model, changes in behaviour and outcomes can 
only come from an exogenous shock that somehow shifts the context in which 
actors are placed and therefore alters their strategic calculations. 
 
The empirical and analytical puzzle identified in the introduction to this thesis is 
a process of evolutionary policy change that I will characterise as complex, open 
and replete with tensions and inconsistencies. My argument here is that accounts 
based on rational choice assumptions are unlikely to provide satisfactory 
explanations to the central research questions of this thesis. 
 
2.5 Institutions and Ideas in Processes of Historical Change 	  In	  the	  second	  half	  of	  this	  chapter	  I	  make	  the	  case	  for	  a	  logic	  of	  explanation	  that	  rests	  upon	  a	  more	  plausible	  set	  of	  assumptions	  about	  the	  workings	  of	  the	   social	  world	   than	   those	   encountered	   above	   and	   that	   provides	   a	   better	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starting	   point	   from	   which	   to	   analyse	   complex	   processes	   of	   EU	   external	  economic	  policy	  change.	  The	   logic	  of	  explanation	  presented	  here	  combines	  historical	  institutionalist	  insights	  with	  a	  constructivist	  ontology.	  	  Before	  laying	  out	  in	  detail	  the	  logic	  of	  explanation	  advanced	  in	  this	  thesis,	  it	  is	   important	   to	   set	   the	   constructivist	   approach	   adopted	   here	   within	   the	  wider	   constructivist	   international	   relations	   literature	   and	   in	   particular	   to	  distinguish	   it	   from	   the	   approach	   most	   commonly	   associated	   with	  international	   relations	   constructivism,	   that	   of	   Alexander	   Wendt	   (1992;	  1994;	   1999).	   Wendt	   famously	   challenged	   the	   materialism	   of	   neorealist	  international	  relations	  theories	  with	  his	  claim	  that	  ‘the	  key	  structures	  in	  the	  state	   system	   are	   intersubjective	   rather	   than	   material’	   and	   that	   ‘state	  identities	   and	   interests	   are	   in	   important	   part	   constructed	   by	   social	  structures’	  (Wendt	  1994,	  p.	  385).	  In	  a	  useful	  taxonomy	  of	  the	  wide	  variety	  of	  perspectives	   taken	   by	   constructivist	   scholars	   in	   political	   science,	   Rawi	  Abdelal	   and	   his	   colleagues	   (2010)	   label	   Wendt’s	   approach	   ‘the	   path	   of	  meaning’	   (p.	   8).	   They	   suggest	   that	   for	   Wendt,	   along	   with	   most	   self-­‐consciously	  constructivist	  scholarship,	  ‘the	  opening	  for	  socially	  constructed	  variation	   in	   action	   lies	   not	   in	   the	   unpredictability	   or	   complexity	   of	   the	  material	  world	   but	   in	   its	   inert,	   almost	  meaningless	   relationship	   to	   human	  existence	   and	   choice’	   (Abdelal	   et	   al.	   2010,	   p.	   8-­‐9).	   Colin	   Hay	   (2002)	  identifies	  structuralist	   tendencies	  within	   this	  approach	   to	  constructivism	  –	  indeed,	  Wendt	  labels	  his	  own	  approach	  ‘structural	  idealism’	  (Wendt	  1999,	  p.	  1).	  Hay	  suggests	  that	  the	  focus	  of	  Wendt’s	  approach	  on	  the	  internalisation	  of	  intersubjective	  norms	  tends	  to	  present	  a	  static	  view	  of	  social	  construction	  in	  which	   it	   is	  unclear	  how	  states	  might	  challenge	  or	  step	  outside	  of	   the	  these	  shared	   norms,	   or	   indeed	   how	   these	   norms	   might	   change	   over	   time	   (Hay	  2002,	  p.	  200).	  	  In	  adopting	  a	   constructivist	   approach	   in	   this	   thesis,	   I	   aim	   to	  move	  beyond	  the	   structuralism	   of	   the	   ‘path	   of	   meaning’	   and	   instead	   to	   adopt	   a	  constructivist	   ontology	   that	   stresses	   the	   dynamic	   interplay	   between	  structure	   and	   agency	   and	   between	   the	   material	   and	   ideational.	   The	  
	   55	  
approach	   that	   I	   adopt	   here,	   then,	   is	  more	   in	   line	  with	   those	   constructivist	  political	   economists	   and	   institutionalists	   (Blyth	   2002;	   2011;	   Hay	   2004a;	  Schmidt	  2011)	  that	  follow	  the	  so-­‐called	   ‘path	  of	  uncertainty’	  (Abdelal	  et	  al.	  2010,	  p.	  11).	  Here,	  space	  for	  the	  role	  of	  ideas	  is	  created	  not	  by	  the	  inertia	  of	  the	   material	   and	   institutional	   landscapes	   in	   which	   actors	   are	   placed,	   but	  rather	  by	  the	  fundamental	  uncertainty	  of	  these	  structural	  environments.	  In	  this	  understanding	  –	   further	  elaborated	  below	  –	  material	   and	   institutional	  constraints	  exist	  and	  shape	  the	  context	  for	  human	  action	  in	  important	  ways,	  but	   they	   do	   not	   fully	   determine	   this	   action.	   Because	   the	   material	   and	  institutional	  structures	   in	  which	  political	  agents	  operate	  are	  uncertain	  and	  ambiguous,	   these	   agents	   must	   develop	   reflexive	   understandings	   and	  interpretations	  of	  these	  structures	  in	  order	  to	  decide	  how	  to	  act.	  	  	  While	   agents	  may	   act	   in	   accordance	  with	   strategies	   designed	   to	  maximise	  their	  material	   interests	   in	   such	   uncertain	   contexts,	   both	   the	  way	   in	  which	  these	   interests	   are	   defined	   and	   perceptions	   of	   the	   best	   strategies	   for	  achieving	   them	   are	   based	   on	   the	   reflexive	   understandings	   of	   individual	  agents.	  In	  this	  sense,	  unlike	  a	  number	  of	  existing	  constructivist	  approaches	  to	  EU	  external	  relations	  (see	  Chapter	  Three),	   the	  approach	  presented	  here	  does	  not	   create	   a	   clear	  distinction	  or	  hierarchy	  between	   agents’	   ideas	   and	  their	  interests.	  Rather	  it	  suggests	  that	  reflexive	  understandings	  must	  be	  used	  in	   order	   to	   give	   content	   to	   perceived	   interests	   and	   to	   determine	   the	   best	  strategies	  for	  achieving	  them	  within	  an	  uncertain	  structural	  context.	  	  This	  constructivist	  ontology	  creates	  space	  for	  the	  agency	  of	  reflexive	  human	  actors	   and	   thus	   also	   stresses	   the	   contingent	   and	   open-­‐ended	   nature	   of	  processes	   of	   political	   change	   (Hay	   2002,	   p.	   201).	   As	   such,	   it	   provides	   an	  appropriate	   foundation	   on	   which	   to	   base	   the	   analysis	   of	   a	   process	   of	  complex	  European	  policy	  change	  over	  time.	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Historical Institutionalism: Calculus versus Cultural Variants 
 
Historical institutionalism emerged in the 1970s as a reaction to the dominance 
of behaviouralism at that time. Its proponents wished to bring a critical 
examination of the state and its institutions back into the study of comparative 
politics and international relations (Schmidt 2006; see for example Hall 1986; 
Katzenstein 1985; Pierson 1994; Evans et al. 1985; Krasner 1984).  
 
The key feature that sets historical institutionalism apart from the rational choice 
institutionalist literature is its rejection of the functionalist view of institutional 
creation in favour of the view that institutions emerge in particular social and 
historical circumstances and are embedded in historical processes. Historical 
institutionalism has contributed the important insight that time and sequencing 
are crucial elements of social processes and that the initial causes of social 
phenomena may have important effects long after these causes cease to exist. 
That is, social processes are path dependent; the order in which things happen 
matters; and the course and institutional accretions of past events condition the 
trajectory of events in the future. 
 
Hall and Taylor (1996) famously divided the historical institutionalist literature 
into those taking a ‘calculus’ (rationalist) or  a ‘cultural’ (sociological) approach 
to the relationship between actors and their institutional context. The calculus 
variant of historical institutionalism has tended to dominate (Hay 2005b, p. 111).  
 
Using an analogy with the economic literature on technological innovation 
(Thelen 2003, p. 219), proponents of the calculus approach view the creation of 
institutions as the partially random outcome of a set of idiosyncratic events at a 
particular historical juncture (Pierson 2000; 2004, p. 18). They then argue that 
once a particular institutional path has been established, feedback effects 
structure the incentives faced by rational actors in ways that encourage a 
continuation down the same path (Pierson 2000; 2004). As a result, historical 
institutionalist approaches in this mould have tended to emphasise the 
‘stickiness’ of institutions once they are in place, with the possibility that the 
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enduring institutions will be inefficient (Kay 2005, p. 568). The central 
contribution of this brand of historical institutionalism and a key aim behind this 
research agenda has been to explain cross-national policy difference in the face 
of international systemic pressures that encourage policy convergence (Thelen 
and Steinmo 1992, p. 10; see for example Hall and Soskice 2001).  
 
The argument that institutions are difficult to change or destroy once they are in 
place presents obvious questions about when, why and how institutions might be 
altered. Historical institutionalists have attempted to address this problem by 
adopting a ‘punctuated equilibrium’ (Krasner 1988) model of institutional 
change, in which periods of relative institutional continuity are interrupted by 
brief periods of significant institutional change. It has been argued that this 
model is too contingent at the front end and too deterministic at the back end 
(Thelen 2003, p. 219), resulting in a situation in which ‘institutions explain 
everything until they explain nothing’ (Thelen and Steinmo 1992, p. 15). 
Furthermore, these models struggle to locate and explain the causes of the 
institutional crises that generate change (Schmidt 2006, p. 105).  
 
A number of critics also point out that using the economic literature on 
technological innovation to throw light on political institutions is a big stretch. 
They argue that political actors are rarely presented with a blank slate on which 
to create new institutions and that institutional design and innovation does not 
generally involve small, unintentional and random actions with significant 
lasting consequences (Kay 2005, p. 563; Thelen 2004, p. 34). Further, periods of 
supposed stasis between critical junctures might actually be much less ‘static’ 
than historical institutionalists allow. Empirical research suggests that 
institutional survival is often dependent on the gradual evolution of institutions 
and their adaptation to new circumstances (Streeck 2001, p. 31; Thelen 2003, p. 
211). Some scholars committed to a punctuated equilibrium model of 
institutional change concede that there can be some limited institutional 
adaptation between ‘punctuations’ (for example Pierson 2004, p. 51-3) but these 
authors have no mechanism to explain these evolutionary processes. 
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The ‘cultural’ variant of historical institutionalism, which draws on the 
assumptions of sociological institutionalism, offers an alternative to the calculus 
theorists’ conception of the relationship between actors and their institutional 
context. In this approach, actors follow a ‘logic of appropriateness’ rather than a 
‘logic of instrumentality’. Instead of determining behaviour through an incentive 
structure for rational utility-maximising actors, institutions are seen as 
conditioning behaviour by providing the cognitive scripts, categories and models 
that make certain actions permissible or otherwise (Hall and Taylor 1996, p. 
948).  
 
This approach offers few solutions to the explanation of change and tends to 
replace the instrumental determinism of rationalism with cultural determinism 
(Schmidt 2006, p. 108-9). If institutions embody the cultural identities and 
meanings that construct actors, it is difficult to see how an actor can step outside 
of this script and embark on alternative courses of action or alter the cultural 
frames and scripts that govern their lives. This leaves little room for agency in 
either policymaking or institutional change. 
 
The Logics of Institutionalist and Ideational Explanation12 
 
In their critique of Hall and Taylor’s (1996) characterisation of the historical 
institutionalist literature, Hay and Wincott (1998, p. 951) contend that a 
disservice is done to historical institutionalism by reconstructing it in terms of 
‘calculus’ and ‘cultural’ approaches. Rather, they suggest that historical 
institutionalism can be better served by emphasising the distinctive nature of the 
relationship between structure and action that defines its approach to political 
analysis (Hay and Wincott 1998, p. 953).  
 
As part of a project to develop a typology of explanations of human action, Craig 
Parsons (2007) attempts to delineate what it is that is distinctive about 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Elements of this section are reproduced in a joint paper written by Tony Heron 
and myself and presented at the Sheffield Political Economy Research Institute 
(SPERI) Annual Conference, Beyond Austerity versus Growth, 1-3 July 2013 
(Heron and Murray-Evans 2013). 
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institutionalist (as opposed to structural, ideational and psychological) 
explanations in political analysis. I present this typology and its institutional and 
ideational ‘logics of explanation’ here in order to delineate the core features of 
institutionalist approaches and to provide a starting point for a proposed logic of 
explanation that incorporates both ideas and path-dependent institutions. 
 
Under Parsons’ (2007) institutional logic of explanation, ‘The setting-up of 
certain intersubjectively present institutions channels people unintentionally in 
certain directions at some later point’ (p. 67). He defines institutions broadly, as 
‘any enduring pattern of behaviour among a group of people’ (Parsons 2007, p. 
66). This encompasses formal organisations and rules as well as informal rules, 
norms and shared – intersubjective – meanings. Particular ideas, then, may 
become embedded and institutionalised within regularised patterns of human 
behaviour.  
 
Under this logic, institutions represent path-dependent structures – in the sense 
that early contingent choices and actions alter the constraints and incentives for 
later decisions in unintended ways (Parsons 2007, p. 72). The institutional logic 
of explanation is distinguished from a structural logic, according to Parsons, in 
that the primary structures that shape human action under the former are human-
made organisations, whereas under latter they are conceptualised as ‘material’ 
structures (Parsons 2007, p. 68). Importantly, under Parsons’ (2007, p. 99-100) 
institutional logic of explanation, institutions shape the environment in which 
actors are placed in a relatively unambiguous fashion and actors’ responses to 
them are treated as objective and unproblematic.  
 
Parsons delineates his ‘ideational’ logic of explanation as separate but potentially 
complementary to the institutional logic. The ideational logic explains ‘actions as 
a result of people interpreting their world through certain ideational elements’ 
(Parsons 2007, p. 96). These ideational elements comprise practices, symbols, 
norms, grammars, models, beliefs, ideas, and/or identities. He notes that his 
definitions of ideational elements and institutions overlap. Whether a logic of 
explanation is ideational or institutional, then, depends on the way in which these 
elements relate to action (Parsons 2007, p. 99-100). Under an institutional logic, 
	  60	  
actors relate to their institutional context in a way that is objective; that is, 
unproblematic and in line with rationalist expectations. Under an ideational 
logic, actors relate to their institutional context in a way that is interpretive and 
reflexive. 
 
Combining Institutional and Ideational Logics of Explanation 
 
Parsons hints that it is possible to combine his institutional and ideational logics 
of explanation when he says: 
 
If practices, norms, symbols, and so on can relate to action in different 
ways, then the same practice, norm, or symbol might affect some people 
in an institutional way and others in an ideational way […and] these 
dynamics could run parallel to each other vis-à-vis the same individual 
(Parsons 2007, p. 100-1). 
 
However, he criticises existing attempts to combine these logics for seeming to 
‘move fairly opportunistically between institutional and ideational arguments’ 
(Parsons 2007, p. 88). And further he suggests that ‘sometimes they advance 
claims about how institutions and ideational factors cause certain actions without 
being explicit about how we would know when and how much action reflects 
one or the other’ (Parsons 2007, p. 89).  
 
One contribution that seemed to address this problem is Mark Blyth’s (2002) 
ambitious and influential book, Great Transformations. Blyth offers a sequential 
model of ideas and institutions, which follows a punctuated equilibrium 
conceptualisation of change (Hay 2004a, p. 205). The argument that Blyth puts 
forward is that stable institutional regimes are made possible by ideational 
consensus around their utility. However, during periodic breakdowns of capitalist 
economies, spells of  ‘Knightian’ uncertainty emerge, in which actors are unsure 
of their interests and crucial ideational battles over the building of new 
institutions take place (Blyth 2002, p. 32-3; Knight 2009 [1921]).  
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Blyth clearly sets out different points in time at which people relate to their 
environment via something resembling Parsons’ institutional and ideational 
logics. At some times the relationship between institutions and actions is 
relatively straightforward and unambiguous. At others, in periods of crisis and 
uncertainty, action is the result of interpretation and contending ideas.  
 
Blyth has been criticised for failing to specify where actors’ ideas come from 
during times of uncertainty (Hay 2004a). Moreover, Blyth’s assertion that ideas 
only matter during times of crisis betrays an ontological inconsistency in as 
much he seems to be saying that at some points actors are reflexive agents while 
at others they respond to institutional structures with a high degree of 
automaticity (Siles-Brügge 2014a, p. 34). This speaks to a broader critique of 
many constructivist approaches that seek to combine ‘ideational elements’ with 
other explanatory logics and in which ideas are introduced as a way of ‘filling in 
the gaps’ and explaining the leftover variance from rationalist accounts (Siles-
Brügge 2014a, p. 34; Hay 2004a; Blyth 2011). 
 
My aim in developing a logic of explanation that incorporates both institutions 
and ideas is not to delineate the circumstances in which one of these logics 
provides better explanations than the other, and vice versa. Rather, it is to 
suggest a logic of explanation in which these two elements can be incorporated 
in an ontologically consistent way and in so doing to create a framework of 
assumptions that allows a better understanding of complex and evolutionary 
processes of historical change.  
 
In Blyth’s (2011) later work, he presents a case for ‘viewing ideas as 
fundamental to both the nature of human action and causation’ (p. 83). Blyth 
makes this case at the level of ontology, suggesting that conventional logics of 
explanation which assume ‘a world that is usually in equilibrium, where causes 
are linear, where change comes from exogenous variables, and where outcomes 
are normally distributed’ (p. 85, emphasis in original) may fundamentally 
misrepresent the nature of the social world.  These conventional logics, he 
concludes, provide dangerously misleading explanations and predictions of the 
world’s workings.  
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Where Blyth’s earlier work stressed uncertainty in the context of economic 
crisis, his later contribution suggests that uncertainty is a feature of all social 
interactions (see Siles-Brügge 2014a, p. 34). He suggests that contrary to the set 
of assumptions that underpin most social science research (see above) ‘we live in 
a world that is actually disequilibrial and dynamic, where causes are endogenous 
and non-linear, and the outcomes of interest are not normally distributed’ (Blyth 
2011, p. 87). This picture is further complicated by the interdependence of 
subject and object in the social world and the feedback loops that link them 
together. That is, the ideas that human actors hold about how the world works 
and their subsequent actions can alter the way that the world itself works (Blyth 
2011, p. 92; this point is also made by Hay 2002, p. 212). 
 
Blyth suggests that the existential world is fundamentally uncertain and that 
human agents must use ideas both to interpret this world and to construct some 
stability within it. People cope with the fundamental uncertainty of the social 
world by creating shared and relatively stable institutions – ‘norms, conventions, 
schemas, and ideologies, collective products that make the world hang together’ 
(Blyth 2011, p. 95-6). 
 
Taking Blyth’s assertion that the social world is essentially uncertain as a starting 
point, I add to this the idea that the institutions created by humans within this 
uncertain context are path dependent. Colin Hay and Daniel Wincott’s (1998) 
definition of path dependence gets us beyond a narrow sense of a process 
whereby initial moves in one direction elicit further moves in that same direction 
(see for example Pierson 2004). They define the workings of path dependence 
thus:   
 
The order in which things happen affects how they happen; the trajectory 
of change up to a certain point itself constrains the trajectory after that 
point; and the strategic choices made at a particular moment eliminate 
whole ranges of possibilities from later choices while serving as the very 
condition of existence of others (Hay and Wincott 1998, p. 955).  
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The logic of explanation that I propose here differs from Parsons’ institutional 
logic in that I disagree with the claim that once path-dependent institutions are 
set in place their relationship with action is an objective one that can be 
explained by rationalist expectations about actor behaviour. Rather, institutional 
norms, understandings, practices or organisations can be intersubjectively 
present and exhibit a path-dependent logic, while at the same time providing 
enough ambiguity and uncertainty to allow contrasting interpretations and 
responses by different actors.  The work of Colin Hay (2002) on the relationship 
between structure and agency (or ‘context’ and ‘conduct’ as he puts it) serves to 
clarify the point. Hay (2002) suggests that political institutions, practices, 
routines, and conventions are ‘strategically and discursively selective’ (p. 212-5). 
By this, he means that the institutional context favours some cognitive 
orientations and behavioural responses over others, but it by no means 
determines how actors will choose to behave (Hay 2002, p. 212).  
 
In this way, the social institutions created through the agency of past actors 
provide structures that constrain and enable actors in the present moment, but at 
the same time these constraints are themselves open to interpretation by reflexive 
human agents. As such, past institutions are not so much ‘material’ and 
determining, but rather uncertain and indeterminate contexts for action. These 
contexts seem at some times ‘partial, fragile, and contingent’ (Blyth 2011, p. 94) 
and at others more solid and taken for granted, but fundamentally they are 
constructed and maintained through human action and therefore subject to 
change through that action.  
 
I turn now to the implications of this combined ideational and institutional logic 
in relation to (a) processes of change and the emergence of institutional 
complexity; and (b) the operation of power relations and the role of discursive 
strategies within these. 
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Ideas and Institutional Change: The Emergence of Complexity and 
Contradiction 
 
In more recent years, historical institutionalists have made an implicit move 
away from ‘punctuated equilibrium’ models of institutional change and towards 
evolutionary conceptions of processes of change. Orion Lewis and Sven Steinmo 
highlight two key changes in the historical institutionalist literature in this regard: 
 
First, new institutionalists have developed a less reductionist perspective 
on institutions and view them as “complexes” of rules rather than unified, 
seamless, and consistent constraints. Second, institutionalists, instead of 
focusing exclusively on either structure or agency, contend that 
interactions between the two drive change (Lewis and Steinmo 2012, p. 
324). 
 
Such developments are to be welcomed, but some contributions in this vein 
continue to struggle to explain institutional change without reference to 
exogenous shocks.  
 
Kathleen Thelen (1999; 2003; 2004) has been at the forefront of efforts to 
address the problems encountered by historical institutionalists in explaining 
political change. She argues that processes of continuity and change should be 
viewed as fundamentally connected. By this logic, if we can better understand 
the exact mechanisms through which institutions are reproduced over time, we 
will also be able to understand the events that might interrupt or alter such 
mechanisms and bring about institutional change (Thelen 1999, p. 399). This 
leads her to argue that institutions are the object of ongoing political contestation. 
They endure when the coalitions of interest groups that underpin them remain 
stable and ‘changes in the political conditions on which institutions rest are what 
drive changes in the form institutions take and the functions they perform in 
politics and society’ (Thelen 2004, p. 31).  
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It remains unclear in Thelen’s approach, however, how the process of change is 
instigated (Schmidt 2006, p. 106). Although she sometimes mentions 
institutional ‘innovators’ her explanations often seem to rest on an external shock 
that shifts the make-up of interest groups or that brings about new political or 
economic imperatives. What is more, if institutions are simply a reflection of 
underlying societal interests then it seems that this approach may have lost the 
most distinctive feature of historical institutionalism – its emphasis on the path-
dependent nature of institutions. 
 
Recent evolutionary understandings of institutional change offer a different way 
of thinking about the interactions between institutional structures and agents and 
continuity and change. Blyth suggests that the essence of biological evolutionary 
change is ‘the coevolution of organisms and environment, how they (re)act back 
upon one another’ (2011, 97). He claims that this can also be applied to the social 
world. Specifically, Blyth argues that interactions between human agents at the 
micro-level produce results at the macro-level that are unintended and not 
reducible to the sum of those actions:   
 
Social systems are most definitely complex adaptive systems replete with 
feedback loops, unintended consequences, and nonlinear dynamics (Blyth 
2011, p. 98). 
 
In this way, institutionalised patterns of action interact with a network of other 
institutionalised patterns of action to shape the world in unpredictable ways. 
Within this changing context, particular institutions may become more or less 
well adapted, useful or appropriate over time. 
 
The key point here is that the wider context in which particular institutional 
structures are placed changes over time and does so in unpredictable ways. 
Purposive agents can react reflexively to maintain or change institutional 
structures in the context of broader changes in the social world. Institutional 
change, then, resides in the ongoing interaction between institutional structures 
and agency, mediated by the ideas and strategies of particular human agents and 
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in the context of wider emergent processes of social change (Béland and Cox 
2011; Hay 2011, p. 68). 
 
Within this context, the important insight for the purposes of this thesis is that 
processes of institutional change are path dependent, contingent and complex. As 
Hay (2002, p. 212) suggests, actors’ imperfect understanding of the complex and 
uncertain context in which they are placed means that their behaviour is likely to 
transform that context in partial and unintended ways. This process is illustrated 
in Figure 2.1. Actors’ partial and unintended transformations of their institutional 
context may well over time contribute to patterns of institutional complexity, the 
layering of institutional structures (see Thelen 1999), and perhaps patterns of 
incoherence within or between institutional structures. In the context of 
policymaking, actors face the difficult task of articulating coherent policy aims, 
tools and narratives that align with their ideas and preferences, within complex 
and ambiguous institutional environments. Institutional path dependencies may 
constrain policy choices and create unexpected contradictions and tensions as 
policies are formulated and deployed by purposive agents. 	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Figure 2.1: Institutions, agents and ideas in complex processes of historical 
change (source: author’s interpretation). 	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Power, Discursive Action and the Strategic Invocation of Institutional 
Constraints13 
 
A number of historical and constructivist institutionalists have been influenced 
by Marxist and other critical approaches in their focus on the importance of 
power in the way that agents and structures interact (Schmidt 2006, p. 104). They 
argue that the struggle for power and resources remains crucial in politics (Hall 
1992, p. 94-5) and that actors create policies and institutions with the intention of 
furthering particular (perceived) interests (Rothstein 1992, p. 35). In this view, 
institutions are not neutral devices for aggregating interests or solving collective 
action problems, but rather structures consciously created by actors seeking to 
promote their (perceived) interests (Hall and Taylor 1996, p. 937-8). 
 
Following these insights it is reasonable to argue that the differing institutionally 
prescribed positions of agents and their varying levels of access to material 
resources are central to any understanding of political processes. Those with 
privileged institutional positions and greater access to material resources have a 
distinct advantage when it comes to realising their political aims (Hall 1992, p. 
95; Hay 2011, p. 69; Hay and Wincott 1998, p. 956).  
 
However, here too there is contingency in that powerful actors’ success will 
always depend on their ability to design and implement effective strategies for 
achieving their aims. Likewise, those with greater access to material or 
institutional resources may be able to structure the context in which other actors 
must make strategic decisions, providing incentives or constraints to encourage 
less powerful actors to behave in certain ways. Less powerful actors, however, 
retain some degree of autonomy to respond to those incentives and constraints in 
ways that they choose based on their interpretations of the choice set available to 
them (see my discussion of African agency in Chapter Six). In addition, 
constructivists argue that agents’ power is at least partly a function of their 
ability to effectively deploy discursive capabilities to influence other actors’ 
behaviour through persuasion. Vivien Schmidt (2011), for example, argues that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Elements of this section are reproduced in Heron and Murray-Evans (2013).  
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power derives not only from actors position and material resources but also from 
their purpose, ‘since actors’ ideas and discourse might reinforce or undermine 
the power they derive from their position’ (p. 60).  
 
Gabriel Siles-Brügge (2014a, p. 34-5), however, argues that while many 
constructivists have made a convincing case that ideas per se matter, they have 
paid less attention to accounting for the success (or otherwise) of particular 
ideational constructions and the role of power in shaping these processes. This 
has led to the accusation from historical materialists that constructivists are 
‘unable to explain why a particular set of ideas became part of the structure and 
not another, rival set of ideas’ (Bieler and Morton 2008, cited in Siles-Brügge 
2014a, p. 35). In this section I seek to explore how the logic of explanation 
outlined above might make a contribution to addressing this problem. 
 
Ben Rosamond (2000a, p. 10) distinguishes between the ‘reflexive’ dimension of 
discourse, that is agents’ internalised beliefs and understandings, and its 
‘strategic’ dimension, which concerns the use of discourse in pursuit of particular 
ends-oriented strategies.	   In a central contribution to the economic constructivist 
literature, Colin Hay and Ben Rosamond (2002) build upon this distinction in 
order to analyse the ‘discursive construction of economic imperatives’ (p. 147) 
as a persuasive rhetorical strategy. Hay and Rosamond contend that while actors’ 
interests themselves are constructed via their interpretations of their material 
context, they are also able to employ strategic rhetorical tactics as part of 
deliberate ends-oriented actions to further their (perceived) interests. 
 
The crux of Hay and Rosamond’s (2002) argument is that policymakers can and 
do use rhetorical strategies that appeal to a particular interpretation or 
construction of contingent and ambiguous economic phenomena as immutable 
‘material’ imperatives. They do this in order predetermine choices, close down 
alternatives and make the case for painful, controversial change or reform. The 
authors make a range of suggestions about what factors might influence the type 
of strategic rhetorical appeal to processes of globalisation and Europeanisation 
used by different actors, but they do not tackle an ancillary question relating to 
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when these rhetorical appeals might be more or less successful in influencing the 
behaviour of the target audience. 
 
To provide an explanation of the success or failure of particular rhetorical 
strategies – and to understand how this relates to the strategic invocation of 
institutional (as opposed to economic) constraints – it is useful to incorporate 
elements of Frank Schimmelfennig’s (2001) theory of ‘rhetorical action’. 
Schimmelfennig uses this theory to understand the eastern enlargement of the 
European Union, which seemed to go against the egoistic preferences of 
powerful EU member states. He argues that those member states with a 
preference for enlargement were able to strategically deploy rhetorical appeals to 
established EU norms in order to bring about their desired outcome. Specifically, 
they were able to deploy the shared norm that the EU should constitute a ‘pan-
European community of liberal democratic states’ in order to ‘shame’ the 
opponents of enlargement into norm-conforming behaviour (Schimmelfennig 
2001, p. 48).  
 
Schimmelfennig has been taken to task for ontological inconsistency because 
member states in his framework seem to be at once motivated by materially-
determined interests and the effects of socialisation (Siles-Brügge 2014a, p. 212, 
fn 2.6). However, the key point to take from his work is that norms (and other 
institutions) may be invoked strategically as imperatives for particular types of 
action in the same way as economic imperatives are invoked in Hay and 
Rosamond’s schema. Furthermore, Schimmelfennig contends that such appeals 
to institutional imperatives make for particularly effective rhetorical strategies, 
since they appeal to supposedly legitimate and broadly agreed standards.  
 
In considering the success or otherwise of strategic appeals to external 
institutional constraints, I return to the logic of explanation outlined earlier, and 
in particular to its emphasis on the path-dependent nature of institutions. Indeed, 
this institutional logic is already implicitly present in Schimmelfennig’s (2001) 
model. He argues that the formation of the European Community 
institutionalised a normative commitment to the creation of a community of 
liberal-democratic states across Europe. This cemented in place a path-dependent 
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institutional constraint, whereby this norm remained at the heart of the European 
Community even when it diverged from the preferences of powerful member 
states, as in the case of enlargement. Schimmelfennig’s argument concentrates 
on the ability of those member states with a preference for enlargement to 
successfully invoke this norm in pursuit of their policy aim.  
 
The suggestion here is that where actors’ preferences, and the rhetorical 
strategies they use to pursue them, converge with a widely agreed upon 
institutional norm or rule, these rhetorical strategies are more likely to prove 
persuasive. This is because actors can invoke this institutional norm to paint their 
favoured outcome as not just desirable, but necessary in order to comply with a 
shared and agreed standard or practice.  
 In	   order	   to	   avoid	   the	   ontological	   inconsistencies	   highlighted	   in	  Schimmelfennig’s	  work,	  I	  take	  a	  position	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  ideas	  and	  interests	  that	  is	  closer	  to	  that	  of	  Hay	  and	  Rosamond	  (2002).	  Here,	  while	  actors	  use	  rhetorical	  strategies	   in	  pursuit	  of	   their	   interests,	   these	   interests	  are	   perceived	   as	   opposed	   to	   materially	   given.	   Because	   they	   are	   situated	  within	   uncertain	   material	   and	   institutional	   contexts,	   actors	   must	   use	  reflexive	  understandings	  in	  order	  to	  define	  their	  interests	  and	  to	  decide	  on	  the	  best	  strategies	  to	  pursue	  them.	  	  Further,	   because	   institutional	   norms	   are	   often	   ambiguous	   and	   contested,	  actors	   can	   seize	   upon	   this	   ambiguity	   and	   flux	   to	   construct	   particular	  projections	  and	  interpretations	  as	  convergent	  with	  their	  policy	  preferences. 
However, the path-dependent logic of institutions may affect how well this 
rhetorical appeal to an institutional norm works over time. In the light of the 
complex, changing and uncertain institutional environment described above, 
institutional appeals can all too easily fail to take account of path dependencies 
that shape eventual policy outputs in unintended and contradictory ways. 
Furthermore, path-dependent processes (as well as the evolution of actors’ policy 
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Figure 2.2: Strategic discursive appeals to institutional constraints (source: 
author’s interpretation). 
 
 
preferences) may lead to divergence between policy preferences and institutional 
norms and rules over time, blunting the effectiveness of appeals to institutional 
norms as a rhetorical strategy (see Figure 2.2). I argue in the thesis that EU 
policymakers’ contested and shifting discursive appeals to WTO rules as an 
imperative for the recasting of the EU-ACP relationship are central to explaining 
the eventual limited and uneven reach of the EPA negotiations. 	  
2.6 Conclusion 
 
I began this chapter with the suggestion that rational choice institutionalist 
understandings leave a number of questions unanswered in relation to the central 
puzzles identified in this thesis. Following a review and critique of the rationalist 
literature that dominates accounts of EU external economic relations, I proposed 
an alternative logic of explanation on which to base the analysis in the remainder 
of this thesis.  
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This logic and its central implications can be summarised as follows. The 
framework here combines Parsons’ (2007) institutional and ideational logics of 
explanation in order to generate insights about processes of complex and 
evolutionary institutional change. In so doing it suggests that institutions are 
created to lend order to a world of fundamental uncertainty. These institutions 
include formal organisations and rules as well as informal rules, norms and 
shared meanings. They follow a path-dependent logic that structures the 
environment in which agents are situated in intended and unintended ways. In 
addition, these institutional structures are ‘strategically and discursively 
selective’ (Hay 2002, p. 212-5) rather than fully determinate of the 
interpretations and responses of purposive agents, and as such they are 
ambiguous and open to different interpretations and responses. Agents, then, 
must deploy reflexive ideas in order to make sense of the institutional context in 
which they are placed and develop strategies for action within it.  
 
The key implications of this logic of explanation are twofold. First, the 
interaction between reflexive agents and indeterminate path-dependent 
institutions – located in the context of the wider and changing social system – 
produces contingent and evolutionary institutional change over time. The fact 
that actors have an imperfect understanding of the complex and uncertain context 
in which they operate means that their behaviour is likely to transform that 
context in partial and unintended ways. This process of change may lead to the 
build up of complexity, contradictions and tensions within institutional structures 
and policy outputs over time.  
 
Second, actors operating in an uncertain environment can and do use discursive 
practices strategically – that is, they use them as part of an ends-oriented strategy 
in pursuit of particular goals based on their perceived interests. One such 
discursive strategy that builds credibility and boosts chances of successful 
persuasion is to make strategic appeals to shared institutional rules, norms or 
understandings. Such strategies depend upon the ability of actors to construct a 
plausible degree of convergence between path-dependent and ambiguous 
institutional structures and their preferred policy outcomes or orientations. 
 
	   73	  
I have sought in this chapter to add weight to existing calls for a move beyond 
the dominance of rationalist accounts of the drivers of EU external economic 
policymaking. In so doing, I have offered an account of the way in which 
institutional and ideational logics of explanation can be combined in a way that 
avoids the tendency to see ideas as a way to ‘mop up some unexplained variance 
in a particular outcome of interest’ (Blyth 2011, p. 84). Rather, the argument here 
is that while institutional structures can be treated as intersubjectively present 
and path dependent, they remain ambiguous and open to the competing 
interpretations and responses of individual agents. It is this ambiguity and 
contestability that makes the space for evolutionary and endogenous processes of 
institutional change.  
 
The contribution I hope to make to the existing literature through this chapter 
comes in the claim that the logic of explanation developed here can not only help 
to account for complex processes of institutional change, but can also offer 
insights into the nature and operation of the power relationships between actors 
and the role of discursive strategies in these. In this sense, as well as offering a 
way forward for understanding the limited reach of the EU’s recent attempts to 
impose a particular model of liberal regional governance through its relations 
with the ACP countries, this chapter speaks to broader questions about the 
process through which certain ideas and discursive strategies come to be 
influential. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  74	  
Chapter Three 
The Internal Drivers and External Impact of 
the EU as a Global Actor 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
There are two literatures pertinent to the subject of this thesis whose contribution 
has not yet been considered. These are, on one hand a literature that deals with 
the EU’s role as a global actor and its interregional relations from a largely social 
constructivist perspective, and on the other a literature that offers accounts of 
processes of policy diffusion and rule transfer from the EU to other countries and 
territories. These literatures relate to two puzzles at the heart of this thesis. These 
puzzles are about the drivers of the EU’s decision to recast the EU-ACP 
relationship as a set of ambitious and politically contested interregional FTAs, 
and the modest results that it achieved in the attempted implementation of this 
policy. 
 
As it stands there is little that connects these two literatures: the former focuses 
on the internal drivers of the EU’s role as a global actor while the latter 
concentrates on the external mechanisms and impact of European policy 
diffusion. In this chapter I present a review of these two literatures, and in so 
doing offer an analytical bridge between the somewhat abstract theoretical 
consideration of competing ‘logics of explanation’ in the previous chapter and 
the empirical analysis that comes in Chapters Four to Seven. I also begin to 
outline the fit between the theoretical approach presented in Chapter Two and the 
landscape of these literatures and suggest that this theoretical approach can help 
to draw out links between the internal drivers and external impact of EU external 
relations.  
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I put forward the following argument in this chapter. There is much of value in 
the existing social constructivist literature on EU interregionalism and the EU’s 
global role. For example, part of this literature takes a critical view of European 
attempts to construct its own image as a ‘normative’ actor and does a good job of 
highlighting the relationship between the EU’s (perceived) commercial interests 
and its supposedly normative agenda. However, more could be done here to 
highlight the historical processes through which the EU’s external projections are 
produced and change over time and to consider the specific policy aims and tools 
that emerge from this process of change. The set of contradictions in the 
neoliberal model of development has been well rehearsed – particularly in 
relation to the EPAs (see, for example, Goodison 2007; Hurt 2003; 2012; 
Stoneman and Thompson 2007) – but this is only part of the story. Specifically, 
the way that sometimes contradictory liberal arguments (see Rosamond 2014) 
are incorporated into EU external projections is a contingent process that takes 
place in the context of a range of path dependent institutional structures. This 
suggests a need to comprehend the particular historical path of EU external 
relations and wider European integration in order to understand how neoliberal 
ideas have been incorporated into the European project over time and how this 
plays out in particular policy outputs. 
 
While the key question for most of the existing literature on the EU as a global 
actor concerns the EU’s adoption of a particular normative agenda in its external 
relations, I am also interested in this chapter in how the EU tries to bring this 
about at the level of policy formation and implementation. The existing literature 
on EU rule transfer and policy diffusion has produced interesting insights about 
the different types of material and discursive policy tools deployed by the EU to 
promote external reform. This literature, however, tends to treat these tools as an 
independent variable and to focus on their external impact rather than any 
contingencies in the process through which they are designed and deployed. 
 
Here I argue that the aims and tools of EU external relations need to be seen in 
the light of their generation through particular historically embedded and 
contingent processes internal to the EU. In arguing this, the two analytical 
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puzzles at the heart of this thesis – about the drivers and reach of the EU’s 
evolving agenda for relations with the ACP countries – can be analytically 
linked. Specifically, an approach that emphasises the political contingency and 
historical embeddedness of the EU’s external relations not only provides a more 
convincing explanation of the EU’s external promotion of a liberal and regional 
model of external governance, but also allows us to problematise the process 
through which the EU constructs its strategies for the diffusion of these norms. It 
is the tensions and contradictions that may arise as agents pursue their 
preferences within path-dependent institutional structures that help us to account 
for the limited and uneven reach of EU external projections in some instances. 
 
This chapter proceeds in three sections. First, I review and summarise the 
existing literature on the role and character of the EU as a global actor and EU 
interregionalism, and outline where my theoretical approach fits within this 
literature. Second, I outline the existing literature on EU rule transfer and policy 
diffusion and its contribution to an understanding of the mechanisms that are 
used by the EU in this process and their impact. Third, I highlight the way in 
which links can be drawn between these two separate literatures and analytical 
puzzles in order to understand the limited and uneven reach of EU external 
projections in some cases. 
 
3.2 Interregionalism and the EU’s Global Role 
 
In Chapter Two I critiqued the rational choice literature that dominates 
theoretical accounts of the EU’s external economic policy output. This section 
looks at broader debates about the role and character of the EU as a global actor. 
I focus in particular on social constructivist literature on the EU as a global actor 
and its application to considerations of EU interregionalism and the EPAs.14 This 
literature has sought to supplement or abandon the rationalist assumptions 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  There is a literature that applies the rationalist assumptions associated with the 
principal-agent approach to the case of the EPAs (Carbone 2007; Elgström 
2009a; Elgström and Frenhoff Larsén 2010). Since the rationalist assumptions 
that underpin these approaches were dealt with extensively in Chapter Two, this 
will not be the focus of the present review. 	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associated with the mainstream literature on EU external economic relations. The 
EU’s commitment to interregionalism and the development rhetoric surrounding 
the EPAs has made for a fertile engagement between these empirical events and 
social constructivist notions of the EU as a civilian, or even normative, power 
(Manners 2002; Orbie 2006).  
 
Normative/Civilian Power Europe 
 
Accounts of the EU’s role in international affairs begin, more often than not, by 
citing François Duchêne’s concept of ‘civilian power’ (Orbie 2006; Telò 2007b; 
Manners and Whitman 1998). Duchêne himself referred to civilian power rather 
unevenly in his own work and mainly deployed it as a description of the role the 
EU might one day play in international relations, rather than a fully developed 
concept (Orbie 2006, p. 123-4). But the concept has undergone something of a 
‘renaissance’ (Orbie 2006, p. 123) since the 1990s. Jan Orbie (2006, p. 123-4) 
puts this revival down to Europe’s growing international aspirations in the 
context of a decline in the legitimacy of US power in the international arena. 
 
Duchêne’s notion of civilian power is now perhaps most commonly associated 
with Ian Manners’ (2002; 2008) suggestion that Europe should be considered a 
‘normative power’. This assertion is based on the idea that the combination of 
the EU’s historical context, hybrid polity and legal constitution make it uniquely 
committed to placing universal norms and principles at the centre of its relations 
with the rest of the world (Manners 2002, p. 241). Manners (2002, p. 242-3) 
highlights five ‘core’ norms (peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law and 
human rights) and four ‘minor’ norms (social-solidarity, anti-discrimination, 
sustainable development and good governance) that lie at the heart of the EU’s 
international affairs.  
 
Manners’ framework has been heavily criticised on a number of fronts. He is 
taken to task for lacking historical depth and failing to capture the tension 
between competing principles and competing groups (Falkner 2007, p. 507); 
making an overly congratulatory assessment of the EU’s benevolence (Langan 
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2012, p. 2); reproducing a reductive and binary distinction between norms and 
self-interest (Storey 2006, p. 334);  and failing to identify criteria and standards 
by which elements of EU external policy can be judged to be normative or 
otherwise (Sjursen 2006, p. 235). For these reasons, most of the literature that 
invokes Manners normative power concept avoids his controversial assertion that 
European values are universally applicable or, indeed, that substantive EU 
foreign policy output is always a reflection of some unitary set of EU internal 
norms.  
 
However, the key insight to emerge from Manners’ work is the connection that 
he makes between the normative characteristics of Europe’s presence in global 
affairs and the EU’s form as a distinct institutional and political entity. Ben 
Rosamond has made a similar point, albeit writing from a different perspective. 
He suggests: 
 
The existence of deep integration among European states has had the 
effect of constituting “Europe” as an actor […] but its power operates in 
ways that conventional state-centric conceptions of world order have 
difficulty assimilating (Rosamond 2004, p. 81).  
 
In his more recent writings – here with Owen Parker – Rosamond highlights the 
importance of economic liberalism, or ‘market cosmopolitanism’, as part of this 
post-Westphalian character and a key feature of Europe’s external projections 
(Parker and Rosamond 2013, p. 229). 
 
In the case of the EU’s commitment to an interregional mode of international 
relations, the links between the EU’s internal character and its presence in global 
affairs are clear. Much of the existing literature on EU interregionalism stresses 
the importance of the EU’s institutional structure and normative basis in driving 
its interregionalist external agenda (see, for example, Börzel and Risse 2009; 
Doidge 2011; Elgström 2009b; Faber and Orbie 2009a; Hettne 2005). The broad 
argument in this literature is not so much that European foreign policy reflects 
universally applicable values, but that the EU’s interregional projects are a 
reflection of distinctively European norms and values, which European 
	   79	  
policymakers may or may not believe to be universally applicable. In this 
formulation, the EU has an explicitly regionalist ideology and strategy that drives 
both its internal affairs and its approach to global politics (Hettne 2005, p. 278).  
 
There are three different aspects to this argument about the drivers of 
interregionalism. First, it is often claimed that the EU’s support for regional 
integration rests on a commitment to the rule of law, multilateralism and 
multipolarity. This vision is set up in explicit opposition to the United States’ 
supposedly more ad hoc and hegemonic approach to international relations 
(Farrell 2005, p. 265). In this line of argument, EU officials view regional 
integration, and its promotion through interregionalism, as a building block for 
achieving a peaceful and rules-based international system.  
 
Second, interregionalism is said to provide the EU with a framework through 
which to articulate other external policy objectives. The European project is 
premised on the idea that regional economic integration is a route to conflict 
prevention that has delivered success in the Europe (Kühnhardt 2003, p. 47). It 
therefore follows that regional integration elsewhere offers a tool for the 
promotion of peace, democratic consolidation and good governance (Börzel and 
Risse 2009, p. 289; Holland 2004).  
 
Third, interregionalism has been closely linked to the EU’s policies for 
promoting development and social justice. The idea that openness to global 
markets is crucial for development and poverty reduction has come to dominate 
EU policymaking circles since the early 1990s (see Chapter Four) and regional 
integration and interregionalism are presented as the most effective route for 
developing countries to become integrated into the global economy (Doidge 
2011). The key point here is that the normative underpinnings of the European 
project – with its emphasis on liberal internationalism and the promotion of 
peace, prosperity and social justice through market-based regional integration 
and interregionalism – are the foundations on which EU external economic 
policy has been built. 
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With regard to the Economic Partnership Agreements the idea that an ideological 
consensus within the European Union – or, at least, within the European 
Commission – is driving EU external relations has shaped some interpretations 
of these agreements. Faber and Orbie (2009a, p. 7), for example, argue that the 
EU’s emphasis on reciprocity and development through trade liberalisation in the 
EPAs reflects the post-Cold War international economic consensus (see also 
Faber and Orbie 2009b). But they also stress that there was a ‘distinctly 
“European” ideological flavour’ (Faber and Orbie 2009a, p. 7) to the EU’s 
approach to the EPAs marked by an attempt to export a model of deep 
integration at a regional level and a combination of economic liberalisation with 
regulatory standards. They conclude that: 
 
Confronted with the so-called failure of the Lomé regime which provided 
non-reciprocal market-access, European policy-makers believe[d] that 
ACP countries would benefit from regulatory integration along the lines 
of the EU model (Faber and Orbie 2009a, p. 7).  
 
Writing from a ‘normative institutionalist approach’, Elgström (2009b) makes 
the similar argument that the EU’s approach to the EPAs has been driven by a 
normative consensus in favour of free trade as a development tool within the 
European Commission. 
 
EU Presence and Actorness 
 
The emphasis placed by the extant literature on the EU’s external relations as a 
‘spillover’ effect from its internal organisation and value system helps us to 
understand why European policymakers would seek to support various liberal 
policy reforms in other regions of the world. But this does not necessarily 
explain why the EU has adopted interregionalism as a mechanism for promoting 
a specific set of regional reforms as an explicit policy objective through the 
EPAs – or why it has done so only recently. Indeed, these deliberate efforts at the 
promotion of a liberal regional project beyond the EU’s borders stand in contrast 
to a recent claim by Tobias Lenz (2013) that ‘Europe’s ideational influence on 
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regionalism can be fruitfully understood as the largely indirect process by which 
the EU experience travels to other regions through socialization and emulation’ 
(p. 211).  
 
Consideration of constructivist arguments concerning the EU’s identity as a 
global actor makes a valuable addition here. According to these arguments, the 
EU’s external relations stem not just from its internal norms and identity but are 
also increasingly part of a conscious effort to promote and legitimise the EU’s 
‘presence’ (Allen and Smith 1990) and ‘actorness’ (Sjöstedt 1977; Hill 1993; 
Bretherton and Vogler 1999; for a summary of the literature on actorness, see 
Toje 2008, p. 203-5). As Söderbaum et al. explain: 
 
During the last decade it seems to have become evident in the 
Commission and in leading policy circles that the EU’s increasing 
economic weight and geographical size are linked to an imperative to 
become a global actor by playing a more important political and security 
role in the world. Thus, in order to play such a global role in the world, it 
is necessary that the EU increases its ‘actorness’ and attains the qualities 
of an actor that is capable of making more autonomous foreign policy 
decisions (Söderbaum et al. 2005, p. 371). 
 
This argument suggests that if there is a coherent doctrine at the heart of EU 
external relations, this relates to establishing the EU as an effective and 
legitimate actor on the world stage (Söderbaum et al. 2005, p. 373). The same 
authors point to a striking self-confidence amongst EU policymakers that the 
world is ‘hungry for its presence’ (Söderbaum et al. 2005, p. 371). In a different 
vein, Bicchi (2006) argues that EU foreign policy is best seen as ‘unreflexive 
behaviour mirroring the deeply engrained belief that Europe’s history is a lesson 
for everybody’ (p. 287).  
 
This confidence that the world was ‘hungry for Europe’ among European 
policymakers – at least in the period before the 2008 financial crisis – led to 
attempts to construct the EU as a powerful and significant global actor. The EU’s 
policy of interregionalism and its promotion of a range of supposedly norm-
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based reforms can be viewed as part of this project to portray itself as a 
legitimate, and indeed unique and distinctive, actor in the international arena 
(Aggarwal and Fogarty 2004a, p. 15).  
 
As well as constructing European-style regionalism as an effective and legitimate 
model for export in its own right, the EU deliberately set up its foreign policy 
identity in opposition to the perceived interest-based hegemonic project of the 
United States (Hettne 2005, p. 286). Along these lines, Grugel (2004) argues that 
the EU’s export of its own regional model is an important way of signalling that 
the EU is a different kind of foreign policy actor. In this way, EU 
interregionalism acts as ‘an identity marker of what it perceives as a more 
humane governance model in its relations with the developing world’ (Grugel 
2004, p. 621). In this way, the US is portrayed as a promoter of, ‘(bad material) 
interests, while the EU exports (good moral) values’ (Börzel and Risse 2009, p. 
22).  
 
At the same time as constructing the EU’s identity as a global actor, the 
promotion of regional integration can also be seen as a way of boosting the EU’s 
legitimacy within its own borders. This works both by juxtaposing the European 
identity with regional ‘others’ (Rüland 2010, p. 1278) and through the assertion 
that regionalism is a universally effective and legitimate mode of governance 
(Söderbaum and Van Langenhove 2006). 
 
A problem with Manners’ original ‘normative power Europe’ formulation is that 
his description of the EU’s foreign policy comes very close to the way that the 
EU itself tries to construct its identity as a normative, not to say morally superior, 
international actor (Robles 2008, p. 194; Sjursen 2006, p. 235). As Börzel and 
Risse (2009, p. 22) point out, to accept the juxtaposition between ‘normative’ 
Europe and ‘self-interested’ others is to reify the EU’s own identity construction 
and take it at face value. In a similar vein, Rosamond and Parker (2013) point 
out, ‘normative power Europe’ is better deployed as a critical approach to the 
EU’s external projections as opposed to a ‘distinctive ontological 
characterisation of the EU’ (p. 229).  
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Much of the EPA literature treats the EU’s claims to its normative and 
developmental motivations with a high degree of scepticism. For example Mark 
Langan’s (2012, p. 243) ‘moral economy’ approach claims that the normative 
content of the EU’s discourse about the EPAs shapes its approach by serving as a 
‘legitimisation’ and ‘rationalisation’ of self-interested geopolitical and 
commercial motivations (see also Langan 2011). Andy Storey (2006) adopts the 
language of Manners’ ‘normative power Europe’ framework, but suggests that 
while the EPAs may be driven by norms, these are in fact the highly 
controversial norms of neoliberal governance and globalization rather than 
sustainable development. These critiques of European claims about the 
normative content of its external policies play an important role in sensitising EU 
scholars to the encroachment of economic and commercial imperatives into what 
might otherwise be considered a norm-based policy agenda. 
 
Norms and Commercial Interests 
 
The role of commercial interests in EU external relations has come under heavy 
scrutiny in the context of the Lisbon Agenda, under which increased emphasis 
has been placed on strengthening the EU’s economic power position and 
promoting European ‘competitiveness’ in the global economy (European 
Commission 2006; George et al. 2009, p. 64; Söderbaum et al. 2005, p. 374). In 
terms of external economic policy, the Lisbon Agenda promotes reciprocal, 
bilateral and interregional agreements that aim to not only liberalise trade in 
goods, but also trade in services. It also pushes for the inclusion of so-called 
‘behind-the-border’ issues – to do with government procurement, trade 
facilitation, investment and competition – within these agreements in advance of 
their adoption by the WTO (Heron and Siles-Brügge 2012; Siles-Brügge 2014a).  
 
The EU’s interregional aims can be seen as a strategy to export the regulatory 
norms that govern economic relations within the EU (Farrell 2009, p. 1180). In 
some cases – for example, in Latin America, this desire to cement the EU’s 
economic presence and power in a particular region may be driven by a the aim 
of ‘balancing’ the power of another major global actor, particularly the United 
	  84	  
States (Bajo 1999, p. 930; Hardacre and Smith 2009, p. 176; Roloff 2006, p. 17; 
Söderbaum et al. 2005, p. 374). In the ACP group of countries, the EU’s export 
of its model of economic governance has been seen as a way of exercising 
hegemonic control in order to exploit economic opportunities (Farrell 2005; 
Söderbaum et al. 2005, p. 375). Moreover, by promoting regional institutions and 
the setting of standards in partner regions, the EU can make sure regulatory 
standards for investment and trade in services are set in a way that is compatible 
with existing EU rules and that consequently confers advantages on EU firms 
(Heron and Siles-Brügge 2012; Meunier and Nicolaïdis 2006, p. 913-4). In 
addition, some claim that interregionalism can help to set precedents for future 
bilateral and interregional agreements, and particularly for WTO negotiations 
(Goodison 2007, p. 248; Hardacre and Smith 2009, p. 184). 
 
Söderbaum et al. (2005) and Siles-Brügge (2014a) point out that in its official 
discourse, the EU presents the promotion of its commercial interests as entirely 
compatible with its ‘normative’ agenda of promoting liberal norms through 
interregionalism in pursuit of peace and prosperity in other parts of the world. 
EU discourse states that interregionalism promotes the integration of developing 
countries into the global economy; that it helps to attract foreign direct 
investment (FDI); and that it promotes the efficient use of resources through 
increased competition (European Commission 1995; 2006; 2008a). On the other 
side of this equation, the Commission’s argument is that interregionalism boosts 
European competitiveness by allowing EU firms privileged access to commercial 
opportunities in partner regions and countries.  
 
In relation to the EPAs, this win-win narrative of liberal governance has become 
the focus of extensive critique from various critical perspectives (Flint 2009; 
Girvan 2010; Hurt 2010; 2012; Stoneman and Thompson 2007). It is dismissed 
by several authors as little more than false rhetoric designed to disguise naked 
commercial imperatives (Hurt 2003; Goodison 2007; Langan 2012). Orbie 
(2011, p. 181) suggests that, given the model of economic governance that the 
EU promotes, it should be known as ‘neoliberal power Europe’ rather than 
‘normative power Europe’ (see also Hurt 2012).  
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Reflections the EU as a Global Actor  
 
The conclusions that I draw from the constructivist literature on the EU as a 
global actor are as follows. I reject the notion that the EU as a global actor can be 
characterised only and uniquely as a ‘normative’ actor and that its normative 
concerns are separate from – or more important than – its external commercial 
motivations. I do, however, take on board and concur with claims that economic 
liberalism – and particularly its regionalist variants – have come to be a norm 
that is central to the European project and to the EU’s external trade and 
development policies. Attempts to project a regional model of liberal economic 
governance beyond European borders seem to reflect a genuine internalisation of 
the normative merits of this model amongst European policymakers as well as 
more instrumental efforts to boost the EU’s power and ‘actorness’ on the global 
stage.  
 
I do not go so far as to say that the EU’s external projections can be reduced to a 
cipher for material interests. However, it is clear that the EU’s narrative of 
mutually beneficial interregional liberalisation has strong links with efforts to 
secure commercial gains through the promotion of European regulatory 
standards in key external markets. The argument advanced here is not that 
material interests ‘trump’ normative aims, but that the EU’s material interests are 
not separable from its external projection of a market liberal project. This 
embodies both a set of ideas about the best way to promote European 
competitiveness and interests in the global market and about the mutual benefits 
– including the promotion of development – that can be drawn from 
comprehensive trade liberalisation. 
 
In this thesis I aim to contribute to the existing social constructivist literature on 
the EU as a global actor by stressing, in line with the theoretical approach 
elaborated in Chapter Two, the historical processes through which the EU’s 
external projections are produced and change over time. Moreover, I wish to 
emphasise the contingent and potentially contradictory nature of EU policy aims 
and tools that emerge from this historical process. The suggestion here is that it is 
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useful to trace the specific process through which broadly neoliberal ideas have 
been incorporated into the European project and particular policy processes, aims 
and tools over time. By doing so, it is possible to garner new insights about the 
way in which tensions are generated within EU external projections. In the case 
of the EPAs, these tensions relate in particular to the EU’s efforts to tie together 
commercial, normative and legal imperatives for the external adoption a liberal 
model of regional economic governance within the context of the longstanding 
EU-ACP relationship and the idiosyncratic institutional norms that constitute the 
international regulatory regime for trade (see Chapters Four and Five). 
 
3.3 Understanding the Mechanisms of EU Policy Diffusion 
 
While the literature on the EU as a global actor has produced many useful 
insights about the internal drivers of EU policy output, it has less to say about the 
reach of these policies beyond the EU’s borders. In this section of the chapter, I 
turn to the literature on ‘rule transfer’ (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004) 
and, more broadly, policy diffusion, to EU accession countries and the European 
neighbourhood. 15  While this literature provides a useful starting point for 
considering the mechanisms used by the EU to promote policy diffusion, I 
suggest that it leaves a number of puzzles in relation to the limited reach of EPA-
specific policy diffusion. Here I argue that a consideration of the mechanisms by 
which the EU promotes policy diffusion can be profitably linked back to an 
understanding of the complex and contingent process through which EU external 
projections are formed.  
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 The literature on this topic is extensive. For reasons of space and relevance, I 
limit this review to those works that have made a central contribution to 
theoretical explanations of the successes of EU policy diffusion. Rather than 
explicating the theoretical debate surrounding processes of rule transfer to the 
accession states and beyond, here I am interested in taking this literature as a 
point of departure for an exploration of the mechanisms the EU employs to 
promote external policy reform. 
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Mechanisms for Policy Diffusion and the ‘Rule Transfer’ Literature 
 
The various enlargements of the European Union from an original six members 
to the current 28, and particularly the 2004 and 2007 Eastern enlargements, have 
naturally attracted sustained academic attention. In particular, scholars have 
enquired into the mechanisms by which the EU transfers European rules and 
policies to prospective member states. Studies of EU policy diffusion have also 
looked geographically further afield at the European Neighbourhood Policy, the 
European Economic Area, EU policy towards the Western Balkans and Swiss-
EU bilateralism (Lavenax 2011).  
 
Before addressing the literature, a brief clarification of terminology is necessary. 
Concepts employed in the literature on the EU’s promotion of external policy 
change include ‘Europeanization’ (Grabbe 2006; Hughes et al. 2004; 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004), ‘EU-ization’ (Wallace 2000) and ‘rule 
transfer’ (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004). ‘Europeanization’ as a term is 
rejected here because it has been used to refer to a wide range of processes 
beyond the EU’s promotion of particular policy or legal reforms outside its 
borders (Haughton 2007, p. 233-4). While ‘EU-ization’ is a more precise term, 
this has not garnered much use in the debates explored below (Haughton 2007, p. 
234).  
 
This leaves us with ‘rule transfer’ and this will be used to discuss the literature 
on EU accession and the associated extension of EU rules. However, when the 
broader process by which the EU promotes the reform or introduction of 
particular rules and policies beyond its borders (which includes, but is not limited 
to, rule transfer) is discussed, I use the term ‘policy diffusion’. ‘Policy diffusion’ 
includes the external promotion of certain reforms that may not reflect parts of 
the EU’s existing acquis, or that may not amount to the export of the acquis in its 
entirety. This broader term thus includes processes through which the EU 
promotes liberal trade norms and market integration beyond its borders. 
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Much of the early literature on EU policy diffusion focussed specifically on 
Central and Eastern European candidate countries and adopted what has come to 
be known as an ‘external incentives model of governance’ (Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier 2004, p. 661; see also Kelley 2004; 2006; Schimmelfennig 2005; 
Vachudova 2005). Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier’s (2004, p. 662) influential 
article takes the adoption of EU rules in non-member states (‘rule transfer’) as 
the dependent variable and seeks to explain ‘how rule transfer happens’ using a 
rationalist bargaining model. Their primary conclusion is that, ‘a state adopts EU 
rules if the benefits of EU rules exceed the domestic adoption costs’ 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004, p. 663). They find that the primary 
factors affecting this rational calculation in EU accession states are the credibility 
of membership conditionality – whether states credibly believe they will be 
allowed to become members if they adopt EU rules – and the domestic costs of 
rule adoption (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004).  
 
The premise of the rationalist external incentives model of rule transfer was that 
this process would be most effective in the context of states with a credible 
prospect of gaining EU membership and most significant during the accession 
process. The correlate of this is that rule transfer would be less effective beyond 
the geographical confines of the accession states. In addition, after the accession 
process was completed and membership conditionality was no longer at play, 
there might be backsliding in accession states’ commitment to reform and its 
implementation (Epstein and Sedelmeier 2008, p. 795).  
 
However, the influence of European policy diffusion has been shown to extend 
both temporally and geographically beyond the confines of membership 
conditionality and the accession process (Epstein and Sedelmeier 2008). In 
attempts to explain the more enduring and widespread influence of EU policy 
diffusion, a number of authors have supplemented the external incentives model 
with ‘new governance’ or ‘network governance’ approaches (Epstein and 
Sedelmeier 2008; Lavenax 2008; 2011; Lavenax and Schimmelfennig 2011). 
These authors characterise the external incentives model as one that sees rule 
transfer as a top-down hierarchical process in which the EU uses its dominant 
market position to impose the adoption of a pre-determined set of rules and 
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policies (the EU’s legal acquis) through material conditionality (Lavenax 2008, 
p. 941). While this may be relevant in the context of the accession states and 
membership conditionality, proponents of the governance approach suggest that 
policy diffusion follows a different logic elsewhere.  
 
Specifically, the governance model is characterised as a horizontal (as opposed 
to hierarchical) mode of engagement between the EU and third countries. In this 
mode, rule convergence proceeds in a functional manner in particular issue areas 
and ties are deepened through cooperation between governmental and non-
governmental actors (Lavenax and Schimmelfennig 2011, p. 887). 
 
Lavenax suggests that where EU conditionality simply exports already 
established EU rules to third countries, from a governance perspective: 
 
“EU influence” consists not primarily in leading third countries to adopt 
EU rules but rather in extending integration dynamics in the sense of 
creating joint regulatory structures (Lavenax 2008, p. 943).  
 
The lack of conditionality in this mode of policy diffusion means that it is most 
likely to occur where interests between the EU and third countries converge and 
enforcement problems and costs are low (Lavenax 2008, p. 939). Beyond the 
EU’s neighbourhood, Lavenax (2008) suggests that ‘instances of regulatory rule 
transfer and organizational cooperation are much more scattered and issue 
specific, reflecting patterns of economic or functional interdependence rather 
than political priorities’ (p. 389). 
 
Both the external incentives model and the governance approach to 
understanding EU policy diffusion have been developed primarily in relation to 
EU accession countries and the dense network of relationships that the EU has 
developed with its ‘near abroad’. It seems to me that the application of insights 
developed through these approaches to the EU’s external relations further afield 
– and to the ACP countries specifically – is relevant, but presents a set of puzzles 
rather than answers.  
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Lavenax (2011) suggests that the EU’s external relations can be characterised by 
‘concentric circles’. In this conceptualisation, the innermost circle constitutes the 
EU’s hierarchical relationship based on membership conditionality with the 
accession states. The outer circles – the EU neighbourhood and beyond – are 
characterised by more ad hoc, functional and horizontal relations. To some extent 
the EU’s relationship with the ACP countries defies this characterization. 
Although the EU-ACP relationship is beyond the scope of EU membership 
conditionality, the EPA negotiations have the hallmarks of a hierarchical, rather 
than a horizontal relationship. There is no membership conditionality at stake in 
the case of the EPAs, but there is ‘policy conditionality’ (see Trauner 2009) in 
the sense that the continuation of preferential access to the EU market for these 
countries has been made conditional upon a range of policy reforms. 
 
The EU-ACP relationship also fits with Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier’s 
(2004, p. 675) description of ‘old’ (i.e. hierarchical) governance in other ways. 
These are, namely, that the power relationship between the actors is highly 
asymmetrical; that the influence of the recipients on the content and scope of the 
rules and policies that are being promoted is minimal; and that the actors 
involved in the process of rule transfer are primarily governmental and 
bureaucratic as opposed to civil society representatives. In this sense, although 
the relationship between the EU and the ACP countries is distinct from that 
between the EU and the accession countries, these relationships share a number 
of key features. The puzzle for students of EU-ACP relations, then, is that while 
this relationship seems to conform in a number of ways with a hierarchical model 
of governance, the EU’s attempts at policy diffusion have been met with limited 
and uneven success.  
 
3.4 Understanding the Limits to EU External Economic Action: 
Internal and External Dynamics 
 
This section refers back to my earlier conclusions about the contingent historical 
process through which EU policies are made. In line with this, it suggests the 
need to probe more deeply into the dynamic process through which not just the 
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EU’s external policy aims, but also its tools and mechanisms for achieving them, 
are designed and constructed. I argue that doing so can provide insights about the 
extent of and limits to processes of policy diffusion. This step also allows the 
development of a linkage between the internal process of EU policy formation 
and the external impact of its mechanisms for policy diffusion through the 
constructivist logic of explanation proposed in Chapter Two.  
 
To be clear, the approach taken here differs from those existing contributions to 
EU studies that link the EU’s limited and contradictory impact on the world stage 
to either the continuing and fragmentary influence of the member states (Hill 
1993; 1996) or bureaucratic divisions within the European Commission (Carbone 
2007; 2009; Elgström and Pilegaard 2008; Pilegaard 2009; 2004; Van Criekinge 
2009; van den Hoven 2007). Here the problem is not a generalised lack of EU 
influence on the global stage – indeed the mechanisms deployed by the EU to 
promote policy diffusion have been rather successful in some cases. Instead the 
aim is to develop a theoretical approach that allows us to explore the limitations 
of specific EU policies of and strategies for the external promotion of particular 
reforms or models of governance.   
 
Gergana Noutcheva (2009) has sought to integrate internal and external 
dimensions of the EU’s normative power in order to better understand the impact 
of processes of policy diffusion. She contends: 
 
On the one hand, conclusions about the EU’s normative power cannot be 
drawn without considering the reactions of non-EU countries to the EU’s 
policies or assessing the impact “on the ground”. On the other hand, 
evaluations of non-member states’ responses to the EU’s external actions 
cannot be credible without first taking into account their perceptions of 
the motivations for pursuing certain policy objectives in the first place 
(Noutcheva 2009, p. 1066). 
 
In other words, Noutcheva suggests that EU policy diffusion can only be 
understood by investigating both the normative justifications of EU external 
policies and the reception that these justifications receive in counterpart 
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countries. She applies this approach to the case of EU policy towards the 
Western Balkans, which she argues lacks a strong normative justification and 
which is perceived by governments and publics in the Western Balkans as 
lacking legitimacy. This opens EU policies to contestation on normative grounds 
and leads to ‘fake compliance, partial compliance or non-compliance’ with EU 
conditions (Noutcheva 2009, p. 1065). The suggestion here is that the way the 
EU builds a normative or persuasive case about the legitimacy or efficacy of its 
external policies (and the way this is received) has an important impact on the 
effectiveness of its attempts at policy diffusion. 
 
However, there is convincing evidence from elsewhere in the existing literature 
that we need to look beyond straightforward normative persuasion to understand 
policy diffusion. A number of authors have considered the role of normative and 
ideational mechanisms for policy diffusion and their effect on particular 
outcomes (Grabbe 2006; Kelley 2004; 2006; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 
2004; Vachudova 2005). Much of this work concludes that normative persuasion 
plays a secondary, and relatively small, role in encouraging policy diffusion 
when compared to material conditionalities.  
 
For example, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004, p. 667-8) refer to processes 
of ‘lesson drawing’ and ‘social learning’ as potential mechanisms for rule 
transfer but conclude that the primary logic of this process is a rationalist one 
based on reinforcement by reward. Kelley (2004, p. 426) contends that 
membership conditionality motivates most policy decisions within EU partner 
countries while processes of socialization only sometimes shape the substance of 
solutions. Others have suggested that the effectiveness of normative persuasion is 
contingent upon the receptiveness of elites in target countries (Appel and 
Orenstein 2013; Grabbe 2006; Haughton 2007; Lavenax 2008; Noutcheva 2009; 
Orenstein 2008a; 2008b). This is a factor that certainly comes into play in my 
analysis of the EPA negotiating process in Southern Africa in Chapters Six and 
Seven. The general point here, however, is that only if policy elites are receptive 
to the norms being promoted by the EU, and the material benefits of the 
proposed reform outweigh the perceived costs, are normative mechanisms likely 
to produce policy diffusion.  
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The existing literature suggests, then, that understanding the internal and external 
dynamics of the EU’s normative action, isolated from its material strategies for 
policy diffusion, will not provide a full understanding of the successes and 
failures of policy diffusion. Mitchell Orenstein’s (2008b) work on social security 
reform suggests a way forward here. Orenstein (2008b) explicitly rejects the 
‘“norms” versus “incentives” debate’ found in much of the literature on policy 
diffusion in favour of a norms plus incentives approach: ‘discerning specific 
mechanisms of influence that may combine both norms and incentives’ (p. 5).  
 
He argues that the primary mode of influence for transnational actors is through 
shaping national policymakers’ perceptions of self interest. This is most effective 
when these actors are able to work with domestic interlocutors to change the 
preferences of domestic ‘veto players’, who occupy institutionally privileged 
positions in the policymaking process (Orenstein 2008b). This might explain 
why certain discursive strategies succeed or fail in particular national 
jurisdictions – that is, due to the support or obstruction of veto players. However, 
it tells us less about why a particular strategy for policy diffusion might succeed 
or fail across a range of national jurisdictions, as has been the case with the 
EPAs. I therefore seek to move beyond the ‘norms’ versus ‘incentives’ debate in 
a rather different way. The aim here is consider how material and institutional 
constraints and potential costs and benefits of policy diffusion are themselves 
constructed alongside normative arguments in favour of proposed policy 
reforms.  
 
My approach has commonalities with the recent work of André Broome and 
Leonard Seabrooke (2007; 2012) on ‘seeing like an international organisation’ in 
its attempt to draw links between the internal processes and external outcomes of 
the actions of international organisations. Broome and Seabrooke (2012) suggest 
that in order to understand the capacity of international organisations to bring 
about changes in national institutions and policies, we should pay attention to 
their internal dynamics. In particular, they suggest that way that the ‘analytic 
institutions’ – specialist units, departments, committees (etc.) – of a given 
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organisation identify and construct policy problems shapes the influence they 
have over national policies and institutions.  
 
The link between the internal and external dynamics of policy diffusion drawn 
here is similar. It has already been suggested that the way in which the EU’s 
external policy aims are constructed, discussed and delivered through and by 
different organisational bodies and personnel in a contingent and historically 
specific process can create contradictions and tensions within these policy 
outputs. This applies to the construction of policy problems and solutions (see 
Broome and Seabrooke 2012), but also to the design of the material and 
discursive policy tools used to promote these solutions. These tools might, for 
example, include strategic invocations of institutional constraints as a discursive 
device to portray a particular reform as necessary (see Chapter Two).  
 
In the case of the accession countries, the material incentive to acquiesce to EU 
demands for rule transfer is relatively self-evident. Although even here, the EU 
constructs strong discursive arguments about the benefits of EU membership. In 
other cases of EU external projection, policymakers may have to work harder to 
construct incentives and a normative case for proposed reforms. In the case of 
the EPAs, the EU’s primary material leverage was in the form of the threat that 
ACP countries would lose preferential access to the EU market if they refused to 
sign an EPA. This leverage could only be mobilised, however, through the EU’s 
invocation of a particular set of WTO rules (see Chapters Four and Five). 
Furthermore, the reach of the EU’s material leverage was uneven and in this 
context EU policymakers made a concerted effort to persuade the ACP countries 
that the EPAs would support their development aims. This strategy for policy 
diffusion, then, combined an appeal to institutional imperatives, material 
incentives and a normative argument. Most importantly, the way that these 
elements were put together and the way that the strategy was deployed was 
contingent on the ideas and decisions of historically embedded agents. 
 
The key point here is that the way that policy aims and tools are constructed has 
important implications for the willingness, or otherwise, of target countries to 
adopt the EU’s proposed policy or institutional changes. Effectively designed 
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policy tools may alter the incentives that policymakers in other countries face 
and/or persuade them that proposed reforms are desirable or necessary in the 
light of institutional imperatives. If there are tensions and contradictions within 
the EU’s discursive and material tools for the promotion of reform, however, 
these tensions may make these tools less effective and open them up to 
contestation by partner countries and other actors. Ultimately, the treatment of 
these policy tools as a given that emerges from a black box of institutional 
activity in much of the existing literature ignores their institutionally embedded 
and often problematic design and construction. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I set out to review and draw insights from the literatures on the 
EU as a global actor and on EU policy transfer and diffusion. These speak to two 
central dimensions of the analysis presented within this thesis: the drivers of EU 
external economic relations and their external reach. However, few links have 
been drawn between these literatures. My aim here was firstly to outline how the 
theoretical approach elaborated in Chapter Two might be applied to an 
understanding of EU external economic relations within the context of these 
literatures. In addition, I aimed to draw links between them, with the specific 
purpose of exploring the connection between the internal drivers of the EU’s 
outward projections and their external reach. 
 
I argued that the existing social constructivist literature on the EU as a global 
actor generates very useful insights about the way in which the EU constructs its 
own image as a distinctive and benevolent global actor. At the same time it 
demonstrates the intertwinement of the EU’s normative and commercial external 
projections. This thesis takes this literature as a point of departure and aims to 
stress the contingent and historically embedded process through which neoliberal 
ideas have come to be central to the European project itself and to its external 
projections specifically. Applying a similar argument to the existing literature on 
EU rule transfer and policy diffusion, I argued that new insights could be 
generated by examining the contingent processes through which EU preferences 
and policy prescriptions are translated into policy tools. 
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These conclusions suggest that links can fruitfully be drawn between the internal 
processes of EU policy formation and the external impact of these policies on the 
ground. I argue that in order to do this, EU external relations need to be seen in 
the light of the particular and historically embedded processes through which 
policy outputs are produced and articulated by reflexive agents. This relates to 
both the EU’s external policy prescriptions and the tools that it uses to pursue 
them. This process of policy development and deployment may generate tensions 
and contradictions as policymakers’ ideas, preferences and discursive strategies 
come up against path-dependent and embedded institutional structures. Such 
tensions may limit the reach of the EU’s mechanisms for policy diffusion and 
open up space for the contestation of EU claims about the normative character of 
its policy prescriptions. 
 
The programme of the remainder of this thesis with regard to this literature is to 
analyse the historical process of change in the EU’s policy aims and tools from 
the Treaty of Rome through to the Lomé Convention, the Cotonou Agreement 
and the EPA negotiations. The aim is to explore the tensions and contradictions 
that emerged in and through this process of change and the way that these played 
out during the attempted implementation of the EU’s ambitious EPA programme. 	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Chapter Four 
Constructing a Successor to the Lomé 
Convention 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The Cotonou Agreement in 2000 marked the point at which the longstanding 
Lomé Convention – which had governed relations between the EU and the ACP 
countries since 1975 – was replaced with negotiations for comprehensive EPAs. 
This represented the completion of the EU’s move away from the putative 
political neutrality of Lomé and towards an increased emphasis on the export of 
neoliberal development norms in EU-ACP relations. Much ink has been spilled 
over the history of the EU-ACP relationship (notable monographs, for example, 
include Brown 2002; Cosgrove Twitchett 1978; Grilli 1993; Ravenhill 1985) and 
the break with the past that came with the Cotonou Agreement. 
 
In this chapter, however, I seek to address a specific puzzle that is raised by the 
recasting of the EU-ACP relationship in the late 1990s and that I will argue is not 
fully addressed in the existing literature on EU-ACP relations and the EPAs. This 
puzzle relates to the EU’s dramatic about-face with regard to the legal defence of 
the Lomé Convention, followed by its decision to pursue EPAs that went far 
beyond the requirements of WTO rules. For much of the post-war period, the EU 
had defended the legality of the non-reciprocal trade preferences that it granted 
under the Lomé Convention. It was surprising enough, then, that in the mid 
1990s the EU gave in to a series of challenges to its trade relationship with the 
ACP countries under the GATT and WTO and accepted that Lomé was in 
contravention of multilateral trade rules. What was more surprising, however, 
was that the EU proposed and then pursued EPAs that went far beyond the 
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requirements of WTO rules with regard to their interregional form and later 
attempts to incorporate a range of ‘WTO-plus’ issues into the deals. Furthermore, 
this ambitious agenda appeared out of proportion to the EU’s peripheral and 
declining commercial and strategic interest in the ACP countries.  
 
Much of the literature written shortly after the signing of the Cotonou Agreement 
in 2000 interpreted the recasting of the EU-ACP relationship through the lens of 
various structural imperatives. These ranged from a shift in the EU’s independent 
political and commercial interests, to the legal challenges under the GATT and 
WTO, to a change in the institutional structures of the European Commission. 
The narrative that I present in this chapter seeks to refute these structural 
arguments. Moreover, I argue that the EU’s change of direction at the Cotonou 
Agreement was not simply a reflection of a conversion to a monolithic neoliberal 
orthodoxy amongst EU policymakers. Rather, drawing upon the theoretical 
arguments set out in Chapters Two and Three, I argue that an approach that 
emphasises the historically embedded and politically contingent nature of 
policymaking processes is able to provide a more nuanced and convincing 
explanation of the EU’s decision to recast the Lomé Convention as a set of 
ambitious and comprehensive free trade agreements. Furthermore, such an 
approach allows me to problematise the process through which the EU 
constructed the aims of the EPAs and the tools for their promotion, which will 
contribute to the understanding of their limited and uneven reach presented in 
subsequent chapters. 
 
In this chapter I argue that the EU’s decision to recast the ACP relationship in the 
form of comprehensive regional FTAs was shaped by a distinctive set of ideas 
pursued by particular European actors in the context of historical patterns of EU-
ACP relations and multilateral trade rules. The	  European	  actors	  that	  constitute	  the	   main	   focus	   of	   my	   analysis	   are	   policymakers	   within	   the	   European	  Commission.	   Institutionalist	   approaches	   to	   understanding	   EU	   trade	  policymaking	  have	  usually	  taken	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  Commission	  and	   the	  member	   states	   in	   the	  European	  Council	   and	  133	  Committee	   to	  be	  the	   central	   dynamic	   of	   this	   process	   (Woolcock	   2005b,	   see	   Chapter	   Two).	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Here,	  I	  choose	  to	  focus	  instead	  on	  the	  ideas	  and	  actions	  of	  the	  Commission	  officials	   whose	   role	   it	   is	   to	   both	   propose	   new	   trade	   policy	   and	   carry	   out	  negotiations	  with	   external	   partners.	   This	   choice	   reflects	   the	   suggestion	   by	  Daniel	   Wincott	   (2004,	   p.	   356)	   that	   constructivist	   accounts	   of	   EU	  policymaking	   should	   focus	   on	   those	   actors	   closest	   to	   the	   policymaking	  process.	   Furthermore,	   existing	   principal-­‐agent	   accounts	   of	   the	   EPAs	   are	  supportive	   of	   the	   notion	   that	   the	   Commission	   enjoyed	   a	   relatively	   high	  degree	  of	  autonomy	  from	  the	  member	  states	  during	  both	  the	  proposal	  and	  negotiation	   stages	   of	   the	   agreements	   (Elgström	   2009a;	   Elgström	   and	  Frenhoff	  Larsén	  2010;	  Elgström	  and	  Pilegaard	  2008;	  Orbie	  2010).	  Of	  course,	  this	  analytical	  choice	  does	  not	  mean	  ignoring	  the	  role	  of	  the	  member	  states	  altogether.	   The	   expressed	   preferences	   of	   the	   member	   states	   formed	   an	  important	   part	   of	   the	   context	   in	   which	   Commission	   policymakers	   made	  decisions	   about	   the	   reform	   of	   the	   EU-­‐ACP	   relationship.	   There	   were	   also	  times	   at	   which	   member	   states	   encroached	   upon	   the	   autonomy	   of	   the	  Commission	   through	   direct	   or	   indirect	   interventions	   in	   the	   policymaking	  and	  negotiating	  process.	  On	  this	  basis,	  reference	  to	  member	  state	  positions	  is	  made	  where	  appropriate	  but	  the	  primary	  analytical	  focus	  remains	  on	  the	  ideas	  and	  actions	  of	  Commission	  policymakers.	  
 
Following a brief review of the relevant existing literature, my argument in this 
chapter unfolds chronologically, as follows. By the early 1990s, belief amongst 
European Commission policymakers in the development model that underpinned 
the Lomé Convention had largely disappeared. This was replaced by a neoliberal 
consensus that emphasised exposure to the exigencies of the global economy as 
essential for development and located the cause of development failures within 
endogenous policy problems. A specifically European dimension to this 
neoliberal consensus stressed the importance of regionalism as a stepping stone 
to full integration into the global economy and the EU’s unique qualifications for 
overseeing and promoting this. European actors were also committed to the 
principle of differentiation and the idea that development assistance should be 
targeted at the poorest developing countries. In this context, the Lomé 
Convention was adjudged – even before a series of adverse rulings under the 
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GATT and WTO – to be not only a failure but an obstruction to ACP 
development. 
 
These GATT/WTO legal challenges were undoubtedly at the forefront of the 
minds of EU policymakers when they made the decision to recast the Lomé 
relationship. The EU’s commitment to multilateralism was in itself a reflection 
of the changing ideological underpinnings of EU external relations. However, the 
way that the EU deployed strategic appeals to WTO rules – particularly Article 
XXIV of the GATT – in the recasting of the Lomé relationship was contingent 
and was underpinned by EU policymakers’ more or less independent 
commitment to promoting trade opening in order to further ACP development. 
The GATT and WTO rulings, then, were used by the EU as a pretext on which to 
realign the EU-ACP relationship with a new set of preferences for ACP trade 
liberalisation, the external promotion of open regionalism, and the principle of 
differentiation in EU development assistance. These independent preferences 
drove both the EU’s sudden abandonment of its legal defence of Lomé and its 
enthusiasm for an EU-ACP regime that went beyond the bare minimum of WTO 
compliance. 
 
EU policymakers were, however, caught between the path dependent trajectories 
of two separate institutional arrangements. These were, on the one hand, 
historical commitments to partnership and the provision of trade preferences to 
the ACP countries as former colonies and, on the other, the idiosyncratic rules 
that had developed via the GATT and WTO’s governance of multilateral trade 
liberalisation. In attempting to reconcile their independent preferences with these 
institutional path dependencies – and indeed to invoke multilateral rules as an 
imperative for ACP trade opening – European Commission policymakers 
generated important contradictions within the content of the Cotonou Agreement. 
 
4.2 The Cotonou Agreement: A Puzzle for the Existing Literature 
 
The primary aim of this chapter is to explain the EU’s abandonment of its legal 
defence of the Lomé Convention in the mid 1990s and its subsequent decision to 
pursue a new EU-ACP trade arrangement that went far beyond the requirements 
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of WTO rules. Before setting out a response to this puzzle, I briefly review 
existing accounts of this shift.  
 
First, the most widely cited trigger of change in the EU-ACP relationship – and 
the explanation of this change most commonly used by the EU itself (see, for 
example, Curran et al. 2008; European Commission 2008b; Mandelson 2007) – 
is the challenges to the Lomé trade regime under the auspices of the GATT and 
WTO in the 1990s. The argument advanced in these accounts is that the 
GATT/WTO challenges left little or no alternative to the wholesale reform of the 
EU-ACP relationship and its recasting on the basis of reciprocity. As I will show 
in the narrative that follows, the challenges posed by the GATT and the issue of 
WTO compatibility clearly played a central role in the thinking of various 
European actors with regard to EU-ACP relations in the 1990s and 2000s. 
However, it is equally clear that these legal issues cannot account alone for the 
reshaping of EU-ACP relations that followed.  
 
There are a number of reasons for this. First, a number of commentators have 
outlined an array of alternative options for the future of the EU-ACP relationship 
following the GATT challenges (ActionAid 2005; Bilal and Rampa 2006; 
Trommer 2013). This includes some who have suggested that the EU could have 
negotiated further WTO waivers for the continuation of non-reciprocal EU-ACP 
trade preferences had it invested sufficient political capital in doing so (Heron 
2013, p. 43; Stevens 2008, p. 214; Faber and Orbie 2009b, p. 54). Given that the 
EU had defended its ACP trade regime under Article XXIV of the GATT since 
the beginning of the Lomé Convention, and that it initially contested the GATT 
challenges to the regime, the EU’s decision not to seek further legal justification 
for non-reciprocal trade preferences represented a break with the past. 
 
Second, the European Commission itself outlined several options for rendering 
relations with the ACP countries WTO compatible. These were set out in a 1996 
Green Paper on the future of EU-ACP relations and included normalising EU-
ACP relations under the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) and the 
negotiation of a single free trade agreement based on ‘uniform reciprocity’ 
between the EU and the ACP countries (European Commission 1996, p. 64-5). 
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As it turned out, neither of these options was pursued by the EU, but the Green 
Paper demonstrates that Commission officials acknowledged from the outset that 
policy alternatives to the EPAs were possible within the context of WTO rules.  
 
A third source of evidence that the shape of Cotonou and the EPAs was not 
dependent solely on WTO compatibility comes from the fact that at their height 
the EPAs were far more ambitious in their content and scope than needed to be 
the case in order to satisfy WTO rules. The EU’s decision to negotiate with ACP 
regions rather than individual countries was not necessary in order to satisfy 
WTO rules and has arguably made the EPA negotiations far more complex than 
they needed to be. Similarly, the EU’s attempts go beyond WTO requirements in 
the inclusion of trade in services and an ambitious regulatory agenda also made 
the EPA process more complex and all encompassing than was required in order 
to satisfy WTO rules (see Chapter Five). 
 
If compatibility with GATT rules was the first explanation for the reform of 
Lomé, a second is provided by post-2000 critical literature on the EU-ACP 
relationship. This argues that the EU’s response to the legal challenges in the 
GATT was used as an opportunity to recast the Lomé regime in line with a set of 
European commercial interests (Farrell 2005, p. 22; Goodison 2007; Hurt 2003; 
Stoneman and Thompson 2007).  
 
The ambitious and complex approach that the EU took to the EPA negotiations, 
however, took place at a time when the strategic and economic importance of the 
ACP countries was in decline. Following the end of the Cold War, the ACP 
countries had become less important as a strategic partner for Europe (Ravenhill 
2004), the EU was  preoccupied in its foreign relations with the newly 
independent states of Eastern and Central Europe, and the EU’s reliance on trade 
with the ACP countries was limited and diminishing (Faber and Orbie 2009b). 
Enzo Grilli states this latter point starkly: 
 
[By the early 1990s there was a] realization that Africa, far from 
remaining the natural economic complement to Europe, is of little 
economic value and has become a quasi-permanent burden for it. This is 
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a valuation not yet openly expressed at the official level, but one whose 
existence and implicit acceptance at the policymaking level in EC Europe 
is already quite evident (Grilli 1993, p. 344). 
 
From a perspective that privileges European commercial self-interest, it appears 
incongruous that the EU should have chosen such an ambitious and complex 
approach to recasting its ACP relationship when other seemingly simpler and 
less costly solutions – for example normalising EU-ACP relations under the GSP 
– existed. 
 
A third explanation of the recasting of the Lomé Convention comes from the 
rational choice institutionalist approaches discussed in Chapter Two. These 
suggest that the key to understanding the content of the Cotonou Agreement is 
the ‘turf wars’ (Stevens 2000) between functionally differentiated Directorates 
within the European Commission. According to this argument, the move to 
reciprocity at Cotonou and in the EPAs reflected a bureaucratic power shift 
towards DG Trade as the result of a reorganisation of the Commission and of 
responsibility for EU-ACP relations in 1999. This is supposed to have 
precipitated a substantive shift in the content of EU-ACP relations towards a 
deep and broad trade liberalisation agenda that was being pursued by actors 
within DG Trade (van den Hoven 2007; Elgström and Pilegaard 2008; Pilegaard 
2009).  
 
The problem with this explanation, as Gabriel Siles-Brügge (2014a, p. 140) 
points out, is that a shift in the EU’s approach to relations with the ACP 
countries had already been indicated – via the 1996 Commission Green Paper 
authored by staff from DG Development – prior to the reorganisation of the 
Commission in 1999. In other words, a shift in the preferences of European 
policymakers about the appropriate aims and tools of the ACP relationship 
seemed to have taken place across the Commission, regardless of any 
interdepartmental turf wars. This was the strong view of officials from DG 
DEVCO (the new name for DG Development) that I interviewed.16 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Interview 5 (DG DEVCO). 
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Dominant understandings of the EPAs associate the break with the past at 
Cotonou with some underlying structural or institutional change, be this legal, 
commercial or bureaucratic. Social constructivist accounts of the EU’s 
interregional relationships offer a more contingent view of European policy 
change (see Chapter Three and Söderbaum et al. 2005; Aggarwal and Fogarty 
2004b; Telò 2007b; Grugel 2004; Hettne 2005; Börzel and Risse 2009). These 
accounts emphasise a set of normative underpinnings for the EU’s decision to 
pursue reciprocal interregional trade relations as the successor to Lomé. These 
included such norms related to the virtues of regional integration; the power of 
European experiences as lessons for other parts of the world; and the idea that 
liberalisation and incorporation into the global economy are crucial for 
development.   
 
The ideas that underpinned changing EU-ACP relations will play a crucial part in 
the empirical narrative that follows, which builds upon existing accounts of the 
EPAs in this vein (Brown 2004; Faber and Orbie 2009b; Gibb 2000; Hurt 2003). 
Where the approach taken here departs from the extant literature, however, is in 
its efforts to problematise the way that these ideas changed over time and were 
deployed through the specific aims and tools of the EPAs. Specifically, I eschew 
the notion that neoliberal ideas and preferences could relatively straightforwardly 
be operationalised as a set of policy prescriptions and tools. Rather, the way that 
particular European policymakers deployed neoliberal development norms was 
contingent and subject to change during the course of the recasting of the EU-
ACP relationship. This was particularly evident, for example, when the content 
of the EU’s EPA negotiating agenda was significantly widened during Peter 
Mandelson’s tenure as EU Trade Commissioner (see Chapter Five). Further these 
ideas were translated into policy aims and tools within a path-dependent 
institutional context. Policymakers, then, had to contend not only with the 
legacies of past EU-ACP relations, but also the multilateral rules that governed 
the international trading system. The way that actors interpreted, acted within, 
and sought to transform these institutional constraints – as well as deploying 
them within strategic discursive strategies – was to have an important impact on 
the eventual shape of the trade and development prospectus for the EPAs. 
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4.3 Association, the Yaoundé Conventions and the Road to Lomé 
 
European relations with Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific have a long 
history, stretching back to the colonial and pre-colonial period (for a brief 
overview of this history, see Whiteman 2012). As is conventional in accounts of 
EU-ACP relations, the narrative in this chapter begins with the incorporation of 
the (former)17 colonies of the European Economic Community (EEC)18 member 
states into the Treaty of Rome in 1957. A timeline of the key events covered by 
the empirical narrative in this chapter is presented in Table 4.1. 
 
The institutionalised relationship between the EEC and the former colonies of its 
member states was set in motion by the regime of ‘association’ under the Treaty 
of Rome. At a late stage in the negotiations, the French Government under 
President Charles de Gaulle used its veto power to force through the addition to 
the Treaty of an ‘association’ between France’s (primarily African) colonies and 
the six-member EEC (Brown 2002, p. 40). This was achieved despite the 
protestations of Germany and the Netherlands (Brown 2002, p. 40; Grilli 1993, 
p. 7). The association of France’s colonies to the EEC had three key aspects (see 
Brown 2002, p. 41). First, the associates would receive access to the EEC 
member markets at preferential tariff levels. Second, the EEC members would 
have the same trade access to the associated states, as well as rights of 
establishment and granting of contracts, as that of France. And third, the first 
European Development Fund (EDF) aimed exclusively at the associates was 
established. It is worth noting that the associates were shoehorned into the Treaty 
of Rome at the very last minute and were not consulted about their association 
(Brown 2002, p. 40-1; Grilli 1993, p. 7). Enzo Grilli suggests that by this 
manoeuvre: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Some colonies were yet to gain their independence at this point. 
18 ‘European Union’ (‘EU’) is used for general references to the organization and 
specific references to the EU after the Maastricht Treaty (1992). For specific 
references to the organization before 1992, ‘European Economic Community’ 
(‘EEC’) is used.	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Year Event Details 
1958 Treaty of Rome Established EEC and ‘association’ between members and (former) 
colonial territories 
1963 
1969 
Yaoundé 
Convention I & II  
Created bilateral FTAs between the EEC and each of the Associated 
African and Malagasy States (AAMS) 
1973 UK accession to 
EEC 
Posed question of how to incorporate states of the British 
Commonwealth into EEC association with former colonial territories 
1975 Lomé Convention Created the ACP group. Established ‘partnership of equals’ between 
the EEC and ACP in which the EEC provided unilateral trade 
preferences, the STABEX scheme for stabilising commodity prices, and 
a range of commodity protocols. Established a number of joint 
institutions to govern the relationship. 
1979 Lomé II Maintained the Lomé Convention in the same form with the addition 
of the SYSMIN scheme designed to stabilise prices for ACP mineral 
exports. 
1985 Lomé III ‘Policy dialogues’ introduced to give the EU more say in the spending 
of EDF assistance. 
1990 Lomé IV 14 percent of EDF set aside for structural adjustment. 
1992 Maastricht Treaty 
 
Created the EU and completed the Single Market. Enshrined a 
commitment to promoting developing country integration into the 
global economy and to supporting ‘the most disadvantaged’ 
countries. 
1994 GATT ruling against 
EU banana regime 
GATT ruled against the EU’s claim that the Lomé Convention could be 
defended on the basis of Article XXIV of the GATT. EU was granted, a 
5-year waiver for the Lomé Convention, later extended to end of 2007. 
1995 Formation of the 
WTO 
Created the Dispute Settlement Understanding and tightened rules for 
granting waivers. 
1995 Mid-Term Review of 
Lomé IV 
European Commission took over much of the responsibility for ACP 
development projects. Clauses related to democracy, human rights, 
good governance and the establishment of market economies 
inserted. 
1996 European 
Commission Green 
Paper on the Future 
of EU-ACP Relations 
Set out four options for the future of the EU-ACP relationship and 
offered a diagnosis of the failure of Lomé that emphasised ACP 
domestic policy failures. 
1997 EU abandoned legal 
defence of Lomé  
EU concluded that GATT and WTO rulings had undermined the 
principles of Lomé. 
1999 Reorganisation of 
the European 
Commission 
Responsibility for trade relations with the ACP countries moved from 
DG Development to DG Trade. 
2000 Cotonou 
Agreement 
Provided a roadmap for replacing Lomé with a series of interregional 
and reciprocal free trade agreements – the EPAs – and enshrined the 
principle of differentiation within this arrangement. 
Table 4.1: Timeline of key events in the evolution of EU-ACP relations – Treaty of 
Rome to the Cotonou Agreement (source: author’s interpretation) 
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France wanted to ensure free access to the Community for the exports 
coming from its former colonies and, eventually, to share with the EC 
partners the costs of providing economic assistance to France d’outre mer 
that it then shouldered (Grilli 1993, p. 7). 
 
 
As more European colonies gained their independence in the 1960s, the 
associational relationship was maintained and extended through the Yaoundé 
Conventions (1963 and 1969).  These created bilateral free trade agreements 
between the EEC and the 18 consenting members of the newly formed 
Associated African and Malagasy States (AAMS). According to Stevens (1983, 
p. 145), association under the Treaty of Rome and the Yaoundé Conventions 
followed the pattern of existing colonial relations closely and did little to alter the 
structure of trade relations between the EEC and the former colonies. The latter, 
then, remained highly dependent upon the export of a small number of primary 
commodities. While the institutionalisation of an EEC trade and aid relationship 
with the former colonies had been a relatively minor and late addition to Treaty 
of Rome negotiations – driven by the French government’s desire to protect post-
imperial ties with Africa while sharing the cost of this with the EEC – by the late 
1960s, the Yaoundé Conventions had become a central feature in the landscape 
of North-South relations (Brown 2000, p. 372). Furthermore, Brown (2002) 
suggests that association under the Treaty of Rome ‘presaged the ability of the 
African states to make claims on the former powers for a variety of forms of 
support, including direct aid and protection from full world market competition’ 
(p. 41). 	  
In understanding the transformation of the relationship inscribed under the 
Yaoundé Conventions into the more comprehensive and distinctive Lomé 
Convention (1975), historical context is crucial. The immediate trigger for 
change to the relationship was the accession of the United Kingdom to the EEC 
in 1973. Given that the former colonies of existing member states were already 
enshrined in a special relationship with the EEC, the question arose as to how the 
states of the British Commonwealth would be incorporated into this arrangement. 
It was decided that the EEC would negotiate a new agreement with the AAMS 
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countries and those Commonwealth countries that were considered ‘associable’ 
because they shared similar production structures with the AAMS (Grilli 1993, p. 
21). From this point on, the AAMS and the associable Commonwealth countries 
were treated as a single group – the ACP countries. Table 4.2 outlines the 
evolving membership of the special relationship with the EEC, from association 
under the Treaty of Rome to the Cotonou Agreement. 
 
A common theme of most discussions of the birth of the Lomé Convention is the 
unique global economic and geopolitical context in which the negotiations took 
place in the mid 1970s (see, in particular, Grilli 1993, p. 25-6). The first oil crisis 
in 1973 and the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries’ (OPEC) 
assertive production strategy sparked fears that developing country producers of 
other primary products could use their ‘commodity power’ in a similar way 
(Cosgrove Twitchett 1981, p. 12). Kahler (1982, p. 209) suggests that this was of 
particular concern to the EEC given its dependence on former colonies for the 
supply of commodities. Similarly, Grilli asserts that, in the context of Europe’s 
dependence on imported commodities, the oil crisis, and a suddenly hostile 
developing world: 
 
Past association with Africa, colonial and post-colonial, came to be seen 
as fixed point on which to anchor a strategy for lessening a serious 
structural weakness of Europe (Grilli 1993, p. 26-7). 	  
It is possible, however, to overstate the danger posed to European interests by the 
potential commodity power of ACP economies. There were few commodities for 
which the supply situation was similar to that of oil and therefore it is unlikely 
that developing countries could have driven up the prices of other commodities 
in the way that OPEC had done (Cosgrove Twitchett 1981, p. 12). Further, the 
EEC had a significantly greater degree of market and financial power than its 
ACP counterparts, reliant as the ACP countries were on aid from the EDF and on 
exports to the EEC. The EEC absorbed 50.4 percent of total ACP exports 
between 1974 and 1976 (Grilli 1993, p. 162). Although imports from the ACP 
were of some importance to the EEC, these were only 7.5 percent of total EEC 
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imports in the same period (Grilli 1993, p. 162). Undoubtedly, however, there 
was a perception within EEC institutions and member states at the time that 
Europe’s supply of raw materials was threatened, and this played a significant 
role in the renegotiation of the EEC’s relationship with the former colonies of its 
member states in the 1970s. 	  
An even more important factor than the perceived material constraints associated 
with the oil crises for the narrative presented here was the ideational context in 
which the first Lomé negotiations played out. The accession of the United 
Kingdom to the EEC in 1973 and the start of the Lomé negotiations coincided 
with the high point in developing country diplomatic cooperation and calls for a 
new international economic order (NIEO) in the United Nations General 
Assembly – claims which were themselves bolstered by the oil crisis. 
Developing country calls for reform of the international economic system were 
influenced by radical theories of underdevelopment, which highlighted the 
negative implications of international economic interdependence for developing 
countries (Woods 2011, p. 251). In particular, developing countries’ claims built 
on the conclusions of Hans Singer (1950), Raúl Prebisch (1950) and a group of 
economists working under Prebisch within the UN Economic Commission for 
Latin America. These economists argued that underdevelopment was a result of 
the position of developing countries within the system of international trade and 
in particular the deteriorating terms of trade to which commodity producers were 
subject.  
 
As a result of new theories of underdevelopment that gained prominence 
between 1964 and 1973 the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) took a lead role in campaigns for increased market 
access for manufactured exports from developing countries, the stabilization of 
international commodity prices and increased development aid (O'Brien and 
Williams 2004, p. 283). In 1970, UNCTAD published radical conclusions that 
stated that reciprocity in trade relations between industrialised and developing 
countries was inappropriate (Cosgrove Twitchett 1978, p. 150). The 
organisation’s conclusion was that developed countries should offer non-
reciprocal tariff preferences to developing countries in order to address the 
	  112	  
structural imbalances that characterised international trade. These non-reciprocal 
tariffs were intended to give developing countries the space to adopt 
interventionist approaches designed to foster the growth of infant industries 
(Piening 1997, p. 173). The period from 1973 to 1979 marked the height of the 
salience of calls for an NIEO in North-South diplomacy (O'Brien and Williams 
2004, p. 283). Towards the end of the Yaoundé period and into the Lomé 
negotiations, the ACP countries – which, at this time, were acting with an 
unprecedented degree of unity – worked with UNCTAD to raise the profile of 
NIEO goals in negotiations with the EEC (Grilli 1993, p. 22). 
 
While the claims made by ACP countries shaped the Lomé negotiations to some 
extent, the asymmetry of market and financial power between the negotiating 
parties meant that it was crucial that these claims were met with a receptive 
response from key European actors. Payne and Phillips (2009, p. 60-1) note that 
the structuralist accounts of underdevelopment that had come to influence calls 
for an NIEO stemmed from the same Keynesian economic consensus that had 
shaped the post-war European political economy. As Rapley (2007) puts it, this 
was a time when many academics and policymakers believed ‘the end of 
ideology’ had come and  ‘everyone agreed that market economies, harnessed to 
an interventionist state, were the wave of the future, that left and right had met up 
and become one’ (p. 17).  
 
This is not to say, however, that EEC member states necessarily bought into 
structuralist accounts of underdevelopment or that they were sympathetic to calls 
for an NIEO. For example, with the exception of France, most governments of 
industrialised nations inside and outside the EEC remained sceptical of the need 
for and benefits of mechanisms for commodity price stabilisation, which were 
being called for by developing countries (Grilli 1993, p. 23). Leadership by the 
European Commission, however, was decisive in pushing member states to make 
concessions to ACP demands during the Lomé negotiations (Hewitt and 
Whiteman 2004, p. 140).  
 
The negotiations with the ACP countries were led by DG VIII, then responsible 
for development. Unlike the majority of member states, its head, Claude 
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Cheysson, was receptive to arguments about the structural impediments to 
development. In a document entitled, ‘Development Aid: Fresco of Community 
Action Tomorrow’, released by Cheysson in 1974, the Commission made 
implicit reference to a number of issues raised by developing country calls for an 
NIEO. The document stated: 
 
If it is truly resolved to take part in the development of the third world, 
the industrialized world must be ready […] to make the necessary 
sacrifices to open its markets wide, to make access to them easier, to 
encourage the manufacture of products from raw materials to an 
increasing degree of processing, and finally to stabilize as far as possible, 
the purchasing power corresponding to this export income (European 
Commission 1974, p. 9). 
 
Furthermore, during the Lomé negotiations, Cheysson referred to arguments 
associated with a structuralist understanding of the causes of underdevelopment, 
stating, ‘the economic world order as it stands does not allow developing 
countries to compete on equal terms in world markets’ (Cheysson 1974).  He 
even went so far as to call for world-wide mechanisms that would bring about 
constant and increasing purchasing power for developing countries in relation to 
industrialised nations (Cheysson 1974). Cheysson and the Commission, then, put 
pressure on EEC member states to make concessions to ACP demands and to 
sign an agreement that acknowledged and, to some extent, aimed to address 
perceived structural impediments to development (Gruhn 1976, p. 254; Hewitt 
and Whiteman 2004, p. 140). While developing country demands for an NIEO 
were rejected at the multilateral level in the 1970s, they were given ‘some 
limited accommodation’ (Brown 2000, p. 372) in the first Lomé Convention, 
signed in 1975.  
 
The central message here is that the aims and tools associated with Lomé were 
oriented around an understanding of development that emphasised the structural, 
rather than domestic, causes of underdevelopment. Crucially, then, Lomé was 
premised on the principle of ‘ideological neutrality’ (CEC-DG VIII 1992, 16, 
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cited in Brown 2000, p. 368), with the assertion that ACP countries had the right 
to determine their own development strategies.  
 
This right to self determination was reinforced by Cheysson in his statement at 
the first session of the Lomé Consultative Assembly, when he said, 
‘Development is something that one has to build for oneself […] we do not have 
a model to offer’ (Cheysson 1976). In addition the structural origins of 
underdevelopment were acknowledged in the preamble to the agreement. This 
stated a commitment to creating ‘a new model for relations between developed 
and developing states’ and moving ‘towards a more just and balanced economic 
order’ (ACP-EEC 1975). The intention at Lomé, then, was not to promote the 
diffusion of a particular set of policies to ACP countries, but instead to address, 
if only in a limited way, the perceived structural impediments to the development 
of ACP economies. 
 
This emphasis on structural barriers to development is borne out in the core 
modalities of the first Lomé Convention. Primary amongst these was the 
abandonment of the reciprocity that had been a feature of the Yaoundé 
Conventions in favour of non-reciprocal preferential access to the EEC market 
for ACP countries. The introduction of non-reciprocal trade preferences was in 
line with the recommendations made by UNCTAD in 1970 and the demands of 
the ACP countries.  
 
In addition, the Lomé Convention introduced the STABEX scheme, designed to 
stabilise ACP countries’ revenues from commodity exports. This was 
accompanied by a series of lucrative commodity protocols for bananas, beef, rum 
and sugar, which offered eligible ACP states guaranteed prices in excess of those 
available on the world market. These measures amounted to an endorsement of 
the idea that the existing structure of the international economy and the effect of 
deteriorating terms of trade were hampering ACP development efforts. In 
addition, the Lomé Convention increased the amount of aid on offer to ACP 
countries under the EDF and determined that this was to be administered 
‘jointly’ – that is, ACP countries would have some right to determine its use 
	   115	  
(Brown 2000, p. 372) – and with relatively few conditionalities in comparison to 
later iterations of the EU-ACP relationship. 
 
Another way in which the Lomé Convention is crucial to the narrative of this 
chapter is in its establishment of the ACP as a regional entity and the 
institutionalisation of its relationship to the EEC. The Convention took the form 
of a legally binding contract that emphasised the principles of equality, mutual 
respect and interdependence, and established a set of joint institutions through 
which the agreement would be administered. This represented a departure from 
the ‘master-supplicant atmosphere’ (Stevens 1983, p. 145) of the Yaoundé 
Conventions and the imperial power-colony relationship of association under the 
Treaty of Rome. Not only this, but the form of the agreement constituted the 
ACP as a region for the first time. Although the promotion of regional 
integration within the ACP group was not an explicit central theme of the Lomé 
Convention, Holland (2006) described the Lomé relationship as a case of 
‘“imagined” interregionalism’ because the ACP region was effectively created 
by the EEC in order to negotiate the agreement (see also Bretherton and Vogler 
1999, p. 126; Hardacre and Smith 2009). The Lomé Convention constituted the 
ACP group as a unified – if disparate and heterogeneous – region. Furthermore, 
the privileged partnership created between this group and the EEC both 
cemented the place of the ACP within the EU’s system of external relations and 
provided a strong set of incentives for the ACP countries to seek to maintain this 
privileged position and the lucrative set of trade preferences that came with it. 
 
The fact that the Lomé Convention constructed the ACP countries as a region 
was also of importance for the way that the EEC justified the Lomé Convention 
under multilateral trade rules. The EEC argued that the Lomé regime was 
rendered legal under Article XXIV of GATT 1947 (free trade areas and customs 
unions) combined with Part IV of the GATT (trade and development). The 
suggestion was that the trade provisions of the Lomé Convention amounted to an 
interregional free trade area as allowed under GATT Article XXIV. Article 
XXIV:8(b), however, made it clear that FTAs should liberalise ‘substantially all 
trade’ between contracting parties, the implication of which was that these 
arrangements should be reciprocal. The EEC argued, however, that Lomé’s non-
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reciprocal preferences were allowed by GATT Article XXXVI:8, which permits 
non-reciprocity in the provision of special treatment to developing countries 
(Onguglo and Ito 2003, p. 13). Other GATT contracting parties disagreed, 
arguing that the provisions under Lomé did not meet GATT rules because they 
neither extended to all developing countries nor fulfilled the requirement of 
reciprocity in order to be considered an FTA (Onguglo and Ito 2003, p. 13). The 
EU continued to argue that the Lomé Convention was compatible with 
multilateral trade rules up to the 1990s, although this was never tested with a 
formal challenge during this period (Grilli 1993, p. 12). 
 
4.4 Creeping Conditionality and the Demise of Lomé 
 
Not long after the ink was dry on the first Lomé Convention, the consensus that 
formed its ideological underpinning began to erode. From the early 1980s, the 
New Right project associated with premierships of Margaret Thatcher in the UK 
and Ronald Reagan in the USA had a profound impact on development thinking 
the world over. This was not just a technical response to changed economic 
circumstances in the face of the oil shocks and stagflation. Rather, it was part of 
a political project with an ideology combining a liberal desire for a small state 
with a conservative emphasis on national discipline (Gamble 1994). The 
industrialised nations, particularly the United States, had huge influence in the 
International Financial Institutions – the World Bank and International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). The neoliberal turn at the national level in these countries was 
associated with a similar shift in these multilateral organisations (Cafruny 2003, 
p. 290). The Reagan government was a key driver in the World Bank’s turn 
towards structural adjustment programmes as its primary mode of development 
support (Brown 2004, p. 19). Structural adjustment programmes made financial 
support conditional upon the privatisation of national industries, the devaluation 
of currencies, measures to curb inflation, cuts to public spending, and the 
reduction of budget deficits (see Williamson 1990). This marked a radical break 
from previous World Bank policies, which had focussed on large scale project 
funding with a strong state focus (Brown 2004, p. 19). Charles Gore (2000) 
suggested that this new development thinking combined a normative globalism, 
epitomised by the argument that participation in the global economy was 
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necessary for development, with a methodological nationalism that claimed that 
development failures stemmed from endogenous problems at the national level 
(see also Payne and Phillips 2009, p. 92). Structuralist claims that trade between 
developed and developing countries disadvantaged the latter were rejected 
(Rapley 2007, p. 70-1).  
 
This neoliberal revolution had important effects on the EEC. Attempts by the 
French government to continue to use Keynesian policies ended in capital flight, 
exchange crisis and the famous policy U-turn of Socialist President Mitterrand in 
1983 (Rapley 2007, p. 70-1). This had a profound effect on the EEC, serving to: 
 
Redirect the embryonic European transnational class toward a neoliberal 
strategy under the leadership of Jacques Delors, who, as Mitterrand’s 
finance minister, had experienced the full force of international 
speculative attacks on the Franc (Cafruny 2003, p. 288).  
 
While the policy orientation of the European Commission was deeply affected by 
the French experience and the neoliberal revolution more broadly, the application 
of neoliberalism in the EEC took on a distinctly ‘European’ flavour. As 
Commission President from 1985 to 1994, Delors strove to implement ‘regulated 
capitalism’ (Hooghe 2001, p. 132). This, while liberal in its outlook, placed 
greater emphasis on governing capitalism through strong regulation than the 
more ad hoc approach that dominated across the Atlantic in the United States 
(Abdelal and Meunier 2010, p. 350). 
 
As neoliberal ideas permeated the European Commission in general, they also 
influenced DG VIII’s approach to development relations. As a result, the 
uniqueness of the Lomé arrangement was gradually undermined by concessions 
to structural adjustment and the ‘good governance’ agenda in the renegotiations 
that took place in 1985 and 1990 (Brown 2004). At Lomé III in 1985, ‘policy 
dialogues’ were introduced to give the Commission a greater say in how aid 
would be spent in the ACP countries. At Lomé IV in 1990, the Commission set 
aside 14 percent of the EDF specifically for structural adjustment (Lister 1997, p. 
115). Further changes reflected a growing consensus in development policy 
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communities in the early 1990s about the importance of good governance for 
development. The Commission proposed at the Mid-Term Review of Lomé IV in 
1995, that it should take over much of the responsibility for development projects 
from ACP governments, that aid should be granted in performance-related 
tranches, that an increased proportion of the EDF budget should be spent on 
institutional reforms, and that a range of political conditionalities should be 
attached to the benefits associated with Lomé (Arts and Byron 1997, p. 77). 
These changes clearly represented a shift away from ‘ideological neutrality’ 
(Brown 2000, p. 368-74) and the idea that the ACP countries should be ‘masters 
of their programmes’ (Crawford 1996, p. 509). 
 
Despite these reforms, inspired by the growing neoliberal consensus, some key 
and distinctive features of the Lomé Convention – non-reciprocal trade 
preferences in particular – remained in place into the 1990s. Lomé’s persistence 
in the context of a geopolitical situation in which the growing voice of 
developing countries in the 1970s had given way to debt crisis and the ‘lost 
decade’ of the 1980s has been explained elsewhere as the result of a logic of 
institutional path dependence. As Ravenhill (2004) describes, the 
institutionalisation of the EU-ACP relationship in the unique ideational and 
geopolitical context of the 1970s later served as a ‘reference point that 
constrained how the relationship could evolve’ (p. 137).  
 
The Lomé Convention had clearly created a powerful set of incentives for the 
ACP countries to seek to preserve the preferential access to the EU market that 
they received under it (see Ravenhill 1993). Likewise, those working within DG 
VIII in the Commission may have perceived an interest in maintaining the 
special relationship with the ACP countries, which provided in large measure the 
raison d’être of their Directorate. While path dependencies certainly played their 
part as an institutional anchor that resisted the drift to neoliberalism, it is also 
worth noting that within this context some European actors expressed continued 
enthusiasm for key aspects of the Lomé arrangement and EU-ACP relations.  
 
It is important to note, then, that there were initial doubts amongst European 
Commission policymakers about the move to integrate emerging neoliberal 
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development norms within the EU-ACP relationship. The changes that were 
made to the Lomé Convention in the 1980s were contested from within the 
Commission by the former Development Commissioner, Edgard Pisani (1988), 
who said, ‘Lomé will not be Lomé if it concerns itself with adjustment. Lomé 
was made for development.’ Further, Manuel Marin, the Development 
Commissioner from 1989 to 1994 expressed some early doubts about the merits 
of structural adjustment (Grilli 1993, p. 174). Commission officials also insisted 
in the run up to the Lomé IV negotiations that adjustment under Lomé would 
avoid the coercive practices of the World Bank and IMF; protect provision of 
long-term project aid; and preserve the ACP countries’ right to determine their 
development priorities (Brown 2000, p. 374-5; 2004, p. 21). While Brown (2000, 
p. 375) suggests that the EC failed to live up to these promises, the point remains 
that up to the 1990s, at least some within the European Commission seemed to 
retain a commitment to some of the underlying principles of the Lomé 
Convention. 
 
It is widely accepted that by the early 1990s the EEC had lost much of its earlier 
interest in the ACP countries (see, inter alia, Cosgrove 1994; ECDPM 1996; 
Grilli 1993). The end of the Cold War and the move towards market economies 
in the former Soviet Union had refocused EEC foreign relations on the countries 
immediately to its east. Furthermore, the declining economic fortunes of many of 
the ACP countries – alongside the rise of the East Asian ‘tigers’ – left the ACP in 
a position of less economic significance to the EU as both an export market and a 
source of raw materials than it had been in 1975 (Faber and Orbie 2009b). It also 
seemed that the process of European enlargement had diluted the influence of 
those countries – especially France – that wished to maintain a special 
relationship with their former colonial territories. As Heron (2011) suggests, 
‘Spain, Portugal and the Nordic countries […] saw little logic in a pro-
development policy based on targeting aid, for the most part, at countries with 
strong colonial links to certain member states while excluding other, equally, or 
even more poor, countries without this historical connection’ (p. 338). It is very 
likely that these were all important influences upon policymakers’ thinking about 
the future of EU-ACP relations. It is worth remembering however, that the 
puzzle as I have framed it is about why, within the context of these ostensibly 
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declining European material and institutional interests in the ACP countries, the 
EU eventually adopted a policy prospectus in the Cotonou Agreement and 
beyond that devoted considerable resources and political capital to pursuing an 
ambitious regional integration and liberalisation agenda in relation to these 
countries. 
 
The contention here is that at least as important for understanding the eventual 
form of the Cotonou Agreement as these material and institutional changes, was 
the fact that any remaining commitment within the European Commission to the 
ideas that had underpinned the Lomé Convention appeared to be disappearing by 
the early 1990s. Not only this but the Lomé regime was increasingly at odds with 
other elements of the EU’s external economic relations, underpinned by an 
emerging multilateralist, regionalist and broadly neoliberal consensus.  
 
Of particular importance in relation to the EU’s approach to the ACP relationship 
in the 1990s was the Commission’s relatively new enthusiasm for multilateralism 
– and, in addition, interregionalism – as a way of governing global trade and 
managing relations with strategic partners. In line with Commission President 
Delors’ commitment to ‘regulated capitalism’, from 1985 the EC eschewed its 
earlier scepticism towards a new multilateral trade round (Woolcock 1999, p. 32) 
and began pursuing a policy known as ‘multilateralism first’ (Elsig 2007a, p. 15-
16). Throughout the 1990s, the EU’s primary external trade policy priority was 
the pursuit of further multilateral trade liberalisation, particularly with regard to 
‘new’ trade issues such as competition policy, investment policy, intellectual 
property rights and technical barriers to trade (later known as the ‘Singapore 
issues’) (Evenett 2007, p. 20). Driven forward by the liberal stance of Trade 
Commissioner Leon Brittan (Barker 2012) the EU sought to build a multilateral 
trade system based on the set of trade and trade-related rules that governed 
Europe itself, and with Europe at its centre.  
 
Following the completion of the Single European Market in January 1993 – and 
in the context of a global proliferation of new and renewed regional projects (see 
Gamble and Payne 1996) – the EU began to place more emphasis on 
interregional cooperation as a stepping stone to multilateral liberalisation 
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(Solignac Lecomte 1998, p. 7). For the first time, in the early 1990s, the EU 
adopted the external promotion of regional integration as an explicit policy aim 
in its relations with its Mediterranean neighbours, the Common Market of the 
South (MERCOSUR) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). 
The EU engaged in cooperation with these regions that included political 
dialogue, technical assistance, financial support and trade cooperation (see Bilal 
2005; Börzel and Risse 2009; Farrell 2009; Santander 2005). The Lomé 
Convention has been seen by some as a precursor to these interregional relations 
(Hardacre and Smith 2009, p. 169). It now, however, seemed somewhat out of 
step with the EU’s emphasis on interregionalism as a stepping stone to 
multilateral liberalisation. This was because Lomé’s non-reciprocal preferences 
allowed ACP countries to maintain relatively protective trade regimes.  
 
Further, the fact that Lomé granted preferential treatment to the ACP countries 
based on historical colonial ties appeared to contradict an emerging norm within 
the EU that development assistance should be targeted at the poorest developing 
countries. This had been enshrined within the Maastricht Treaty (1992), which 
highlighted the importance of development support for ‘the most disadvantaged’ 
developing countries. 
 
Opinions within the Commission had also hardened against the development 
modalities of the Lomé Convention specifically by the early 1990s. Importantly, 
this had begun to happen before any formal challenge to Lomé within the GATT 
had materialised (see below). At this time, there was a growing consensus 
amongst Commission policymakers that the Lomé Convention had failed to 
achieve its development aims. This conclusion was supported by aggregate 
figures that showed a decline in the ACP share of total EU imports from 7.5 
percent to 4 percent between 1974 and 1989 (Grilli 1993, p. 162). Some 
commentators saw this decline as evidence of the ineffectiveness and 
unimportance of Lomé preferences to ACP countries (Davenport 1992). Others 
suggested that these aggregate figures obscured a more complex picture. 
McQueen and Stevens (1989) concluded from a country- and product-level 
analysis that ACP trade performance would have been much worse without 
preferential access to the EU market (see also Gibb 2000; McQueen et al. 1998; 
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Panos 1998). McQueen and Stevens (1989) also reported that certain non-
traditional ACP exports had grown relatively quickly under Lomé and that a 
small number of countries – especially Mauritius, Jamaica and Zimbabwe – had 
managed to exploit trade preferences to achieve significant diversification in 
their export profiles. Despite these qualified and limited successes, by 1992, the 
European Commission was reporting that ‘for a large group of developing 
countries (the less developed countries) development efforts have ended in 
complete failure’ (European Commission 1992, p. 1, emphasis added). 
 
By this point, critics within EU policymaking circles had concluded that ‘Lomé 
was part of the problem rather than the solution’ (ECDPM 1996, p. 9). The same 
1992 Commission publication that had adjudged the EU’s development efforts a 
failure, asserted that ‘external aid is effective only when it backs sound 
development strategy’ (European Commission 1992, p. 1). Integration into the 
global economy on a liberal basis was now seen as central to such a sound 
development strategy, and had been written into the Maastricht Treaty (Heron 
2011, p. 338). In line with the international neoliberal consensus outlined above, 
the Commission also concluded that domestic policy problems were at least in 
part responsible for the poor development performance of many countries and 
that economic restructuring should be a key long-term priority, particularly in 
Africa (European Commission 1992, p. 6). 
 
Increasingly, then, where developing country protectionism and intervention in 
the domestic economy had previously been encouraged – or at least permitted – 
under the Lomé Convention, this was now seen as a barrier to development 
(Parfitt 1996, p. 55). The trade preferences provided under the Lomé Convention 
were viewed as perpetuating patterns of dependence on the EU rather than 
fostering the supply-side reforms that needed to be undertaken in order to further 
ACP development aims (ECDPM 1996, p. 9). As Cosgrove put it at the time: 
 
Within Europe, Africa’s failures are increasingly viewed as endemic and 
indigenous. This has helped to foster a view throughout the European 
Community that Africa’s failure to demonstrate any kind of economic 
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advancement has eroded the credibility of the previous special 
relationship (Cosgrove 1994, p. 245). 
 
Meanwhile, Grilli (1993, p. 174) suggested that by 1993 a ‘new orthodoxy’ about 
the determinants of Africa’s export failure under Lomé had led Commission 
officials to conclude that ‘structural’ reforms within ACP countries were of 
paramount importance. 
 
4.5 The Bananas Wars 
 
As I have already noted, the EU’s own explanation for the recasting of the EU-
ACP relationship suggested that rulings against the Lomé Convention in the 
GATT and WTO were the key driver behind this decision. These rulings, 
however, originated not in a dispute about Lomé itself, but rather about the 
creation of the single banana market in 1993 (Heron 2013, p. 28). 
 
On 1 July 1993 the EU adopted a Council Regulation on the common 
organisation of the market in bananas (Regulation 404/93) (Petersmann 1997, p. 
207). This replaced a variety of member state import systems with a single 
harmonized system based on the Lomé banana regime and made necessary by 
the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. The tariff system within this applied differentially 
to ACP and non-ACP countries. Latin and Central American banana exporters 
claimed they were adversely affected by the scheme and requested that a GATT 
Panel find the regime in breach of GATT’s non-discrimination principles 
(Spiegel 2000, p. 222). 
 
In February 1994 a GATT panel (EEC Bananas II DS38/R) found that the EU’s 
banana regime contravened the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) principle that 
guarantees non-discrimination between states in market access. In addition, it 
ruled against the EU’s claim that the Lomé regime could be defended as a free 
trade area on the basis of Article XXIV of the GATT (Heron 2013, p. 28). This 
was because Article XXIV:8(b) states that free trade areas must eliminate 
‘substantially all the trade between the constituent territories’. In the discussion 
of Article XXIV the panel found that: 
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Only agreements providing for an obligation to liberalize the trade in 
products originating in all of the constituent territories could be 
considered to establish a free-trade area within the meaning of Article 
XXIV:8(b) (EEC Bananas II 1994, p. 48, emphasis added). 
 
The non-reciprocal nature of Lomé preferences meant that they did not meet this 
requirement. The panel also concluded that the Enabling Clause, which allows 
for preferential treatment for developing countries on a non-discriminatory basis, 
was not applicable to the Lomé regime because it excluded many developing 
countries. Finally, the panel ruled that because Part IV of the GATT (which deals 
with special and differential treatment) did not mention Article XXIV (on free 
trade agreements), the two could not be combined in order to justify an 
exemption for Lomé from the MFN principle (Heron 2013, p. 28). 
 
By mobilising its forces amongst GATT members, the EU gained the necessary 
two-thirds majority to obtain a waiver from the ruling until the end of the of the 
Lomé IV regime in 2000 (Spiegel 2000, p. 225). This waiver allowed the Lomé 
regime to continue to operate in the interim period but did not prevent further 
legal challenges to the Banana Protocol (Heron 2013, p. 28). 
 
The EU response to the GATT Panel decision angered Latin American banana 
producers and the US launched a further complaint in the name of the US banana 
producer, Chiquita. A 1997 WTO Dispute Panel ruled that the EU banana regime 
violated WTO trade rules (Spiegel 2000, p. 225-7). The banana dispute rumbled 
on for another eleven years. Despite modifications by the EU, in 1999 the WTO 
ruled that the banana regime was still in breach multilateral trade rules, by which 
time the US had already imposed sanctions of $520 million on EU imports 
(Spiegel 2000, p. 228).  
 
On 29 December 2000, the EU applied for a further two waivers – one designed 
to protect existing banana preferences and the other to protect Lomé-equivalent 
preferential arrangements under the transitional Cotonou regime. These were 
eventually achieved at the Doha Ministerial Conference (2001). The first waived 
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Article XIII of the GATT for a transitional regime on the import of bananas until 
31 December 2005 and the second waived Article I of the GATT in relation to 
the continuation of Lomé preferential tariff treatments as specified in the 
Cotonou Agreement until 31 December 2007 (Feichtner 2012, p. 116-7). The EU 
applied for a further waiver for the banana regime in 2005 but this was declined 
in the face of Latin American opposition (Feichtner 2012, p. 118-9).  
 
The case of the Banana Wars is emblematic because the EU had contested 
challenges to the banana regime and Lomé Convention, pitted itself against the 
USA, and risked reputational damage by being found repeatedly in contravention 
of WTO rules. Having initially defended the legal status of the Lomé 
Convention, however, by 1997 the European Commission came to the 
conclusion that the GATT and WTO’s rulings had ‘undermined the principles 
underpinning Lomé trade preferences, in particular those of non-reciprocity and 
stability’ (European Commission 1997, cited in Gibb 2000, p. 468). As such the 
EU indicated that rather than applying for a further extension to the waiver that 
related to non-reciprocal ACP preferences, it would seek to recast the Lomé 
relationship in a way that was WTO compatible (Heron 2013, p. 29). The reason 
that the EU gave for this decision was the tightening of rules for the granting of 
waivers under the WTO, which by that time required a 75 percent rather than a 
two-thirds majority (Heron 2013, p. 29). As I argued at the beginning of the 
chapter, however, this decision – and the EU’s subsequent pursuit of ambitious 
EU-ACP FTAs that went beyond the requirements of WTO rules – appears 
something of a puzzle unless the changing ideas of Commission and other EU 
policymakers are considered. 
 
4.6 WTO Compatibility and the Cotonou Agreement 
 
The issue of WTO compliance is raised by almost all critical accounts of the 
EPAs (Heron and Murray-Evans 2013, p. 13; see Gibb 2000; Hurt 2003; 
Ravenhill 2004; Goodison 2007; Faber and Orbie 2009b). The key argument 
here is that Lomé could have been rendered WTO compatible without the need 
for reciprocity. Tony Heron (2011, p. 29), for example, argues that during the 
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Banana Wars the chief concern of those who challenged the EU’s trade practices 
was its discriminatory banana regime, rather than Lomé trade preferences per se. 
Further, while the EU had been refused in its application for a further waiver for 
the banana regime, numerous precedents existed for waivers granted for non-
reciprocal trade regimes similar to Lomé (Heron 2011, p. 29).  
 
Achille Bassilekin (2007), Advisor to the Permanent Delegation of the ACP 
Group in Geneva, suggests that a waiver for the continuation of Lomé-equivalent 
non-reciprocal preferences might have been possible beyond 2007, but that this 
faced considerable obstacles. These included, ‘a rather heavy atmosphere in the 
Goods Council’ (p. 6) in the context of the Banana Wars; the need to get Latin 
American banana producers on side; and the requirement to offer enough 
sweeteners to countries like Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia in order to 
buy off their opposition (Bassilekin 2007). As Gerrit Faber and Jan Orbie 
(2009b) put it, ‘Obtaining a new waiver for non-reciprocity towards the ACP 
[was] a matter of political negotiations rather than legal requirements’ (p. 54). 
 
In this context, Christopher Stevens (1999, cited in Gibb 2000) argued that 
WTO-compatibility had become central to the recasting of Lomé precisely 
because the EU had placed it there ‘by arguing that a continuation of the waiver 
negotiated for Lomé is unviable for the longer-term future’ (p. 468). In line with 
the argument developed earlier in this chapter, Heron says: 
 
The deeper point was that these matters were themselves being shaped by 
a fundamental shift in the ideological underpinnings of global economic 
governance in general and the EU’s external relations with the 
developing countries in particular (Heron 2013, p. 29). 
 
It should be recalled from the argument presented above that this ideological 
shift within the European Commission in particular had begun to be cemented 
even before the GATT challenges to the Lomé regime in the mid 1990s. 
 
Following the banana rulings, the Lomé status quo was not sustainable without 
significant political wrangling on the part of the EU. However, once the EU had 
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decided that it was no longer willing to defend Lomé’s legal status, the shape of 
Lomé’s successor was not fully determined by WTO rules. There were two main 
ways in which the EU-ACP relationship could be rendered WTO compatible (see 
Gibb 2000, p. 469). First, the EU could seek to protect non-reciprocal 
preferences by extending them to all ACP countries at a specified level of 
development, in order to comply with the Enabling Clause. Second, the EU could 
abandon the practice of non-reciprocity and instead seek reciprocal free trade 
agreements with individual or groups of ACP countries under article XXIV 
(Gibb 2000, p. 469). 
 
Within this context, the Commission published its landmark Green Paper on 
Relations between the European Union and the ACP Countries in 1996. The 
Green Paper insisted that a new EU-ACP arrangement must ‘achieve respect for 
the relevant WTO rules’ (European Commission 1996, p. 22). It identified four 
options for the future of the EU-ACP relationship: the maintenance of the status 
quo; the integration of the ACP into the existing GSP; the negotiation of a single 
free trade agreement based on ‘uniform reciprocity’ between the EU and the 
ACP countries; or the negotiation of ‘differentiated’ reciprocal free trade 
agreements between the EU and ‘homogeneous regional groups of ACP 
countries’ or individual ACP countries (European Commission 1996, p. 64-5).  
 
Despite identifying this range of alternative options for the future of the EU-ACP 
relationship, the Green Paper also marked the point at which any lingering 
commitment to the preservation of the ‘ideological neutrality’ of Lomé gave way 
to a fuller embrace of the neoliberal orthodoxy that centred on the need to expose 
developing countries to the global economy. Furthering the narrative presented 
within earlier Commission documents (see above), the policy diagnosis of Lomé 
offered by the Green Paper placed heavy emphasis on the role of ‘supply-side’ 
blockages. It declared that the ‘state of institutions and economic policy in the 
recipient country have often been major constraints’ on the effectiveness of trade 
preferences (European Commission 1996, p. iv; Heron and Murray-Evans 2013, 
p. 16). The document also stressed the EU’s growing focus on interregional 
relations with developing countries and its own role as a ‘model of cooperation 
and regional integration’ (European Commission 1996, p. 6) 
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Further, responses to the Green Paper from member states revealed a broad 
consensus that the Lomé Convention – although in essence a useful arrangement 
– had failed to achieve its development aims (Posthumus 1998). The consultation 
following the publication of the Green Paper also revealed broad support for the 
idea that fostering exposure to the global economy should be a key priority of 
future EU-ACP relations (Posthumus 1998). In line with the EU’s emphasis on 
supporting the poorest developing countries – enshrined within the Maastricht 
Treaty – most EU member states also favoured some form of special and 
differential treatment for the most vulnerable ACP countries (Posthumus 1998).  
 
There was a broad consensus within the Commission and amongst member 
states, then, that the new EU-ACP relationship should foster ACP exposure to 
the global economy, promote regional integration, and offer special treatment to 
the poorest developing countries.19 In this context, the European Commission 
had the task of building a coherent mandate for the negotiations for the Cotonou 
Agreement. In so doing, however, Commission policymakers were caught 
between two separate sets of path dependent institutions. These were, (a) 
historical commitments to partnership and the provision trade preferences to the 
ACP countries as former colonies; and (b) the idiosyncratic rules that had 
developed via the GATT and WTO’s governance of multilateral trade 
liberalisation. It was here, then, that EU policymakers deployed the GATT and 
WTO banana rulings – and Article XXIV of the GATT in particular – as a 
pretext for the implementation of a policy based on the EU policymakers’ more 
or less independent preference for broad, differentiated and region-based ACP 
trade opening. The Commission’s proposed mandate for the Cotonou Agreement 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Where there was disagreement amongst the member states, this was focused 
less on the core aims of EU development relations – poverty reduction through 
differentiated integration into the global economy – and more on the strategy for 
their achievement. Central to this debate were concerns about the continued 
relevance of the ACP group (given the trend towards targeted development 
assistance); the speed and extent to which ACP countries should be encouraged 
to liberalise their trade regimes; and the subdivision of the ACP group into 
smaller regions for the purpose of negotiating the new relationship (Posthumus 
1998; Solignac Lecomte 1998, p. 9-10). 
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– and the content of the Agreement itself – was heavily influenced by this 
strategic move. 
 
The negotiating mandate for the Cotonou Agreement that was proposed by the 
Commission in 1997 and approved by the Council in June 2008 relied upon both 
the Enabling Clause and Article XXIV as means of establishing WTO 
compatibility (Gibb 2000, p. 469). Article XXIV and the creation of free trade 
agreements, however, was placed front and centre by the Commission. The 
Commission’s proposed mandate for the negotiations stated: 
 
In the long run, the […] proliferation of economic cooperation 
agreements compatible with the WTO, and in particular GATT article 
XXIV on free-trade areas, would ultimately mean that the EU’s future 
trade arrangements were perfectly in line with WTO provisions and 
require no exceptions (European Commission 1997, p. 25). 
 
The content of article XXIV made it quite clear that any free trade agreement 
between the EU and ACP would need to be reciprocal to the extent that 
‘substantially all trade’ would be liberalised. Taking this article as the basis for 
the recasting of Lomé, then, appeared to be a neat way of reconciling WTO 
compatibility with the new consensus within the European Commission that 
development within ACP countries would only be served if these countries were 
encouraged to undergo economic restructuring and liberalisation.  
 
The move to reciprocity can be seen not so much as a necessary outcome of the 
GATT challenges to the Lomé regime, but rather part of the EU’s contingent 
strategy to deploy the constraints imposed by WTO compatibility in such a way 
as to render its desired reform agenda a necessary condition for the continuation 
of ACP preferences. Article XXIV, then, became a fixed point onto which the 
EU could pin its insistence on ACP trade reforms and render the continuation of 
trade preferences conditional upon ACP trade liberalisation. This was reflected in 
the trade component of the Cotonou Agreement (2000), which mandated that 
Lomé would be replaced with a number of reciprocal FTAs. 
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Alongside reciprocity, the principle of regionalism was central to both the EU’s 
negotiating mandate and the eventual Cotonou Agreement. The proposed 
negotiating mandate placed the promotion of regional integration as a key 
priority and stated: 
 
This type of operation is specific to the Community, enabling other 
countries to benefit from the experience of building Europe and the 
know-how accumulated in a number of areas [of regional integration] 
(European Commission 1997, p. 18-9). 
 
Following this, the Cotonou Agreement determined that the reciprocal FTAs that 
were to replace Lomé would be negotiated between the EU and a number of 
ACP sub-regions. Articles 28-30 of the Cotonou Agreement also pledged the 
EU’s commitment to providing capacity-building support for regional 
institutions and national governments in matters of regional integration. 
 
In theory a new EU-ACP relationship based on GATT Article XXIV did not 
require a region-based solution, in that a single ACP FTA or a series of bilateral 
agreements between the EU and individual ACP countries might have been 
proposed instead (Heron and Murray-Evans 2013, p. 17). To some extent, 
regional agreements were presented as a practical solution to negotiating free 
trade agreements with the large and diverse ACP group (see Siles-Brügge 2014a, 
p. 142). However, the decision to pursue a region-based arrangement also clearly 
reflected the growing commitment amongst Commission policymakers to the 
external promotion of regional integration (see above and European Commission 
1995; 1996). When asked about why a region-based model was chosen for the 
post-Lomé settlement, interviewees from the Commission stated the belief that 
regional integration had been an instrument for economic growth in Europe and 
that it could be useful elsewhere as well. Furthermore they believed that the EU 
was in a unique position to export its regional experiences and that these could 
be particularly useful in the ACP context where economies are small and 
(particularly in Africa) borders are sometimes arbitrary.20 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Interview 5 (DG DEVCO). 
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Although there is evidence from earlier Commission documents that the EU had 
some idea about the shape the EPA regional configurations would take (see 
Solignac Lecomte 1998, p. 8), all that was stated in the Cotonou Agreement was 
that the EPAs would build on the regional integration initiatives of ACP states 
(Article 35.2). The evidence suggests, then, that at this stage the EU’s new 
enthusiasm for supporting processes of regional integration beyond its borders 
was viewed as compatible with practical concerns about rendering the large and 
diverse ACP group manageable for the purposes of negotiating WTO-compatible 
reciprocal free trade agreements under Article XXIV.  
 
These elements of the post-Lomé settlement – reciprocity and regionalism – did 
not incorporate the growing consensus amongst European policymakers and 
member states that development assistance should be targeted at the most 
disadvantaged countries. Under the Enabling Clause, the EU could legally offer 
preferential treatment to a group of developing countries at a specified level of 
development. This could be deployed in one of two ways. These were, (a) a 
unilateral offer of improved market access to UN classified Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs); or (b) the extension of this offer to all developing countries 
under the EU’s GSP (Bartels 2008, p. 12). The latter option, however, would 
have meant extending improved preferences to over 50 non-ACP countries. 
Here, EU policymakers were constrained by the history of the EU-ACP 
relationship. ACP countries opposed the extension of improved preferences to all 
developing countries under the GSP because this would significantly reduce their 
preferential margins (Gibb 2000, p. 471). Furthermore, the unilateral nature of 
the EU’s GSP was deemed contrary to the longstanding character of the Lomé 
Convention as a partnership of equals (Gibb 2000, p. 471). 
 
In this context, the only legally robust way in which differentiation could be 
offered within the Cotonou Agreement was by granting non-reciprocal trade 
access to those countries formally classified as LDCs (Heron 2013, p. 120). The 
group of LDCs included roughly half of the ACP as well as nine non-ACP 
countries (Gibb 2000, p. 471). The EU had already granted Lomé-equivalent 
non-reciprocal market access to non-ACP LDCs in 1997 (Orbie 2007, p. 33). 
	  132	  
Article 37.9 of the Cotonou Agreement went a stage further, stating that the EU 
would provide duty free access for ‘essentially all’ LDC products at the latest by 
2005. The agreement also pledged – without clear basis in WTO rules – ‘to take 
due account of the vulnerability of landlocked and island ACP countries’ and ‘to 
take into consideration the needs of countries in post-conflict situations’ (Article 
84.1) in the EPA negotiations. 
 
The EU’s aim then, had been to deploy WTO rules – and particularly Article 
XXIV – as an imperative to recast the EU-ACP relationship in line with a more 
or less independent set of preferences for a development policy that emphasised 
region-based and differentiated ACP liberalisation. These preferences help to 
explain both the EU’s decision to end its legal defence of the Lomé Convention 
and its subsequent decision to recast the EU-ACP relationship in a way that went 
beyond the minimum requirements of WTO rules. Some of the tensions within 
this strategy, however, were already evident. 
 
There was a clear tension between the EU’s aim of using conditionalities 
associated with reciprocity to leverage trade reform in the ACP regions on the 
one hand, and its commitment to differentiation on the other. It remained unclear 
within the Cotonou Agreement how and to what extent asymmetry and 
differential treatment would be enshrined in the EPAs. This was particularly 
problematic in the context of the EU’s aim of negotiating the EPAs on an 
interregional basis and the questions that this raised about how differential 
treatment for LDCs and other vulnerable states might be incorporated into such 
an arrangement. This problem was compounded by the fact that while Special 
and Differential Treatment provisions are enshrined elsewhere in the legal texts 
of the GATT and WTO, Article XXIV makes no mention of this or of how a free 
trade agreement might be rendered ‘development friendly’ (Heron 2013, p. 28). 
 
The EU’s ambition to retain some elements of its historic privileged partnership 
with the ACP countries raised its own problems. The Cotonou Agreement made 
little acknowledgement of the fact that the existing contours of the ACP group 
did not offer a good geographical fit with any of the existing regional integration 
projects on which the EU hoped to base the EPAs. These interregional 
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agreements would have to be reached in advance of the 2007 expiry of the WTO 
waiver that had been granted to allow the continuation of Lomé preferences 
during the EPA negotiation process. This left little time in which to make the 
necessary adjustments in regional memberships and to build capacity within 
ACP regions for the complex negotiations.  
 
These cracks could be papered over before the EPA negotiations got under way. 
However, the difficulties of reconciling the legacies of an existing set of trade 
relationships, the EU’s shifting aims and priorities for cooperation with the ACP, 
and its commitment to and discursive invocation of WTO rules became more 
evident from 2002 onwards. 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter began with an empirical puzzle. Why did the EU abandon its legal 
defence of the Lomé Convention in the mid 1990s and instead pursue the 
recasting of the EU-ACP relationship in the form of ambitious interregional 
FTAs? 
 
Extant explanations of this puzzle appeal to legal imperatives, European 
commercial interests, bureaucratic divisions within the EU, and normative 
commitments to trade liberalisation and the promotion of regionalism. The 
account presented here sits closest to the last of these explanations. However, it 
seems that even the literature that is most explicit in identifying the ideological 
thrust of the EU’s approach to the Cotonou negotiations (Hurt 2003; Gibb 2000) 
makes an assumption – not borne out by the EPA negotiations to date – that the 
neoliberal beliefs held by powerful actors could be relatively unproblematically 
translated into substantive policy tools and outcomes.  
 
By contrast, this chapter has begun to develop an understanding of the complex 
processes of historical change that characterised the evolution of the EU’s 
approach to relations with the ACP countries and the roles of path dependency 
and contingency in these. Taking account of this complexity allows a more 
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nuanced understanding of the forces that shaped the content of the Cotonou 
Agreement. It also reveals a series of tensions that emerged in the making of 
Cotonou that ultimately limited the reach of the EU’s material leverage in the 
EPA negotiations and opened the EPAs to discursive contestation from a variety 
of actors. 
 
This chapter has stressed the importance of incremental change in the ideas that 
had provided the foundation for the EU-ACP relationship under the Lomé 
Convention, culminating in the abandonment of the principle of non-interference 
in ACP development strategies in the 1990s. This coalesced into a consensus that 
the primary obstacles to ACP development were endogenous and a shared 
commitment to liberalisation, differentiation and regionalism, both as ways of 
addressing these problems and as principles for the governance of the 
international system.  
 
After the banana rulings, the Lomé status quo was perhaps no longer legally and 
politically sustainable. The EU, however, used the rulings as a pretext to deploy 
WTO rules – Article XXIV in particular – as an imperative for ACP trade 
opening. Furthermore, the EU’s proposal for comprehensive and interregional 
EPAs went beyond the requirements of WTO rules. The decision to pursue the 
EPAs, then, reflected a more or less independent set of EU policy preferences for 
comprehensive and region-based ACP trade opening. The way that these 
preferences were translated into a concrete policy agenda, however, was shaped 
by the strategic invocation of WTO rules as well as path-dependent features of 
EU-ACP relations. 
 
Clearly, reconciling the exigencies of WTO rules (as interpreted and deployed by 
European actors) with the historical legacy of the EU-ACP relationship on the 
one hand, and with the preferences of EU actors for deep regional trade reform 
on the other, was more problematic than perhaps it seemed at first. By the time 
the Cotonou Agreement was signed in 2000, the EU had set in motion a 
replacement for the Lomé Convention that it justified on legal, normative and 
practical grounds. The EPAs would, by virtue of reciprocal free trade areas, meet 
the requirements of Article XXIV of the GATT while also fulfilling European 
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normative preferences for the reform of ACP trade regimes. Regionalism 
provided a practical basis on which these negotiations would be conducted while 
also supporting the EU’s normative aim of fostering regional integration beyond 
its borders. Meanwhile, differentiation would be enshrined in the EPAs in order 
to satisfy European calls for protection of the most vulnerable developing 
countries. However a series of tensions – between reciprocity, regionalism, 
differentiation and WTO compatibility – were becoming apparent and it is to 
these that I now turn. 	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Chapter Five 
The EPAs and the Limits of EU External 
Economic Action21 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In 2000, when the Cotonou Agreement was signed, the plan to replace the Lomé 
Convention with reciprocal FTAs between the EU and ACP sub-regions seemed 
justified on legal, normative and practical grounds. Not only this, but the EU’s 
preponderance of market and financial power vis-à-vis the ACP countries – 
along with the latter’s vulnerability to the loss of Lomé-equivalent preferences – 
led those writing on EU-ACP relations at the time to conclude that the outcomes 
of the negotiations were likely to reflect EU preferences for the reciprocal and 
comprehensive liberalisation of ACP trade regimes (Farrell 2005; Goodison 
2007; Stoneman and Thompson 2007; Brewster et al. 2008). However, the expiry 
of the WTO waiver on 31 December 2007 – the putative deadline for the 
conclusion of the negotiations – came and went without a single comprehensive 
agreement having been signed (Heron and Murray-Evans 2013, p. 17).  
 
The conclusion of a comprehensive EPA between the EU and CARIFORUM the 
following year provided grounds for optimism that other ACP regions would 
eventually fall into line (Heron and Murray-Evans 2013, p. 17). Yet despite the 
precedent set by the CARIFORUM EPA, to date it remains the only agreement 
of its kind. Indeed, by 2011, only 34 out of 79 ACP states had signed even the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 This chapter draws on a co-authored paper written by Tony Heron and myself 
and presented at the Sheffield Political Economy Research Institute (SPERI) 
Annual Conference, Beyond Austerity versus Growth, 1-3 July 2013 (Heron and 
Murray-Evans 2013). The material presented here is based on my own research, 
or, where it draws on Tony’s previous research and publications, these are 
referenced as appropriate.	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more limited ‘goods only’ interim EPAs, while the European Commission was 
reporting that only 18 (only four outside CARIFORUM) had taken significant 
steps to ratify and implement these agreements (Bilal and Ramdoo 2011; Heron 
and Murray-Evans 2013, p. 12). At the time of writing (July 2014) two more 
regions – West Africa and SADC-minus – have recently agreed to conclude 
EPAs. These agreements came in the wake of a number of significant 
concessions from the EU and the removal of binding clauses on most of the 
controversial ‘WTO-plus’ issues (trade in services, government procurement, 
trade facilitation, investment and competition) from the final texts. 
 
In more recent times – prompted by the limited progress in the EPA negotiations 
– scholars have paid more attention to the contingencies of the EPA process than 
previously (Bilal and Stevens 2009; Collier 2012; Del Felice 2012; Hurt et al. 
2013; Siles-Brügge 2014a; Stevens 2006; Trommer 2013). One variant of this 
literature highlights the uneven reach of the EU’s material leverage over the ACP 
countries in order to explain the refusal of a large number of countries to sign 
even an interim EPA (Bilal and Stevens 2009; Collier 2012; Stevens and Kennan 
2006). Another variant of this literature – which is of particular relevance to this 
chapter – draws attention to non-material aspects of the EPAs. This literature 
focuses on the role of transnational coalitions (ACP governments, sceptical 
European member states, NGOs and activists) in rebutting the EU’s depiction of 
the EPAs as ‘non-coercive’ and ‘development friendly’ and, instead, portraying 
them as coercive, driven by commercial self-interest and potentially deeply 
damaging to the ACP countries (Heron and Murray-Evans 2013, p. 3). In this 
vein, both Celina Del Felice (2012) and Stephen Hurt and his colleagues (2013) 
claim that the discursive tactics employed by these actors had a significant 
bearing upon the EPAs by persuading EU policymakers to make concessions on 
the most controversial elements of the agreements. Similarly, in a recent paper, 
Silke Trommer (2013) highlights the way that ACP governments in the West 
African regional configuration were able to challenge the EU’s agenda by seizing 
on legal ambiguities in frameworks governing the international trading system.  
 
In this chapter, I argue that both of these sets of literature analyse and draw out 
important features of the EPA negotiations. The materialist literature, for 
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example, demonstrates how the incentives associated with the EPAs placed more 
pressure to sign an EPA on some ACP countries than others. However, this 
literature is less forthcoming on the origins of this set of skewed incentives and 
the processual construction of the EU’s EPA strategy. I also contest the idea that 
the EPA decisions of ACP countries can be understood solely in terms of their 
vulnerability to the loss of trade preferences (see Murray-Evans 2013). And 
while I recognise the role played by transnational NGO coalitions in discursively 
presenting counter narratives of the EPAs and the viability of alternative policy 
options (Del Felice 2012; Hurt et al. 2013; Trommer 2013), I attempt to go 
beyond the limited existing exploration of ideational elements of the EPA 
negotiating dynamics. Specifically, I ask why it was that the EU’s own extensive 
and well-resourced rhetorical action appears to have – at least in most cases – 
failed to persuade the ACP of the merits of comprehensive EPAs (Heron and 
Murray-Evans 2013, p. 4). 
 
In Chapter Four I began to build an argument about the constructed and 
contingent nature of the EU’s ACP policy preferences and the policy tools for 
achieving these. In particular, I argued that the Cotonou Agreement was shaped 
by an emergent EU development consensus focussed on encouraging the 
exposure of the ACP countries to the global economy. To a considerable extent, 
the operationalisation of this consensus was linked to the strategic discursive 
invocation of the unfavourable WTO rulings in the EU banana case, which were 
portrayed as an external imperative for the reform of EU-ACP relations. In 
redesigning the EU-ACP trade relationship, the EU proposed a set of agreements 
that met the reciprocity and anti-discrimination requirements of GATT Articles I 
and XXIV. Policymakers also shaped the proposed recasting of the relationship 
in such a way as to meet their aim of opening up ACP trade regimes on a 
regional and differentiated basis. In this way, the EU’s discursive strategy was to 
portray comprehensive region-to-region free trade agreements as not only 
desirable, but necessary in order to comply with shared institutional rules.  
 
As Tony Heron and I have argued elsewhere, this strategy relied on the ability of 
the EU to maintain a plausible level of convergence between its aims and 
preferences for the EPAs and intersubjective understandings of the constraints 
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imposed by WTO law (Heron and Murray-Evans 2013). That is, the EU had to 
be able to make a convincing case that the particular EPA model that it proposed 
was indeed necessary in the light of ambiguous international trade rules (see 
Chapter Two). In this chapter, I will suggest that three tensions emerged within 
this discursive strategy over time. These tensions were caused by incompatibility 
between European preferences and path-dependent features of WTO rules; the 
difficulty of reconciling the aim of WTO compatibility with the existing 
geographical and historical features of ACP regions; and the EU’s changing 
policy preferences and their divergence from the trajectory of ongoing WTO 
negotiations. These tensions resulted in the uneven reach of the EU’s material 
sanctions within problematic ACP negotiating regions. They also opened up the 
EU’s normative arguments in favour of comprehensive EPAs to damaging 
criticism from a range of actors. As such, these tensions contribute to an 
explanation of the limited and partial success of the EU’s attempts to export a 
comprehensive model of liberal regional governance through the EPAs.  
 
This chapter proceeds by examining each of the tensions highlighted above in 
turn, before discussing the way that these tensions were reflected in the outcome 
of the EPA negotiations to date.  Table 5.1 offers a timeline of key developments 
in the EPA negotiations that are referred to in this chapter. 
 
5.2 The WTO, the EPAs and Differentiation 
 
The EPA negotiations got under way in September 2002. Even before they had 
started, a key tension was being exposed. This related to the reconciliation of 
WTO rules with the EU’s commitment to the provision of development support 
and trade protection to the poorest and most vulnerable ACP countries. The 
position of LDCs and the EU’s handling of differential treatment for these 
countries have been controversial features of the EPA negotiations. Much of this 
debate is centred around the decision by then European Trade Commissioner, 
Pascal Lamy, to grant duty free and quota free access to the EU market for all 
goods from LDCs under the Everything But Arms (EBA) arrangement 
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Year Event Details 
2000 Cotonou 
Agreement 
Provided a roadmap for replacing Lomé with a series of interregional 
reciprocal free trade agreements – the EPAs – and enshrined the principle 
of differentiation within this arrangement. 
2001 Everything 
but Arms 
EBA brought forward the commitment made in the Cotonou Agreement to 
grant duty free and quota free access to the EU market to all LDCs. 
2002 Start of EPA 
negotiations  
Negotiations began with an all-ACP phase that achieved little of substance. 
2003 Regional EPA 
negotiations 
begin 
The European Commission was eager to begin negotiations with regional 
groupings of ACP countries as early as possible. Little of substance was 
achieved in the early stages of the regional negotiations. 
2003 WTO Cancun 
Ministerial 
WTO negotiations suffered an acrimonious collapse. The most controversial 
of the Singapore issues – competition policy, government procurement and 
investment – were removed from the multilateral agenda. 
2004 Mandelson 
becomes EU 
Trade 
Commissioner 
Mandelson succeeded Pascal Lamy as Trade Commissioner. This coincided 
with a more aggressive turn in the EU’s EPA strategy and an increasing 
emphasis on the inclusion of the Singapore issues within the EPA 
negotiations. 
2007 Expiry of the 
WTO waiver 
and interim 
EPAs 
EPA negotiating activity increased in 2007. It became clear by October that 
the ACP regions – with the exception of CARIFORUM – would not be ready 
to sign full EPAs when the WTO waiver expired at the end of that year. The 
EU offered the option for countries from these regions to sign ‘interim’ 
goods only agreements and introduced Market Access Regulation 1528 
which would preserve market access for those countries that did this. By 
early 2008, 34 out of 79 ACP countries had initialled or signed a full or 
interim EPA. 
2008 Ashton 
becomes EU 
trade 
Commissioner 
Following the controversial climax to the EPA negotiations at the end of 
2007, Ashton struck a more conciliatory tone and made some progress 
repairing damaged EU-ACP relationships. Nonetheless, all deadlines for the 
completion of full EPAs were missed. 
2010 De Gucht 
becomes EU 
Trade 
Commissioner 
Karel De Gucht became Trade Commissioner (following a brief occupation 
of this role by Benita Ferrero-Waldner) and reportedly took a more 
pragmatic approach to the EPA negotiations, aiming to bring them to a 
swift conclusion. 
2011 Commission 
announces 
expiry of MAR 
1528 
By 2011 the position remained that only 34 out of 79 ACP countries had 
signed a full or interim EPA and only 18 of these (four outside CARIFORUM) 
had taken sufficient steps to ratify and implement the agreements. The 
Commission announced that the remaining countries would cease to 
benefit from access to the EU market under MAR 1528 should they fail to 
ratify and begin implementation of the EPAs by 1 January 2014 (later 
extended to 1 October 2014). 
2014 West Africa 
and SADC-
minus EPAs 
agreed 
Early in 2014, negotiators from the SADC-minus (except Angola) and West 
Africa EPA groupings agreed to conclude EPAs that covered trade in goods 
but not the majority of the EU’s controversial WTO-plus agenda. The EU 
also offered concessions on the MFN clause, export taxes and reciprocity. 
Table	  5.1:	  Timeline	  of	  key	  events	  in	  the	  EPA	  negotiations	  –	  Cotonou	  
Agreement	  to	  mid	  2014	  (source:	  author’s	  interpretation).	  
	   141	  
(see a number of contributions in Faber and Orbie 2007; Collier 2012). This 
decision was taken only three months after the Cotonou Agreement was 
concluded. 
 
At first sight, Lamy’s decision appears puzzling in the context of the EPAs 
because EBA effectively removed the incentive for LDCs to sign a reciprocal 
agreement with the EU. Under EBA, the LDCs – which included 39 of the 79 
ACP countries – would continue to receive preferential access to the EU market 
regardless of whether they signed an EPA. As Tony Heron (2013) suggests, EBA 
‘appeared to have been designed with only the most cursory attention to how it 
might impact on the realization of the remainder of the post-Lomé settlement’ (p. 
64).  
 
The market access commitment made under EBA, however, can be seen firmly 
within the context of the negotiations for the Doha Round in the WTO (Heron 
2013, p. 64). As one of my interviewees noted, EBA was clearly an attempt by 
Lamy to signal the EU’s commitment to making the Doha negotiations a 
‘development round’.22 The decision to introduce the EBA scheme, coupled with 
a relative lack of progress in the EPA negotiations during Lamy’s tenure, might 
signal a preoccupation with WTO negotiations under Lamy, who a colleague 
referred to as a ‘multilateralist at heart’.23 Indeed, Lamy amplified the EU’s 
commitment to ‘multilateralism first’ (see Chapter Four) during his tenure by 
placing a moratorium on new bilateral trade negotiations (see Elsig 2007a; Heron 
and Siles-Brügge 2012).  
 
It is also possible to argue that EBA stemmed from a deeper contradiction in the 
EU’s EPA agenda. This tension emerged out of attempts to combine WTO-
compatible FTAs with development-oriented differentiation. The origin of this 
contradiction was in the WTO’s idiosyncratic treatment of Special and 
Differential Treatment and the EU’s invocation of a strict interpretation Article 
XXIV of the GATT as a pretext for the EPAs. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Interview 5 (DG DEVCO). 
23 Interview 3 (DG Trade).	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As I discussed in Chapter Four, differentiation and the targeting of development 
assistance at the most vulnerable developing countries was a core element of EU 
development policy introduced in the 1990s. As such, it had been enshrined in 
the Cotonou Agreement even before Lamy introduced EBA. Article 37.9 of the 
Cotonou Agreement stated that the EU would provide duty free access for 
‘essentially all’ LDC products at the latest by 2005. EBA simply brought forward 
this commitment. The problem with EBA was not so much that it had been 
introduced without due attention to its impact on the EPA negotiating process, 
but rather that this offer of differential treatment was made outside of the EPA 
negotiating process. More importantly, there was no legally robust way of 
incorporating this commitment to differential treatment within the EPAs 
themselves. 
 
The problem here was the legal ambiguity surrounding Special and Differential 
Treatment itself. The more the EU’s case for reform relied on appeals to WTO 
compatibility, the more it rested on the GATT’s particularistic take on special 
and differential treatment. Amrita Narlikar argues that at the heart of these rules: 
 
Lies a major and unsustainable discrepancy: extreme legalization in the 
enforcement of the rules […] and an inordinate reliance on de facto 
improvisation in the making of those rules (Narlikar 2005, p. 42). 
 
Eligibility for trade preferences was never clearly addressed, either under the 
GATT or the WTO, and was instead allowed to develop as a series of ad hoc 
concessions (Heron 2013, p. 74). As such, the EU’s appeal to WTO rules in this 
context was on less solid ground than perhaps it made out. Specifically, the only 
legally robust category on which special and differential treatment could be 
based was in relation to UN designated LDCs (Heron 2013, p. 74). During the 
Cotonou negotiating process, it was suggested that the EU might have offered 
improved preferences to all developing countries covered by its GSP (Bartels 
2008, see Chapter Four). However, once this option had been rejected, the EU 
was restricted to offering differential treatment to LDCs only. Other groups that 
had been identified as particularly vulnerable by the Cotonou Agreement – 
landlocked and island countries and states in post-conflict situations – could not 
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be offered similar differential treatment while the EU continued to insist that the 
new arrangement must adhere strictly to the principles enshrined in WTO rules. 
 
Debate continued throughout the early stages of the EPA negotiations about how 
LDCs could be incorporated into the EPAs in a way that allowed region-based 
agreements but also reflected the principle of differentiation. In 2005, the UK 
House of Commons recommended that LDCs be allowed to join an EPA without 
having to offer the reciprocity required of their non-LDC regional partners (Bilal 
2007, p. 212). A report from the House of Commons Select Committee on 
International Development in 2005 stated: 
 
Peter Mandelson [EU Trade Commissioner] has now promised that he 
will seek to ensure that it is possible in the WTO to allow special and 
differential treatment for LDCs within an Economic Partnership 
Agreement (House of Commons Select Committee on International 
Development 2005, p. point 39).  
 
The SADC-minus negotiating group proposed a similar position in its EPA offer 
to the EU (SADC 2006). 
 
Both of these suggestions were ultimately rejected on the grounds that they were 
incompatible with WTO rules.24 The problem here was that while special and 
differential treatment provisions are enshrined elsewhere in the legal texts of the 
GATT and WTO, Article XXIV makes no mention of this (Heron 2013, p. 28). 
As such, Article XXIV provides no guidance as to how ‘development friendly’ 
free trade agreements might be rendered WTO compatible beyond the simple 
matter of reciprocity (Heron and Murray-Evans 2013, p. 18). The EU’s 
privileging of Article XXIV as the primary legal basis on which to build the 
recasting of the Lomé regime (see Chapter Four) meant that the EPAs lacked a 
clear principle through which differentiation could be incorporated.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Interview 12 (South Africa government), 
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The way that differentiation had been enshrined in the Cotonou Agreement and 
deployed under EBA actually made the EU’s pursuit of the EPAs harder. The 
EPAs rested on the ability of the EU to exercise leverage afforded by the ACP’s 
dependence on preferences to impose trade liberalisation as well as an ambitious 
range of other reforms (see below). Under GATT Article XXIV, in order to 
retain these trade preferences, ACP countries would have to liberalise 
‘substantially all’ of their import tariffs in relation to EU goods. EBA effectively 
removed this incentive in relation to LDCs. Furthermore, the EU’s insistence on 
a strict interpretation of WTO rules had prevented it from enshrining this 
differential treatment within the EPAs. Consequently, LDCs could only receive 
non-reciprocal trade preferences if they adopted EBA instead of signing an EPA.  
 
This compounded an already existing problem that related to the EU’s 
deployment of the threatened removal of trade preferences as a stick with which 
to drive the EPAs forward. This problem was that the extent to which ACP 
countries had developed a dependence on Lomé preferences over the course of 
the Convention’s existence varied to a considerable degree (McQueen et al. 
1998; McQueen and Stevens 1989). Some countries, then, were much more 
exposed to any loss of preferences than others. This, along with EBA, created 
highly uneven incentives at the national level, which in turn hampered EU 
attempts to foster regional agreement in the EPAs. 
 
5.3 The WTO, the EPAs and Regionalism 
 
The unevenness of the EU’s material leverage was not the only problem that 
hampered the EU’s ability to reach agreement on interregional EPAs. In Chapter 
Four, I argued that the decision to base the post-Lomé EU-ACP relationship on 
article XXIV of the GATT did not necessitate a region-based set of agreements. 
Rather the decision to negotiate the EPAs on a regional basis was driven by two 
separate motivations. First, the ACP group was large and heterogeneous and 
some of its members had limited technical and institutional capacity for complex 
trade negotiations. Consequently, the European Commission deemed region-
based negotiations to be the most practical way of implementing EPAs in time 
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for the expiry of the WTO waiver at the end of 2007. Second, the Commission 
claimed to be able to offer ‘added value’ (European Commission 1996, p. xii) in 
comparison to other donors in the area of regional integration and it was argued 
that regional EPAs would give the EU an opportunity to provide valuable 
support to existing integration projects in ACP regions. However, once the 
negotiations got under way, tensions between these two dynamics emerged.  
 
This tension can be summarised as follows. On the one hand, the EU’s aim – 
driven by the exigencies of WTO compatibility and the waiver expiration 
timetable – was to base the EPA negotiations on regions that would incorporate 
all of the ACP countries and that would be able to swiftly conclude reciprocal 
FTAs with the EU. The EU presented the 2007 deadline created by the expiry of 
the waiver as immovable, which gave a sense of urgency to the negotiations. On 
the other hand, the EU’s aim was to provide support for a set of existing regional 
integration projects that had developed through historical processes quite 
separate from the EU-ACP relationship (see Chapters Six and Seven). The 
geographical scope of these regions and the ACP group was not coterminous in 
any of the proposed EPA regions (see below). 
 
The EPA negotiations officially began in September 2002. They were structured 
to take place in two stages, the first between the EU and the ACP group and the 
second between the EU and the ACP sub-regions, on which the final agreements 
would be based. The ACP preference was for a legally-binding framework for 
the EPAs that tackled the majority of contentious issues at the first stage (Bilal 
and Laporte 2003) and for only a few issues, such as individual tariff phase-
down schedules, to be resolved at the regional level. 25  By contrast, the 
Commission argued that the Cotonou Agreement provided the legal framework 
for the negotiations and was eager to push ahead at the sub-regional level, going 
so far as to invite ACP regions to begin informal discussions before the first all-
ACP phase had been concluded (Bilal 2006, p. 17). Ultimately, the all-ACP stage 
only lasted until October 2003. The official ACP-EU communiqué at the 
conclusion of this stage of the negotiations dryly noted: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Interview 28 (ACP). 
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The meetings held during the first phase of EPA negotiations have 
allowed the parties to converge on a number of issues. However, 
divergent views remain. Both parties therefore agree to continue 
discussions at the all-ACP – EC level (ACP-EC 2003, p. 7). 
 
 
The Cotonou Agreement had not prescribed the configuration of the ACP regions 
for the EPA negotiations and this was an issue that needed to be resolved before 
the talks could proceed. The Cotonou Agreement specified that the shape of 
regional configurations was a choice to be made by the ACP countries (Article 
37.5).26 In 2001, however, the Commission released a communication stating 
that the regional configurations were ‘not entirely at the discretion of the ACP’ 
(European Commission 2001, p. 3) and setting out the criteria by which a 
regional group would qualify to negotiate an EPA. This document specified that 
the EPA groups should be functioning regional integration projects that were 
‘effectively engaged in an economic integration process’ (European Commission 
2001, p. 9), that ACP countries could be members of one regional configuration 
only, and that the regional negotiations should take place in one setting and lead 
to one agreement. 
 
The problem with these requirements was that there was not one existing 
regional integration project in Africa, the Caribbean or the Pacific that easily 
matched the contours of the ACP group.27 It was fairly obvious from the outset 
of the negotiations that because of their geographical separation from the rest of 
the ACP, the Caribbean and Pacific ACP countries would each form a 
negotiating group (which is not to say that these groupings were unproblematic).  
The form of the African groups was much less clear given the multitude and 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 The regional impact studies commissioned by the EU in 1998 – on UEMOA, 
CEMAC, EAC, SADC, CARICOM plus Dominican Republic, and the Pacific 
ACP countries – suggested that the Commission had some idea about the shape 
the regions should take (Bilal 2002, p. 20). 
27 The EAC group, which was formed in 2007, became the only EPA region to 
match an existing regional project in terms of geographical scope.	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Figure 5.1: African Regional Economic Communities as possible bases for 
EPAs (source: author’s interpretation) 	  	  
complexity of overlapping regional organisations with conflicting mandates on 
the continent.   
 
Within Africa there were five ‘regional economic communities’ (RECs) – pillars 
of the African Economic Community – that contained mostly ACP countries and 
had economic integration as a central aim. These were therefore potential bases 
for an EPA negotiating group. These groups were: The Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), The East African Community (EAC), 
The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), The Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Southern African 
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Development Community (SADC) (see Figure 5.1).28 There was also a range of 
other smaller regional initiatives that overlapped with these RECs. This 
‘spaghetti bowl’ (Bhagwati 1995) of overlapping regional institutions is often 
cited as a sign of the dysfunctional nature of African regionalism and a primary 
obstacle to deeper and more effective regionalism on the continent (Draper et al. 
2007, see Chapter Six). The European Commission saw the EPAs as a way to 
encourage African countries to address this issue and end overlapping 
memberships. 29  Choosing coterminous regional negotiating configurations, 
however, was a considerable challenge given the institutional path dependencies 
of extant overlapping regionalisms (see Chapter Six). 
 
The European Commission insists in public that ACP countries chose the EPA 
configurations (within the parameters set by the 2001 Commission document). 
However, Officials concede in private that they sought to persuade ACP 
countries to form configurations that were deemed viable in terms of their ability 
to negotiate and implement an EPA before the expiry of the WTO waiver in 
December 2007.30  
 
The eventual set of configurations (see Table 5.2) was problematic for a number 
of reasons. In some cases – for example the Dominican Republic and Mauritania 
– ACP countries were not part of any eligible regional integration process. In 
other cases, existing regional groups contained non-ACP countries that were 
excluded from the EPA negotiations. These included Australia and New Zealand, 
which play a dominant role in the Pacific Islands Forum (Scollay 2010, p. 4); 
Egypt, which is a member of COMESA; and South Africa, which was only  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 The other RECs of the African Economic Community either contain a number 
of non-ACP countries (Community of Sahel-Saharan States [CEN-SAD] and 
Arab Maghreb Union [UMA]) or focus primarily on security and political 
dialogue (Intergovernmental Authority on Development [IGAD]). 
29 Interview 3 (DG Trade). 
30  For example, a confidential interview with a former DG Trade official 
(interview 3) revealed that the Commission argued the case for the Democratic 
Republic of Congo – a member of three separate RECs – to be part of the Central 
Africa EPA configuration to give this region more market potential. In 2007, the 
Commission also insisted that Tanzania leave the SADC-minus group and join 
the EAC group instead (a customs union of which it was a member).	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allowed to join the SADC-minus group at a late stage in the negotiations (see 
Chapter Seven). Countries that were not part of any existing regions were made 
to fit into the nearest configuration; non-ACP members of existing regions were 
excluded from the negotiations; and in Eastern and Southern Africa existing 
regions were split into as many as three (and later four) negotiating groups (see 
Chapter Seven).31  The reality of the configurations, then, was far from the ideal 
set out by the EU, that the EPA groups should all constitute regions ‘effectively 
engaged’ in economic integration (European Commission 2001, p. 9). 
 
The reality of this complex set of existing regions was that they provided a poor 
fit with the vision of discrete interregional FTAs. This was particularly the case 
given that in order to comply with the WTO waiver, interregional agreements 
had to be completed by the end of 2007. Various options existed to resolve this 
tension. For example, the EU might have negotiated regional EPAs in those 
cases where there was an appropriate existing region and negotiated bilaterally 
with those countries that did not fit with any existing region. The EU might also 
conceivably have sought an extension to the WTO waiver (although success in 
this endeavour was dependent upon the EU’s willingness to pursue a number of 
political bargains, see Chapter Four). This would have allowed more time to 
address the problems with existing ACP regional configurations in a more 
satisfactory way before commencing interregional negotiations. The EU might 
have done this, for example, through dialogue to address overlapping 
memberships and capacity building measures to improve the negotiating capacity 
of existing regions. However, the EU’s decision to make all of the 79 ACP 
countries fit into six discrete regions, and to pursue the completion of the 
agreements as quickly as possible, reflected the sense of urgency that had been 
engendered by its strict adherence to the end of the WTO waiver as the final 
deadline for the EPAs. In a dilemma between providing support for existing ACP 
regional initiatives and pursuing the timely completion of WTO-compatible 
agreements, EU policymakers came down firmly on the side of the latter. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 The SADC REC members were initially divided between the SADC-minus, 
Central Africa, and Eastern and Southern Africa EPA groups. Tanzania later 
joined the EAC EPA, dividing the SADC REC into a fourth EPA group. 
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This resolution, however, can be seen as storing up problems for the later stages 
of the negotiations. All of the ACP regions – with the possible exception of 
CARIFORUM – had problems developing the institutional capacity and political 
will for joint regional negotiations. Under the pressure of competing national 
perceptions of the value or otherwise of signing an EPA – particularly in the 
context of the skewed incentives discussed in the previous section – this lack of a 
coherent regional institutional negotiating capacity and identity contributed to the 
fracturing of a number of the negotiating groups when the negotiations reached a 
head in late 2007. 
 
5.4 The WTO, the EPAs and ‘Global Europe’ 
 
One of the most controversial parts of the EPA negotiating process relates to the 
inclusion of trade in services and a series of issues that came to be known as the 
‘Singapore issues’. The latter were first elaborated at the WTO Singapore 
Ministerial Conference in 1996 and included government procurement, customs 
issues, and rules on investment and competition. Trade in services and the 
Singapore issues had a profound effect on the EPAs in part because the EU 
began to more strongly espouse their inclusion within the agreements at the same 
time as three of the four Singapore issues were dropped from the WTO 
negotiating agenda. Furthermore, Article XXIV required only that substantially 
all trade in goods be liberalised in order to justify an exemption for an FTA from 
the MFN principle. In this sense, the inclusion of these issues within the EPAs 
went beyond the requirements of WTO rules (they were ‘WTO-plus’ issues). 
Their inclusion within the EU’s negotiating agenda, then, undermined the EU’s 
continuing discursive claims that WTO-compatibility was the external 
imperative for the EPAs. 
 
The Cotonou Agreement covered trade in services but negotiations on these was 
not made compulsory. Dirk te Velde and his colleagues concluded that under 
Cotonou: 
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In principle the ACP is not obliged to start negotiations, but the EU and 
the ACP agree to extend their partnership to encompass the liberalisation 
of services in accordance with the provision of GATS [General 
Agreement on Trade in Services] (te Velde et al. 2004, p. 2). 
 
The Commission had stated in its draft mandate for EPA negotiations that the EU 
‘should be prepared to further postpone the start of the negotiations [in services]’ 
(European Commission 2002, cited in Siles-Brügge 2014a, p. 130). In the first 
phase of the EPA negotiations, the main services issue raised was in relation to 
GATS mode 4 (the supply of a service through the presence of natural persons), 
which was a defensive issue for the EU (Siles-Brügge 2014a, p. 130; te Velde et 
al. 2004, p. 2). The Cotonou Agreement also made somewhat vague reference to 
the Singapore issues. These were included, however, in sections on support for 
ACP regional and national economic development, rather than as explicit issues 
for binding negotiation (Siles Brügge 2012, p. 159). 
 
At the point in time at which the Cotonou Agreement was being negotiated, the 
inclusion of the Singapore issues within the prospectus for the EPAs – albeit in 
vague and tentative fashion – appeared in line with the broad direction of travel 
within the WTO. Their inclusion in multilateral talks had been pursued at 
successive Ministerials in the late 1990s and early 2000s by the EU, Japan and 
Korea (Ferguson 2008, p. 20). The issues were, however, opposed by most 
developing countries and received a lukewarm reception from US negotiators 
(Ferguson 2008, p. 20). Negotiations on these issues at the Cancún Ministerial in 
2003 reached a stalemate. Following this, the three most controversial Singapore 
issues (government procurement, investment and competition) were dropped 
from the Doha Development Round agenda by a Framework Agreement in July 
2004 (Ferguson 2008, p. 20). 
 
The European Commission’s response was to launch its Global Europe trade 
strategy in 2006 (European Commission 2006). This had as its central feature a 
more aggressive external trade stance that would complement the domestic 
ambition of the Lisbon Agenda. The Lisbon Agenda itself had been launched in 
2000, with the express aim of creating an EU that was ‘the most competitive and 
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dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world by 2010’ (European Council 
2000). Both Global Europe and the Lisbon Agenda were underpinned by a 
discourse of ‘global competitiveness’ through which policymakers had asserted 
the need for neoliberal restructuring within the EU (Heron 2013, p. 77; see Hay 
2007; Rosamond 2002; Tsoukalis 1997).  
 
Global Europe centred on the pursuit of bilateral free trade agreements and 
reiterated its commitment to including the ‘Singapore issues’ within these even 
if, as the document noted, the issues remained ‘outside the WTO at this time’ 
(European Commission 2006, p. 11).  It stated: 
 
FTAs should also tackle non-tariff barriers through regulatory 
convergence wherever possible and contain strong trade facilitation 
provisions […] stronger provisions for IPR [Intellectual Property Rights] 
and competition  [… and should] seek to include provisions on good 
governance in financial, tax and judicial areas where appropriate 
(European Commission 2006, p. 11). 
 
Global Europe’s attention was very much focussed on emerging markets (India, 
Russia, China, Korea) and trade organisations (ASEAN, Mercosur, the Gulf Co-
operation Council) in Asia, Latin America and the Middle East (European 
Commission 2006, p. 11). Mention of the ACP countries in the Global Europe 
document (European Commission 2006) was limited to a passing sentence (p. 
10-11); a reference to sustainable development (labour standards and 
environmental protection); mention of the ‘development needs of our partners’ 
(which concerned primarily the preference-eroding effects of FTAs, p. 12); and 
broad support for ‘openness and integration’ (p.10). 
 
The appointment of Peter Mandelson as EU Trade Commissioner in the 
aftermath of the Cancún debacle coincided with a growing focus on trade in 
services and the Singapore issues in the EPA negotiations (Heron and Siles-
Brügge 2012). The Commission strongly denies suggestions that it put pressure 
on ACP countries to sign up to ‘WTO-plus’ regulatory components of the EPA 
in the latter stages of the negotiations, asserting only that it sought to persuade 
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ACP negotiators that such components would support development (European 
Commission 2008b; Mandelson 2008). However, complaints from ACP states,32 
NGOs and even EU member states (Beattie 2006) suggest that the Commission 
placed a considerable amount of pressure on the ACP countries to include 
binding commitments on investment, competition, and even public procurement 
(which was only mentioned in passing in the Cotonou Agreement) in the final 
EPA deals. 
 
Gabriel Siles-Brügge (2014a, p. 137-46) makes a convincing argument about the 
reasons for the inclusion of trade in services and the Singapore issues in the 
EPAs under Mandelson. He says that this did not stem from a direct European 
commercial interest in accessing ACP markets (although there was an implied 
sense that the EPAs would support European competitiveness as well as ACP 
development). Instead, it was the result of the convergence of the EU’s 
commercial and development-oriented trade narratives. This was the product of a 
positive-sum view of free trade, which underpinned the Commission’s 
commitment in the 1996 Green Paper to development through trade 
liberalisation, but which became even clearer in the narrative of win-win 
regulatory liberalisation that emerged in relation to Global Europe and the EPAs 
in the mid 2000s.  
 
In this phase of the EPAs, Siles-Brügge (2014a, p. 141) contends that the EU, in 
line with its more aggressive approach to liberalisation through bilateral 
negotiations, became more ‘activist’ in its EPA stance. The Cotonou Agreement 
had initially suggested that the feasibility of negotiating on the EU’s WTO-plus 
regulatory agenda was limited due to the ACP countries’ lack of capacity in these 
areas. The Commission now stressed that these capacity issues should be 
addressed through the EPA negotiations. This shift towards a more activist 
stance can also be seen in the role of regionalism in the EPA project under Peter 
Mandelson. Here, regional ‘deregulatory liberalisation [was seen] as part and 
parcel of a broader neoliberal agenda’ (Siles-Brügge 2012, 176). Since the EPA 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Weller (2008, p. 2) reveals that amongst 13 ACP negotiators questioned on 
their experiences of the EPA process, 11 felt they had been put under pressure to 
negotiate on trade-related issues by the European Commission. 
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configurations were not based precisely on existing regional initiatives, part of 
the negotiation process would now be to encourage the EPA configurations to 
become liberal regions with harmonised regulatory structures. The Commission 
even went so far as to attach conditions related to intraregional trade 
liberalisation – in the form of a ‘regional preference clause’ – to the only full 
EPA to be signed to date, between the EU and CARIFORUM (Girvan 2008). 
The EU’s support for regional integration, then, went from being a foundation on 
which to base the EPAs, to an aim of the conditionality associated with the 
agreements.  
 
In the context of this shift in approach, and as the negotiations entered a high-
pressure phase in 2006 and 2007, the Commission continued to insist that the 
expiry of the WTO waiver in December 2007 presented an immovable and 
external constraint. Indeed, the Commission used this deadline to ramp up the 
pressure on ACP countries and regions to agree to the EPAs in order to preserve 
existing levels of market access. For example, Mandelson stated in September 
2007: 
 
We are committed to replace Cotonou trade preferences with a new trade 
regime that does not unilaterally discriminate against non-ACP 
developing countries. We have to do this by 1 January 2008. As our 
experience with bananas shows, other developing countries are unlikely 
to hesitate to challenge us. It is a gross irresponsibility to pretend 
otherwise (Mandelson 2007). 
 
These discursive appeals, however, were undermined by the divergence between 
the EU’s EPA strategy and the trajectory of WTO negotiations (see Heron and 
Murray-Evans 2013). More clearly than ever, the EU was seeking to push the 
EPAs beyond what was required in order to satisfy WTO rules. 
 
In addition to the EU’s continued insistence on trade in services and the 
Singapore Issues as a part of the EPAs, the costs of compliance were steadily 
increasing as a plethora of other requirements was introduced onto the agenda in 
November 2007 (Heron and Murray-Evans 2013, p. 22). These included a 
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controversial ban on export taxes and an MFN requirement, which mandated that 
ACP countries must extend to the EU any more favourable treatment granted to 
another major trading partner (see Chapter Seven). 
 
The EU attempted to justify these new measures by arguing that it wanted to 
avoid being disadvantaged after it had granted benevolent EPA terms to the ACP 
countries. On the motivation behind the MFN clause, Development 
Commissioner Louis Michel conceded:  
 
The European Commission and our member states provide 56 percent of 
all development assistance in the world. It is difficult to say that Europe 
should let our partner countries treat our economic adversaries better than 
us. We are generous but not naïve (quoted in IPS Correspondents 2008).  
 
Furthermore, a former DG Trade Official granted in an interview that the 
Commission’s demand for a ban on export taxes was introduced because the EU 
could not accept the principle that raw materials might be deliberately withheld 
and sold to the EU’s trade competitors.33 All of this gave the impression that 
despite official protestations to the contrary, the EU was keen to protect some 
‘offensive interests’ in the negotiations.  
 
Overall, the increasing prominence of trade in services, the Singapore issues and 
a range of other technical clauses in the negotiations after Cancún undermined 
EU negotiators’ ongoing references to the exigencies of WTO rules and the 
finality of the waiver expiry deadline. This meant that Commission officials now 
had to rely more and more on making a normative case that would persuade the 
ACP countries of the desirability (as opposed to legal necessity) of the EPAs 
(Heron and Murray-Evans 2013, p. 22). 
 
Where the EU’s earlier norm-based narrative had emphasised the importance of 
differentiation and using the limited flexibility allowed under WTO rules, the 
narrative under Mandelson’s tenure stressed that deep and comprehensive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Interview 3 (DG Trade). 
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regional trade liberalisation would benefit all ACP countries regardless of their 
level of development or degree of vulnerability. While the Commission was keen 
to stress that the Singapore issues would only be included in the EPAs if the ACP 
countries wanted them to be – a claim contested by ACP countries and NGOs 
(see above) – regulatory liberalisation now became a core element of the 
‘development focus’ of the EPAs (Mandelson 2005a). For example, Mandelson 
commented in 2008: 
 
I also hear a lot about the EU using this final phase of the EPA 
negotiations to push the so-called “Singapore” issues back onto the table 
– the questions of investment, competition and procurement – as well as 
services. I can’t and won’t crowbar these issues into final deals. But I am 
in no doubt that these are development issues (Mandelson 2008). 
 
Indeed, the Commission’s way of selling the EPAs to LDCs in particular – which 
did not need to sign an EPA in order to maintain their preferential access to the 
EU market – was to stress that the real development component of the EPAs was 
the package of trade and regulatory reforms that these agreements would help to 
lock in, providing an environment in which competition would flourish.  
 
The Commission argued that allowing LDCs to join the EPAs while being 
exempted from reciprocity and other trade reforms would remove the incentive 
for reforms that provided the development component of the EPAs. These 
reforms would facilitate the tackling of ‘behind-the-border’ regulatory issues in 
ACP countries and regions, which would in turn help them to improve their 
export competitiveness in international markets and create an attractive 
environment for inward investment (Bilal 2007, p. 208; European Commission 
2005). In confidential interviews, Commission officials expressed puzzlement at 
the idea that LDCs might not wish to sign up to comprehensive EPAs that 
included agreement on various WTO-plus issues. They argued that it was 
cooperation in these very areas that would provide the most significant 
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development support through the inward investment that such reform would 
attract.34  
 
Through the narrative at the heart of the Lisbon Agenda and Global Europe, then, 
European competitiveness and ACP development had come to be portrayed as 
two sides of the same coin. In other words, what was good for the EU – the 
fostering of competitiveness through liberalisation and regulatory convergence – 
was also good for the ACP countries by virtue of the same logic of positive-sum 
trade liberalisation. This new narrative, however, came at the expense of 
undermining the EU’s discursive case for the legal necessity of the EPAs. 
Furthermore, as I will aim to show in the next section, the effect of the 
divergence between the EU’s EPA strategy and the trajectory of developments in 
the WTO was to expose the EU to a rhetorical barrage from various critics – 
ACP governments, sceptical EU member states, NGOs and activists. These 
actors mobilised a counter-narrative that rebutted the European Commission’s 
depiction of the EPAs as ‘non-coercive’ and ‘development friendly’ (Heron and 
Murray-Evans 2013, p. 3). 
 
5.5 The Conclusion of Interim EPAs and the Continuing Negotiations 
 
In 2005, Peter Mandelson (2005b) stated that the EPA negotiations would lead to 
‘a single trade regime at the regional level, with common and modern customs 
procedures.’ The reality immediately following the expiry of the WTO waiver at 
the end of 2007 looked quite different. Chapters Six and Seven offer a fine-
grained analysis of the outcome of the EPA negotiations using the SADC-minus 
region as a case study. Here, I offer an overview of the way that the tensions 
outlined in this chapter played out across the ACP regions. 
 
In 2006 and 2007 it became clear that the EPA negotiations were going nowhere 
fast in most of the ACP regions. As the deadline approached, the Commission 
increased the pressure on ACP regions to sign comprehensive EPAs that 
included commitments to regional regulatory harmonisation and the reciprocal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Interview 8 (EEAS). 
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liberalisation of trade in goods and services with the EU (Drieghe 2008, p. 50). 
Its primary tool for achieving this was to invoke the expiry of the WTO waiver at 
the end of 2007. Mandelson (2006) stated, ‘We should not flaunt the deadline, 
but equally we have no magic alternatives to offer, and it is politically unrealistic 
to think WTO members would agree to extend the current waiver’. 
 
By early 2007, it became clear that negotiations had barely begun on the detail of 
the EPAs in most regions, and that not enough time remained before the expiry 
of the waiver to reach agreement on full regional EPAs (Stevens 2008, p. 212). 
As the clock ticked down to the waiver deadline, the Commission proposed a 
solution in October 2007 for those countries not ready to sign a full EPA. Under 
this, individual countries and sub-regions would be encouraged to sign ‘interim 
EPAs’. These were WTO compatible, goods-only agreements (European 
Commission 2007). They were intended to serve as a stepping stone to full EPAs 
and were open to countries which did not sign initially to join at a later date.  
 
The Commission ensured that market access would not be interrupted 
immediately following the waiver deadline by introducing Market Access 
Regulation (MAR) 1528, which unilaterally provided duty free and quota free 
access to the EU market to all ACP countries that initialled an interim EPA 
(European Council 2007). Any country that did not initial or sign an agreement 
would revert to access to the EU market through either EBA or the GSP. While 
the decision by the EU to offer interim EPAs relieved some of the pressure to 
conclude full agreements by the deadline, it did not relieve pressure on 
preference-dependent non-LDCs to come to an agreement with the EU on trade 
in goods at the very least (Bilal and Stevens 2009, p. 44). 
 
The decision to offer interim EPAs to the ACP countries meant that the EU had 
to, at least temporarily, sacrifice its regional and WTO-plus agenda. That 
policymakers were willing to do this after they had invested so much effort in 
securing comprehensive and interregional EPAs appears initially as a puzzle. 
Following the argument pursued throughout this chapter, however, it seems less 
surprising. The EU had consistently deployed the WTO waiver as a goad to 
action and a way of legitimising the pressure that it placed on the ACP countries 
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to sign an EPA. When it became clear that ACP countries were not ready or 
willing to sign full EPAs, the EU became ‘entrapped by its own rhetorical 
strategy’ (Drieghe 2008, p. 49). In order to avoid losing credibility in the 
negotiations the EU was obliged to stick by its earlier EPA timetable (Drieghe 
2008, p. 52). The decision at Cotonou to use the WTO as an external imperative 
for the reform of ACP trade regimes – a strategy that had later been (imperfectly) 
adapted to include regulatory issues – made it difficult for the Commission to 
later abandon its commitment to WTO compatibility and the timetable imposed 
by the WTO waiver. 
  
Who Signed and Why? 
 
The arrival of the December 2007 deadline brought a rush to sign interim EPAs. 
By early 2008, 19 of the 79 ACP countries had signed or initialed an interim 
EPA and 15 Caribbean countries had signed the full CARIFORUM EPA (see 
Table 5.3).35 The East African Community – members of which had broken 
away from their original negotiating configurations (Eastern and Southern Africa 
and SADC-minus) in late 2007 to form a new EPA region – signed a regional 
interim, goods-only agreement. In all of the other EPA regions, some countries 
signed or initialled an interim agreement, while others took the decision not to 
sign and to revert to the next best preference scheme for which they were eligible 
(EBA or GSP). Where more than one member of these regions has signed a 
single EPA text, because of their very different trade sensitivities (Stevens 2006), 
each country opted for a different liberalisation schedule and a different package 
of sensitive products (Bilal and Stevens 2009, p. 4). 
 
Dominant explanations of this pattern of uptake of the EPAs at the time of the 
expiry of the WTO waiver use materialist arguments about market access 
(Stevens 2008; Bilal and Stevens 2009). The assumption here is that whether or 
not a particular ACP country was willing to sign an EPA was a function of its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Two of the 79 – Somalia and East Timor – took no part in the negotiations 
(Stevens 2008, p. 223, footnote 11). 
	   161	  
 Signed Full EPA Signed Interim 
EPA 
No EPA Signed 
CARIFORUM Antigua and Barbuda, 
Bahamas, Barbados, 
Belize, Dominica, 
Dominican Republic, 
Grenada, Guyana, 
Haiti*, Jamaica, Saint 
Lucia, Saint Kitts and 
Nevis, Saint Vincent 
and Grenadines, 
Surinam, Trinidad and 
Tobago 
  
Central Africa  Cameroon Central African 
Republic*, Chad*, 
Congo, DR Congo*, 
Equatorial Guinea*, 
Gabon, Sao Tome & 
Principe* 
EAC  Burundi*, Kenya, 
Rwanda*, Tanzania*, 
Uganda* 
 
Eastern and 
Southern Africa 
 Madagascar*, 
Mauritius, Seychelles, 
Zimbabwe 
Comoros*, Djibouti*, 
Eritrea*, Ethiopia*, 
Malawi*, Somalia*, 
Sudan*, Zambia* 
Pacific  Fiji†, Papua New 
Guinea 
Cook Islands, East 
Timor, Kiribati*, 
Marshall Islands, 
Micronesia, Nauru, 
Niue, Palau, Samoa*, 
Solomon Islands*, 
Tonga, Tuvalu*, 
Vanuatu* 
SADC-minus  Botswana, Lesotho*, 
Mozambique*, 
Namibia†, Swaziland 
Angola*, South Africa 
 
West Africa  Ghana†, Ivory Coast Benin*, Burkina Faso*, 
Cape Verde, 
Gambia*, Guinea*, 
Guinea-Bissau*, 
Liberia*, Mali*, 
Mauritania*, Niger*, 
Nigeria, Senegal*, 
Sierra Leone*, Togo* 
*LDCs 
†Country initialled but did not sign interim EPA 
 
Table 5.3: EPAs – Who signed in 2007/2008? (source: adapted from a figure 
originally made by the author for Heron 2013, p. 66) 	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vulnerability (or lack thereof) to the loss of EU preferences. That is, those 
countries that agreed to sign (interim) EPAs at the end of 2007 were those which 
were: (a) dependent on existing preferential access to the EU market, and (b) 
were non-LDCs and therefore not eligible for EBA (see Stevens 2008).  
 
Clearly this distinction between preference dependent non-LDCs and other ACP 
countries reflects an important dynamic in the negotiations. Indeed, 26 out of 40 
non-LDCs signed a full or interim EPA compared to only 8 out of 39 LDCs (only 
one of the 15 CARIFORUM signatories, Haiti, was an LDC). Further, Stevens 
(2008, p. 217) underlines that those non-LDCs that refused to sign an agreement 
– Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Nigeria, South Africa and seven 
Pacific Islands – either do not export a large number of products affected by high 
tariffs to the EU, or possess an existing trade agreement that gives them 
preferential access to the EU market.  
 
I argue however, that this type of materialist account only tells part of the story 
about the outcome of the EPA negotiations and masks a more complex process 
of contestation and the role of the EU’s rhetorical action in this. Specifically, 
there are clear outliers in the pattern of responses to the EPAs highlighted by 
Stevens. These include preference-dependent non-LDCs that were reluctant to 
sign and implement an EPA (for example, Namibia) and LDCs that chose to sign 
an agreement (Haiti, Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Lesotho, 
Mozambique, Comoros and Madagascar, as cited by Stevens 2008, p. 217). In 
addition, CARIFORUM’s decision to go far beyond what was legally required to 
secure EU market access by signing a full EPA that included trade in services 
and the Singapore issues, constitutes something of a puzzle for the materialist 
perspective (see Heron 2011). I argue that EPA responses, rather than following 
a straightforward materialist logic, can be linked to the set of tensions that I have 
identified in the discursive case for the EPAs made by the EU. 
 
Once the problematic nature of the EU’s regional agenda and the uneven 
leverage associated with the threat of lost preferences had been revealed, the EU 
became increasingly reliant on norm-based argument to persuade the ACP 
countries of the merits of the EPAs. Further, the increasing prominence of the 
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Singapore issues in the negotiations from 2004 onwards meant that the EU could 
no longer hide behind the pretext of ‘WTO compatibility’ (Heron and Murray-
Evans 2013, p. 22) and it came to rely even more on norm-based argument. 
However, the divergence of the EU’s negotiating agenda from the trajectory of 
WTO negotiations also exposed the EU’s norm-based case for the EPAs to an 
onslaught from a coalition of critics that included ACP governments, EU 
member states and NGOs and activists. Furthermore, the convergence of the 
EU’s commercial and development agendas opened the EU up to claims that its 
pursuit of the EPAs was motivated by commercial self-interest as much as 
concern for ACP development.36 
 
Opposition from civil society to the EPAs began almost as soon as the talks got 
underway in September 2002 (see, for example, Traidcraft 2003) but there is no 
doubt that this became more pronounced after 2004. At this point, the inclusion 
of the Singapore issues in the negotiations became a stick with which 
transnational activists could beat the EU. These organisations pointed out that 
these measures went far beyond what was required for WTO compatibility and 
questioned in the strongest terms EU claims that these measures would support 
ACP development. For example ActionAid stated: 
 
In seeking agreement on investment, government procurement and 
competition policy under EPAs after developing countries collectively 
rejected such agreements at the WTO, the European Commission is 
pursuing a self-interested market-access agenda without due 
consideration to the development needs of African countries. Agreements 
on these issues would create lopsided rules that would disproportionately 
benefit EU investors at the expense of domestic African investors, 
leading to the economic exploitation of African producers, workers, 
small-scale and medium-level processors (ActionAid 2004, p. 23). 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 This was a common theme in interviews with NGO and ACP representatives 
in the interviews conducted for this thesis. It was mentioned explicitly in 
Interview 14 (South Africa Government), Interview 27 (ACP), and Interview 37 
(civil society). 
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And Oxfam put this sentiment in equally strong terms: 
 
In the Economic Partnership Agreements […] Europe is proposing 
competition rules that work in favour of large corporations instead of 
development. Neither the WTO regime nor the Cotonou Agreement 
requires negotiation on competition policy in EPAs (Oxfam 2007, p. 11). 
 
 
The EU’s continued discursive appeals WTO compatibility and the 2007 
deadline led civil society groups and ACP countries alike to accuse the EU of 
using bullying tactics in pursuit of its own self-interested ends (see, for example, 
Oxfam 2006; 2007; Traidcraft 2007a). In addition, these alleged bullying tactics 
were frequently criticised for increasing tensions between ACP countries in the 
same region and disrupting existing regional integration projects, with particular 
reference to Africa (EcoNews Africa et al. 2007; ActionAid 2004; Oxfam 2006; 
Traidcraft 2007b). 
 
Another strand of the transnational activists’ discursive challenge to the 
agreements has been highlighting the ambiguity of the WTO rules that the 
European Commission was so keen to present as a clear set of limitations on the 
future of EU-ACP relations. In June 2007, the Overseas Development Institute 
laid out a number of alternative options in the event that agreement on full EPAs 
could not be reached by the end of the year. This included the possibility that the 
EU could seek an extension to the waiver at the WTO, or that it could offer a 
better ‘fallback, interim regime’ than existed under the GSP (Overseas 
Development Institute 2007, cited in Stevens 2008, p. 4). A number of civil 
society organisations also picked up on the idea that WTO rules were a good deal 
more ambiguous – and offered a larger range of options for the future of the EU-
ACP relationship – than the EU was willing to admit (see, inter alia, ActionAid 
2005; Oxfam 2007). 
 
Those writing on this discursive contestation (Del Felice 2012; Hurt et al. 2013; 
Trommer 2013) suggest that these activist coalitions shifted the EU’s position, 
forcing officials to reconsider particularly controversial aspects of the 
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negotiations. This, however, seems only to have been the case very recently, 
when the EU made considerable concessions in the negotiations in early 2014 
(see Hurt 2013; Murray-Evans 2013). What is more interesting is the way that 
this contestation was utilised by some ACP policymakers in weighing up 
decisions to sign EPAs or not. Stephen Hurt and his colleagues (2013, p. 70) 
argue that contestation of the EPA agenda encouraged ACP countries to adopt 
norm-based counterarguments and to resist signing agreements out of kilter with 
their development aims. Of great significance for this thesis is the way in which 
the tensions that emerged in the EU’s justification of its EPA goals provided the 
discursive space for this contestation and gave it particular bite. 
 
Silke Trommer (2013), for example argues that the West African EPA grouping 
was able to seize on the ambiguity in WTO rules in order to challenge the EU’s 
interpretation of the degree of market opening required in order to comply with 
article XXIV of the GATT and make a lower market access offer than the EU 
had demanded. Namibia, too, has made extensive efforts to lobby the European 
Parliament in order to encourage EU negotiators to offer the maximum flexibility 
allowed under article XXIV.37 Further, those countries that signed an (interim) 
EPA in 2007 – with the exception of those in CARIFORUM – for the most part 
refused to include binding agreements on the WTO-plus aspects of the EU’s 
trade agenda. Instead, they opted for so-called ‘rendezvous clauses’ which put 
off the negotiation of these issues until a future date. Some rejected the inclusion 
of such rendezvous clauses altogether. 
 
Beyond those countries vulnerable to the removal of Lomé-equivalent 
preferences, elite responses to the EU’s normative case for the EPAs were crucial 
in determining whether or not ACP countries signed a full or interim EPA. The 
tensions within the EU’s normative case help to explain a generalised pattern in 
which this normative argument found limited purchase amongst ACP elites. 
However the extent to which ACP governments were or were not receptive to the 
EU’s arguments about the development benefits of comprehensive EPAs also 
helps to explain the outliers in this pattern (see also Chapter Seven). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Interview 13 (Namibia government). 
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The only full EPA to date was signed between the EU and CARIFORUM in 
2008. It seems that CARIFORUM negotiators were persuaded by the EU’s case 
that the conclusion of a reciprocal agreement was essential to safeguarding EU 
trade preferences (Caribbean Regional Negotiation Machinery 2008; Heron and 
Murray-Evans 2013). This does not explain, however, why CARIFORUM 
agreed to go beyond the requirements of the WTO to sign an agreement that 
included trade in services as well as a range of regulatory issues. Tony Heron 
(2011) suggests that Caribbean elites believed that a comprehensive EPA might 
improve access to the EU market and encourage diversification away from 
increasingly uncompetitive agricultural commodities. Matthew Bishop and his 
colleagues (2013), argue that CARIFORUM’s ‘convergence of thinking with the 
EU’ (p. 104) reflects a neoliberal narrowing of ‘the terrain upon which 
development has been both theorised and practised in the region’ (p. 82). It 
appears then that the EU’s rhetoric found receptive ears in the Caribbean due to 
both a desire to diversify Caribbean economies and the grip of neoliberalism in 
the region. 
 
Beyond the Caribbean, the EU’s normative arguments have had some purchase 
in the handful of LDCs that have signed interim EPAs (including in the SADC-
minus region, which is examined further in Chapters Six and Seven). Not least of 
these is the case of the East African Community, where four LDCs – Uganda, 
Tanzania, Burundi and Rwanda – joined Kenya (a non-LDC) in signing a 
regional interim EPA. Again – in line with the EU’s normative argument – the 
EAC members cite the creation of ‘a transparent and predictable trade regime 
[which will] increase FDI inflows’ as a motivation behind signing the EPA (East 
African Community 2012, p. 5). Further empirical research on this case would be 
a valuable addition to the literature but is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
After 2007 – EPA Negotiations Continue 
 
Following the expiry of the WTO waiver at the end of 2007 the EU had lost the 
leverage that had been associated with that deadline. The market access 
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regulation (MAR 1528) extended to those countries that signed or initialled an 
interim EPA stipulated that these countries must ratify and begin implementation 
of the agreements within ‘a reasonable period of time’ (European Council 2007, 
p. Art 2.3 [b]) but provided no clear deadline for this.  
 
In an attempt to repair some of the damage done to EU-ACP relations by the 
EU’s perceived bullying tactics in the run up to the deadline, the new Trade 
Commissioner, Catherine Ashton, struck a conciliatory tone in communications 
about the EPAs. Although she did not go so far as to apologise for the EU’s 
approach to the negotiations, Ashton (2009) acknowledged that ‘The run-up to 
the December 2007 WTO deadline for interim EPAs has given rise to an 
impression of steamrollering of ACP concerns.’ She also made assurances that 
the EU’s WTO-plus agenda would not be forced upon unwilling ACP countries, 
stating: 
 
And while we should be ambitious there must also be no imposed 
dialogue, which is why issues like government procurement have already 
been removed from some negotiations. […] The explicit right of the ACP 
to regulate their own markets will be recognised (Ashton 2009). 
 
While Mandelson had made similar assurances that the Singapore issues would 
not be forced upon the ACP regions, Ashton’s approach signalled a genuine shift 
in tone. Interviews with ACP government actors in Southern Africa revealed a 
consensus that Ashton’s approach was more flexible and sympathetic to ACP 
concerns than that of the acerbic Mandelson.38 Ashton, however, was in office 
for just over a year and a number of interviewees mentioned that this was not 
long enough to significantly alter the trajectory of the EPA negotiations.39 
Despite Ashton’s more sympathetic approach to the negotiations, deadlines set 
by the interim agreements for the completion of full EPAs in December 2008 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Interviews 11 and 12 (South Africa government); Interviews 17, 18 and 20 
(Namibia government); Interview 21 (Angola government); Interview 28 (ACP); 
interview 3 (DG Trade). 
39Interview 11 (South Africa government); Interviews 17, 18 and 20 (Namibia 
government); Interview 21 (Angola government); Interview 28 (ACP). 
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(EAC) and July 2009 (Eastern and Southern Africa) came and went without 
further agreement.  
 
One interviewee suggested that Ashton’s successor, Karel de Gucht, was 
unwilling to spend a disproportionate amount of effort on negotiations with the 
ACP group as this had little commercial interest to the EU.40  De Gucht tried to 
recapture some of the leverage that had been lost after the expiry of the WTO 
waiver in order to bring the negotiations to a conclusion. On 30 September 2011, 
the Commission revealed that of the 36 countries that had signed or initialled an 
EPA, only 18 (and only four outside the Caribbean) had ratified the agreement 
(DG Trade 2011). The Commission announced that those countries that had 
failed to ratify and begin implementation of the agreement by 1 January 2014 
(later extended to 1 October 2014) would cease to benefit from market access 
through MAR 1528 (Bilal and Ramdoo 2011, p. 1). Commission officials 
insisted publicly that the new deadline was simply designed to clarify an 
uncertain and temporary legal situation that existed under MAR 1528, but 
privately some conceded that this was a last ditch attempt by the EU to bring the 
EPA negotiations – which by that point had stretched for over nine years – to a 
conclusion.41  
 
This attempt to wrestle back leverage in the EPA negotiations, however, 
displayed many of the problems that plagued its earlier stages. Once again, those 
most vulnerable to the EU’s threat of downgrade to alternative preference 
schemes were preference-dependent non-LDCs. Further, it remained the case that 
WTO-compatible agreements could be reached without ACP countries signing 
up to any of the EU’s more ambitious services and regulatory agenda. 
Commission officials continued to pay lip service to the aims of promoting 
regional integration and agreement on regulatory issues. In private, however, 
they conceded that if whole ACP regions were not willing to sign up to full EPAs 
by the new 2014 deadline the Commission would accept bilateral and sub-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Interview 8 (EEAS). 
41 Interview 6 (EEAS). This was also suggested in interviews with ACP national 
representatives: Interview 20 (Namibia government); Interview 14 (South Africa 
government).	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regional agreements with willing ACP countries.42 These would be left open to 
others in the region to join at a later date, in order – the Commission claimed – to 
avoid disruption to processes of regional integration and to allow for a ‘variable 
geometry’ approach to further integration within ACP regions.43 The acceptance 
of this outcome was a far cry from the aggressive and ambitious project to 
promote regional liberalisation and regulatory harmonisation through 
comprehensive trade deals that was promoted by the EU in earlier stages of the 
negotiations. 
 
At the time of finalising this thesis two more regional EPAs – between the EU 
and West Africa (February 2014) and SADC-minus (July 2014) respectively – 
were initialled. Early indications suggest that these deals have been considerably 
watered down in comparison to the EU’s earlier ambitions. Isabelle Ramdoo and 
San Bilal (2014) report that in the West African case, tariffs are to be liberalised 
in relation to 75 percent of West African imports from Europe (rather than the 80 
percent that the EU had earlier claimed was the minimum value that would meet 
the requirements of WTO law). Further the agreement includes only one of the 
Singapore issues (trade facilitation) as a binding clause, while others are dealt 
with by rendezvous clauses (EC-WA-ECOWAS-WAEMU 2014). 44  Further 
details of the SADC-minus deal, where there have also been notable concessions 
from the EU, are discussed in Chapter Seven.  
 
The general picture from these two recent agreements is one in which the EU has 
had to amend its negotiating stance in order to persuade ACP regions to sign the 
EPAs, in which the former’s ambitious WTO plus agenda has been largely 
rejected by ACP countries, and in which the looming deadline for the completion 
of WTO compatible agreements – the expiry of MAR 1528 on 1 October 2014 – 
has again been the driving force in persuading ACP countries to sign an EPA. 
While the EU was somewhat successful in deploying WTO compatibility as an 
imperative for these agreements, then, it was not able to incorporate its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Interview 8 (EEAS). 
43 Interview 4 (DG Trade). 
44 I would like to thank Gabriel Siles-Brügge for pointing me towards this 
information.	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comprehensive agenda for ACP regional integration and trade opening in these 
agreements (see Chapter Seven for a more detailed assessment). 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
In conclusion the outcome of the EPAs demonstrates both the EU’s uneven 
leverage across the ACP regions and the limited reach of its norm-based 
arguments about the desirability of the agreements. It has been argued that this 
limited reach is linked to the contingent, constructed and path-dependent nature 
of EU policy formation and projection. The approach used here to analyse this 
policy formation allows linkages to be made between the internal processes 
through which policies are constructed and their external impact.  
 
In Chapter Four, I made the case that the EU’s invocation of WTO rules as an 
impetus for ACP reforms shaped the Cotonou settlement to a considerable 
extent. In this chapter, I have charted how tensions in the EU’s argument about 
the legal necessity of these reforms caused the EU’s case for the agreements to 
unravel.  These tensions were caused by incompatibility between EU aims and 
preferences and existing WTO rules, the difficulty of reconciling the aim of 
WTO compatibility with historical patterns of ACP regionalism, and the 
divergence between changing European preferences and ongoing WTO 
negotiations. It was this unravelling that opened up space for sustained 
contestation of the EU’s EPA narrative by a coalition of actors that included 
large international NGOs, national and regional social movements, and ACP 
states and regions. These actors were able to use weaknesses in the EU’s 
discursive case for the EPAs in order to portray the EU as a self-interested and 
coercive actor that was trying to use its overwhelming market power to force 
concessions from the ACP countries.  
 
With regard to the take up of EPAs, the broad trend has been that preference-
dependent ACP countries have tended to sign full or interim EPAs in order to 
preserve market access, while LDCs and those not dependent on preferences 
have proved less likely to do so (Bilal and Stevens 2009). However, departures 
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from this overall trend suggest the influence of ideational factors that cut across 
material incentives. These differentiated outcomes can be traced back to the way 
that the set of tensions identified in this chapter have played out in different 
geographical and historical contexts and to the contingent responses of ACP 
elites to the EU’s norm-based case for the EPAs. It is to the specificity of such 
responses that we now turn in Chapters Six and Seven, which offer a more fine-
grained analysis that both furthers my more general argument and reveals the 
detail of how the EPAs played out in Southern Africa. 
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Part III 
Case Study of the  
SADC-Minus EPA 
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Chapter Six 
History and Agency in the SADC-Minus 
EPA 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The negotiations for an EPA between the EU and the Southern African 
Development Community EPA group (SADC-minus) have been long and 
difficult. For a long time during the negotiations, countries within the region 
were divided over the EPA: at the end of 2007 four had signed the interim 
agreement whilst the other three were very reluctant to follow suit. More 
recently, in mid 2014, the region (with the exception of Angola) initialled a 
revised version of the EPA following a number of concessions from the EU. 
Much has been written about the potential for these fraught negotiations to cause 
disruption to the region’s already fragmented pattern of overlapping regional 
integration projects (see, for example, Bertelsmann-Scott 2006; Stevens 2008; 
Tekere 2006; Walker 2009) as well as the potential for the EPA to ‘lock in’ a 
pattern of neoliberal development in the region (Hurt 2012). For the purposes of 
this chapter and the next, however, the focus is on the process and outcome of 
the negotiation and what this reveals about the discursive underpinnings and 
contestation of the EU’s comprehensive EPA agenda. 
 
According to supporters and even some critics of the process, the reason that the 
EU’s comprehensive EPA agenda did not take root in Southern Africa, was the 
lack of institutional capacity in place for such complex negotiations.45 It has been 
suggested that this was particularly the case with regard to the architecture of 
regional integration in Southern Africa, which consisted of a series of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Interviews 1 and 3 (DG Trade); Interview 29 (commentator). 
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overlapping regional organisations with conflicting mandates. In addition, 
European negotiators cited the resistance, and even irrationality, of Southern 
African elites as key barriers to the completion of full EPAs.46 Elements of this 
interpretation clearly represent important dynamics of the EPA negotiations in 
SADC-minus. However, to dismiss the resistance of SADC-minus and other 
ACP actors as ‘irrational’ masks the contested nature of the EPAs and the ideas 
that underpinned EU attempts to export a particular model of liberal regional 
governance to the ACP countries. Furthermore, explanatory appeals to a lack of 
negotiating capacity tell us little about the specific and divergent responses of 
SADC-minus countries to the EPA. 
 
The thesis has already revealed the emergence of a set of internal contradictions 
within the aims and policy tools deployed by the EU in the context of the EPAs. 
It has already hinted that the way particular ACP regions received the EU’s 
discursive case for the EPAs was crucial in shaping the outcome of the 
negotiations. The questioning of materialist accounts of the EPAs within this 
thesis, then, suggests a need to explore the contestation of the EU’s case for the 
EPAs more fully. This chapter and the next take a more fine-grained approach to 
exploring these patterns of ideational contestation between the EU and ACP and 
the way that they shaped the EPA negotiating process and outcome in the case 
study region.  
 
My argument is that the distinctiveness of responses to the EPA within ACP 
regions was not just a result of technical issues of capacity or material issues of 
preference dependence. Rather, this distinctiveness was brought about by the 
way in which the contradictions within the EU’s discursive case for the EPAs 
were revealed in the particular context of each region.  
 
The argument proceeds as follows. Both regional integration and national 
development strategies within the ACP regions constitute historically embedded 
processes. These processes are inherently political and contested and embody 
particular ideas about the proper aims and tools of regionalism and development, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Interview 1 (DG Trade). 
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which are not necessarily in line with those promoted by the EU. Furthermore, 
within this context, and despite their weak position of structural power, national 
and regional ACP elites were able to exercise agency in the way that they 
interpreted and responded to the choices on offer under the EPAs. A contingent 
process of contestation over the EPAs, then, took place within each of the ACP 
regions. 
 
This chapter explores the way in which the wider theoretical approach offered by 
this thesis can be deployed in order to generate insights about this process of 
contestation. Specifically, it looks for synergies between the logic of explanation 
developed in Chapter Two and existing literature on Africa in International 
Relations, particularly with reference to ‘African agency’. The empirical focus of 
the chapter is on the historical context in which the process of EPA contestation 
in Southern Africa was embedded, while it is the job of Chapter Seven to explore 
the detail of the way in which this contestation played out. 
 
This chapter makes the case that the historical processes of regional integration 
and development in Southern Africa represented a problematic fit with EU 
ambitions for comprehensive intra- and inter-regional liberalisation through the 
EPAs. Specifically, the claimed link between regionalism, economic liberalism 
and development that underpinned the EU’s model of regional development 
governance differed from the development model(s) and political strategies that 
had informed the historical evolution of regional integration in Southern Africa. 
In particular, a commitment to functional differentiation and an interventionist 
model of development had underpinned processes of regionalism in Southern 
Africa in their early stages. Furthermore and in contrast to the EU, processes of 
regionalism in this part of the world have not undergone a full-scale neoliberal 
conversion. Instead, regional projects seek to accommodate a range of liberal and 
interventionist national development strategies; to bolster jealously guarded state 
sovereignty; and to attract external funding through the projection of a 
commitment to compliance with donor policy agendas.  
 
At the national level the chapter also illuminates a lack of consensus within the 
region about the desirability or effectiveness of neoliberal development 
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strategies. Indeed, development trajectories and strategies within the Southern 
African region exhibit considerable variety. These differences are embedded 
within diverse colonial histories and the brute facts of resource endowment and 
geographical size and position. They are also heavily conditioned by the 
dominant economic position of South Africa within the region. Yet these 
differences also reflect the contested development strategies of reflexive and 
purposeful agents and the particularity of their path-dependence as both 
constraints on and opportunities to action. Historically embedded development 
trajectories within the region range from Angola’s oil-dependent strategy of 
state-led accumulation and import substitution, to Botswana’s embrace of 
liberalisation, deregulation and aspiration to build an economy based on financial 
services. 
 
This chapter begins by offering some brief theoretical reflections on the place of 
African history and agency within the broader narrative of the thesis. It then 
analyses the historical processes in which the contestation of the Southern 
African EPA was embedded. This is done firstly in relation to processes of 
regional integration in Southern Africa and secondly with regard to national 
development trajectories and strategies in the SADC-minus countries. 
 
6.2 Ideas, Institutions and African Agency 
 
In its theoretical approach, this thesis stresses a logic of explanation in which 
political processes are viewed as embedded within path-dependent institutional 
structures that are made and remade by purposive and reflexive agents (see 
Chapter Two). Ideas, beliefs and shared understandings both condition and 
provide the tools that actors use to interpret and develop responses to their 
institutional context.  
 
The core focus of this thesis is on EU external economic action and the internal 
sources of the limited and uneven reach of the EPAs. For this reason, I have so 
far applied the logic of explanation referred to above to EU-led processes of 
policymaking and the tensions that emerge from these. The EPAs were, however, 
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negotiations between two or even three parties – the EU, the ACP regions and 
the individual ACP countries. There is a danger, then, that focusing exclusively 
on the EU side of this equation feeds into narratives that treat developing 
countries as the relatively inert receivers and bearers of politics and policies 
produced elsewhere. Various authors criticise such tendencies in relation to the 
treatment of Africa in the international relations literature (see Bayart 2000; 
Brown 2012; Brown and Harman 2013a; Cornelissen et al. 2012a; Dunn and 
Shaw 2013; Harman and Brown 2013; Lonsdale 2000). 
 
Furthermore, I have argued previously that a series of tensions within the EU’s 
discursive case for the EPAs served to undermine its plausibility within the ACP 
regions. The logical corollary of this argument – which stresses that purely 
materialist approaches struggle to explain the implementation of the EPA policy 
– is a need to explore more fully how the policy ideas and rationalisations that 
lay behind the EPAs were received and contested within the ACP countries and 
regions. In order to do this, we must acknowledge the historically embedded 
agency of ACP actors and their ability to interpret and respond to the choice set 
on offer under the EPAs in a purposive and reflexive manner. 
 
In relation to the case study of the EPA negotiations in Southern Africa there are 
long-standing debates about the place of Africa within the international 
economic system and, particularly, a more recent literature on ‘African agency’. 
There is insufficient space here for a comprehensive review of these important 
literatures. Rather, some brief reflections are offered on the theoretical 
implications of applying the logic of explanation developed in Chapter Two to 
the issue of African engagement with the EPAs. I firstly consider the 
implications of this approach in the context of the literature on African 
extraversion and the neopatrimonial state. And secondly I suggest that recent 
reflections on African agency and the neopatrimonial state literature offer a 
particularly good fit with the theoretical approach pursued in this thesis.  
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The Neopatrimonial State and African Extraversion 
 
Theories of the neopatrimonial African state began to emerge in the late 1970s 
with the work of Jean-François Médard (1979, cited in Bach 2012, p. 27) on 
underdevelopment in Cameroon. Since then, these theories have been highly 
influential in discussions of the African state (see, inter alia, Jackson and 
Rosberg 1982; Sandbrook 1985; Jackson 1990; Bayart 1993; Bratton and van de 
Walle 1994; Bach and Gazibo 2012; for a recent critical review, see Erdmann 
and Engel 2007). Drawing on Weberian understandings of the modern state, the 
concept of neopatrimonialism suggests the coexistence of formal institutions of a 
legal-rational regime of authority and legitimacy (to a greater or lesser extent) in 
African states with continued reliance by African leaders on personal 
relationships and the distribution of patronage in order to sustain their authority. 
 
Various authors have considered the external dimensions of the prevalence of 
neopatrimonial regimes within sub-Saharan Africa and its implications for the 
positioning of African states within international politics. In his seminal Africa in 
the International System, Christopher Clapham (1996) explores the international 
conditions, as well as strategies of African elites, that have brought about the 
survival of weak African states in the post-colonial era. Put simply, Clapham’s 
analysis concludes that many African states possess ‘negative’ sovereignty (see 
Jackson 1990) – the formal legal sovereignty ascribed to them by other states – 
but lack the ‘positive’ sovereignty of effective control over society (Clapham 
1996, p. 15). This means that African rulers have had to resort to building 
‘shadow states’ behind a façade of formal statehood. Through these, they 
conduct personal survival strategies based on patronage through the distribution 
of funds gained via the control of state apparatuses (Clapham 1996, p. 56-60). 
 
Other authors have offered a similar understanding of Africa’s place within the 
international system through the concept of ‘extraversion’ (Bayart 2000; Taylor 
2004; 2010; Taylor and Williams 2004). This argues that the formal sovereignty 
granted to African states at independence has helped to maintain their status as 
weak states lacking effective internal control. African state elites have used a 
	  180	  
strategy of extraversion – the use of external resources in order support networks 
of influence through patronage – to maintain their position of power. The 
international system, then, is complicit in a charade in which ‘many state elites in 
Africa use the mantle of sovereignty not to promote the collective good but to 
bolster their own patronage networks and to weaken those of potential 
challengers’ (Taylor 2010, p. 6). 
 
These works that call the African state into analytical question have contributed 
much to understandings of African countries’ interaction with their external 
environment. In particular, they provide a counterpoint to narratives of African 
marginalisation by stressing the linkages between African states and the 
international system. As such they challenge structuralist accounts of 
underdevelopment that offer little room for the exercise of agency by African 
actors. Furthermore, these approaches point to a central dynamic of the operation 
of many African states – that is, the existence of political authority based on 
personalised networks of patronage alongside formal political institutions. 
 
Caution is required, however, because there is a danger that the ubiquity of 
neopatrimonial arguments (see Bach 2012, p. 33) gives rise to characterisations 
of the African state that are overly generalised, pessimistic and perhaps even 
derogatory. Thandika Mkandawire, for example, stresses the impact that this 
literature has had on dominant understandings of the African state: 
 
By the late 1990s, the African state had become the most demonised 
social institution in Africa, vilified for its weakness, its over-extension, its 
interference with the smooth functioning of markets, its repressive 
character, its dependence on foreign powers, its ubiquity, its absence 
(Mkandawire 2001, p. 293). 
 
There is also a problem with a lack of effective historicisation in some of the 
neopatrimonial state literature. This applies more in some cases than others. 
Clapham (1996), for example, is careful to ground his analysis of the African 
state and its role in international relations in a detailed historical narrative that 
emphasises different outcomes in different African countries.  
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Others are prone to present a homogeneous and undifferentiated view of African 
states. Taylor’s (2004) article in Global Governance, for example, makes broad 
generalisations about the nature of power and the state in Africa. He says, ‘Power 
in Africa must be understood in terms of the systemic exercise of patronage as a 
fundamental operating framework for politics’ (Taylor 2004, p. 412). He goes 
on: 
 
The malady affecting the continent is not simply, or even primarily, 
economic, nor is it external. It is political and endogenous and can be 
located in the behaviour of the continent’s governing elites; any policies, 
whether neoliberal or dirigiste, will be exploited by elites for private or 
political advantage (Taylor 2004, p. 414). 
 
The implication here seems to be that the particular character of African states 
stems from the endogenous venality of African elites. Chabal and Daloz’ (1999) 
view that the clientelist character of the African state stems from a common set 
of ethnic social relations is couched in a similar vein. Such approaches obscure 
the cultural diversity of sub-Saharan Africa and fall back on a form of cultural 
determinism that negates the possibility of future transformation. This 
deployment of neopatrimonialism has led to some commentators to condemn it 
for its ‘violent and objectifying discourses’ (Wai 2012, p. 28; see also Hill 2005). 
 
In addition, there seems to be little room in the neopatrimonial state literature for 
contingency and role of ideas, which I have argued are inherent in the exercise of 
agency (see Chapter Two). Much like the rationalist theories of agency that 
underpinned Western donors’ structural adjustment agendas, the neopatrimonial 
state literature appears to assume that African elites will act in ways oriented 
towards personal enrichment and power rather than societal interests.  
 
Whitfield and Fraser (2009) point out that the dominant view that portrays 
African elites as ‘driven by innate conditions to act in neopatrimonial ways’ 
might be overly pessimistic and obscure the differences between the 
development visions and priorities African governments and aid donors. This 
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precludes the conclusion that these differences can and do ‘emerge from 
legitimate disagreements about the best strategies of political and economic 
management to advance national development’ (Whitfield and Fraser 2009, p. 
14). Similarly, Mkandawire (2001) contends that ‘although many writers assume 
that African leaders’ objection to structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) was 
because these programmes would undermine their rent seeking and clientelistic 
chasse gardée [literally ‘private hunting ground’], there are well-documented 
developmental arguments against SAPs’ (p. 296).  
 
Here, I do not assume that African elites are necessarily oriented towards 
personal enrichment or the maintenance of power rather than societal goals. 
Rather I argue that the ideas, assumptions and aims that inform African agents’ 
actions should be the subject of empirical investigation. 
 
African Agency 
 
A more optimistic ‘African agency’ literature has emerged in the last decade that 
is in part a response to the neopatrimonial state literature and is in part driven by 
empirical developments. This literature suggests that:  
 
Broad-brush characterizations of the African state as fragile, weak or 
disconnected from a wider geo-economic order misrepresent an important 
evolving reality on the continent (Cornelissen et al. 2012b, p. 8).  
 
Its proponents have sought to explore the role of African actors in shaping 
international relations in a range of issue areas (Adebajo et al. 2007b; Harman 
and Brown 2013; Lee and Smith 2010; Lee 2012; Whitfield 2009) and to engage 
theoretically with these trends through the concept of ‘African agency’ (Brown 
2012; Brown and Harman 2013a; Leftwich 2010; Lonsdale 2000). This literature 
has the laudable aim of redressing the tendency amongst approaches that range 
from Marxist and dependency theories to modernisation theory to view Africa as 
an inert receiver of political decisions taken elsewhere. Meanwhile, it also offers 
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something of a corrective to neopatrimonialism, remaining more agnostic about 
the form of African states and the motivations of African agents.  
 
However, associations between the African agency literature and ‘Africa rising’ 
narratives (for example Roxburgh et al. 2010; The Economist 2011; The 
Observer 2011) have led to criticisms that this literature tends to minimise 
African countries’ still weak structural position in the international system. 
Stefan Andreasson (2013, p. 143), for example, concludes that the endurance of 
patterns of weak state agency suggests that African states have failed to translate 
the potential opportunities associated with the emergence of a multipolar 
international order into improved positions in the international system. Stephen 
Hurt (2013) challenges the ‘“optimistic” discourse’ about Africa’s rise, which in 
his view fails to acknowledge ‘the persistence of wider structures (both material 
and ideational) that set the parameters of Africa’s engagement in the global 
political economy’ (p. 52).47  
 
However, the best of the literature on African agency acknowledges the highly 
asymmetrical character of the international system and calls for historically 
situated empirical investigation of the way that African actors enact their agency 
within this (see Brown 2012; Brown and Harman 2013b). When African agency 
is carefully defined, then, it has much in common with the theoretical approach 
advanced within this thesis and provides a useful way of framing African 
engagement in asymmetrical political processes.  
 
William Brown argues, following Wight, that agency is not ‘the faculty or state 
of exerting power’ (Wight 2006; cited in Brown 2012, p. 1894) but rather ‘the 
ability to exercise subjective freedom of action’ (Brown 2012, p. 1899). In this 
view, African agents who engage in negotiations or other interactions in the 
international arena possess agency to the same extent as agents from anywhere 
else in the world, in spite of the fact that they are often placed in highly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  I have argued elsewhere that this criticism stems from a conflation of agency 
(an ontological presupposition that actors can respond to structures in subjective 
ways) and power (an empirical claim about the structural position of particular 
actors and their ability to bring about particular outcomes) (for an extended 
discussion, see Murray-Evans 2013). 	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disadvantageous structural positions. As such, their actions are not fully 
determined by their positions within international (or indeed, regional, national 
or sub-national) institutional structures. Rather, they have the capacity to 
negotiate and contest these structures and possibly to transform them, albeit in 
ways that are limited and partial. 
 
The most relevant contributions to the African agency debate also take account 
of the historically embedded nature of this capacity for agency. Brown suggests 
that we need two historical registers in order to understand African agency: 
 
First, by assessing the current historical conjuncture and what agents seek 
to do with such subjective freedom as exists. Second, by situating this 
within the longer-term historical trajectories of state formation and 
insertion into the international system that continue to inform many of the 
constraints on that agency (Brown 2012, p. 1900-1). 
 
Brown concedes that the latter register will inevitably focus more on structural 
constraint than the former, but that both involve the interplay of structure and 
agency. He suggests that the longer-term trajectory that confronts today’s 
African agents can be broadly characterised by ‘underdevelopment, lack of 
diversification, marginalisation from key markets and reliance on volatile 
primary product exports’ (Brown 2012, p. 1901).  
 
Brown also draws upon the work of Clapham (1996) to suggest that the analysis 
of this longer-term trajectory needs to be situated in the particular incorporation 
of  African states into the international system:  
 
The search for revenue and external political support, whether for 
national development projects or to oil the wheels of power, is a constant 
feature of African (and maybe all) international relations but assumes 
critical importance for those regimes that are more dependent on 
clientelist-type political relationships (Brown 2012, p. 1902). 
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This approach notes the presence of neopatrimonial structures and practices of 
extraversion within some African states, but stresses that its analysis must be 
historically and contextually situated. In this sense the historical legacies of 
particular states can be viewed as the contingent product of the specific 
interactions of structure and agency. The agents occupying ‘the current historical 
conjuncture’ (Brown 2012, p. 1900) can challenge, as well as reinforce, 
embedded practices and legacies. 
 
This chapter and Chapter Seven, which present the case study of the EPA 
negotiations in Southern Africa, speak to Brown’s two historical registers in turn. 
This chapter deals with the longer-term trajectory of the Southern African region 
and its political and economic organisation. Here the focus is on the 
accumulation of the institutional structures that were to provide the context in 
which the contestation of the EPA in Southern Africa played out. As Brown 
suggests, the focus here is inevitably more upon structural and institutional 
constraint than agency and ideas. However, I stress that these processes of 
institutional accumulation were political, contested and embodied particular 
ideas, beliefs and policy orientations regarding the aims of regionalism and 
development. Chapter Seven moves on to examine the more recent historical 
conjuncture and in particular the contestation of the EPAs through the actions of 
reflexive and purposive agents in SADC minus and its constituent countries.  
 
6.3 Regionalism in Southern Africa 
 
In explaining the difficulties that dogged the SADC-minus EPA negotiation, EU 
officials cited a range of issues that related to the capacity of regional 
organisations in Southern Africa to carry out such negotiations.48 These included 
the presence of a set of overlapping regional organisations with conflicting 
mandates and a lack of political will for the pooling of sovereignty that was 
considered to be a necessary condition for region-to-region trade negotiation. My 
interviews revealed that there was optimism amongst Commission officials 
during the early stages of the EPA negotiations that the incentives that the EPA 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Interviews 1 and 3 (DG Trade); Interview 29 (commentator). 
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created for regional cooperation and the support for capacity-building on offer 
could help to resolve some of these perceived problems.49 
 
These problems have proved more intractable than Commission officials 
expected and they represented key features of the negotiations between the EU 
and the SADC-minus grouping (see Chapter Seven). This section of the chapter 
argues that these problems stemmed from a deep-seated incompatibility between 
the EU’s proposed model of regional economic governance and the way in which 
a specific understanding and achievement of ‘regionalism’ had occurred in 
Southern Africa.  
 
On the one hand, the EU’s model of regional integration stressed links between 
comprehensive trade liberalisation, the promotion of inter- and intra-regional 
competition and development processes. On the other, the Southern African 
model of regionalism had been based historically on an interventionist 
development strategy and functional differentiation between regional 
organisations with a range of different political and economic aims and 
competencies. With regard to market integration, most regional organisations in 
Southern Africa have now incorporated this into their aims, but it remains highly 
contested within Southern African regional projects. The particular dynamics and 
architecture of regionalism in Southern Africa are a far cry from European-style 
market integration. These differences are difficult to understand based on generic 
appeals to problems of capacity building. Rather, Southern African regions have 
been, and continue to be, ‘constructed by certain actors for certain purposes’ 
(Söderbaum 2004a, p. 422; see also, Gibb 2012; Sidaway and Gibb 1998; 
Söderbaum 2004b) through a set of deliberate but contested and contradictory 
regional strategies carried out by Southern African elites and cemented over an 
extended period of time. 
 
The complex network of overlapping regional projects and their set of conflicting 
and overlapping mandates is cited as a key issue in most analyses of regionalism 
in Southern Africa (see, inter alia, Draper et al. 2007; Draper 2012; Dzinesa et al. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Interviews 3 and 4 (DG Trade).	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2012; Gibb 2012; Malewezi 2001; Mills and Sidiropoulos 2001; Nagar 2012; 
Zarenda 2001). Southern and Central Africa are home to members of at least 
seven – SADC, SACU, COMESA, EAC, ECCAS, CEMAC and IOC 50  – 
regional initiatives. To add to the potential confusion, most countries in the 
region are members of more than one of these groupings and several countries 
are members of three or more. The paradox here is that most of these overlapping 
regions have made formal commitments to the formation of customs unions – 
which are logically incompatible with overlapping memberships – while 
seemingly making little effort to rationalise the regional architecture in line with 
this aim. While these patterns of regionalism are frequently condemned as 
irrational, less consideration has been given to their historical genesis and the 
political strategies that sustain them, particularly in the context of the EPA 
negotiations (with the notable exceptions of Østergaard 1993; Qualmann 2006; 
Tekere 2006). 
 
Most of the regional initiatives that cover Southern Africa were founded during 
the ‘second wave’ of regionalism in the 1970s and early 1980s (with the 
exception of SACU, which is the world’s oldest customs union, founded in 1910) 
(Hurrell 1995; Breslin and Higgott 2000). These initiatives tended to be state-led 
and inward looking (Akokpari 2008, p. 90) and were characterised by functional 
differentiation (Østergaard 1993; Qualmann 2006; Tekere 2006). That is, some 
of these organisations targeted the integration of regional markets, others were 
focussed on political cooperation and solidarity, and others still focused on 
cooperation and intervention in particular economic sectors. 
 
For example, COMESA had its origins as a preferential trade agreement and 
economic integration project. SADC, on the other hand, was the successor to the 
organisation of anti-apartheid ‘Frontline States’ and as such was oriented 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50  These acronyms stand for: Southern African Development Community 
(SADC), Southern African Customs Union (SACU), Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), East African Community (EAC), 
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic and 
Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC), and the Indian Ocean 
Commission (IOC). Note that some of these regional initiatives are not RECs of 
the African Economic Community. This is the reason that they were not 
mentioned in my discussion of African regionalism in Chapter Five. 
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primarily towards political solidarity and sectoral development projects designed 
to lessen its members’ economic dependence on South Africa (Anglin 1983; Hill 
1983; Khadiagala 2012; Sidaway and Gibb 1998; Takirambudde 1999). SACU, 
meanwhile, was originally a tool of the apartheid regime designed to control and 
exploit South Africa’s immediate neighbours (Lee 2002, p. 7; Gibb 2012; 
Sidaway and Gibb 1998).  
 
Although SADC, SACU, COMESA and other regional projects overlapped from 
the start – and while there was some conflict between the regions (Sidaway and 
Gibb 1998, p. 171) – their functional differentiation meant that this overlap was 
not, in itself, a problem. The problems with this situation emerged, however, 
with the wave of market-oriented regionalism that began in the 1990s and the 
associated convergence of most of the regional initiatives in Southern Africa on a 
market integration agenda, particularly where the ostensible aim was to convert 
them into customs unions (Qualmann 2006). 
 
The reluctance of Southern African countries to resolve these overlapping 
memberships in order to pursue the completion of customs unions is partly 
explained by the path dependency of these functionally differentiated and 
overlapping regional projects. This reluctance was in part due to the way in 
which a number of countries had developed and reinforced their political and 
economic ties in multiple regions through membership of overlapping 
organisations. Tanzania and Zambia are cases in point. Tanzania was a founder 
member of the EAC, but when the original incarnation of this organisation 
collapsed in 1977 the country’s foreign policy shifted towards Southern Africa. 
At this point Tanzania and Zambia co-founded the Mulungushi Club, which 
would later become the Southern African Development Coordination Conference 
(SADCC, the precursor to SADC) (Khadiagala 2012, p. 26-7). As founder 
members of the organisations that led the external liberation struggle against 
apartheid South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia retain key political ties of 
solidarity in Southern Africa. However, both countries also have economic and 
political ties in other regional organisations. Tanzania again became a key 
member of EAC when it was reformed as a customs union in 2000 and Zambia 
not only has strong ties of identity to COMESA, but also hosts its headquarters in 
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Lusaka. Elites in countries like Tanzania and Zambia appear, then, to have 
decided that maintaining the economic and political ties that emerged over time 
in particular regions is more important than ending overlapping regional 
memberships in order to complete the process of market integration and form 
customs unions.51  
 
On top of this, external funders play a key part in bankrolling African regional 
initiatives. For example, 72 percent of the funding for SADC came from external 
sources in 2011-12 (Buzdugan 2013, p. 922). Leaving a particular regional 
grouping, then, might also mean sacrificing access to lucrative external funding. 
Some African countries have chosen to protect their funding flows by 
maintaining formal membership in multiple regions even if they have allowed 
their active participation to lapse (Sidaway and Gibb 1998, p. 171).  
 
If, as suggested above, some Southern African states wish to maintain their 
membership in multiple regional organisations we might ask why it is that 
African countries and regions have made, and continue to make, formal 
commitments to the formation of customs unions. This question speaks to a 
wider criticism of African regionalism, in which it is claimed that African leaders 
‘are good at professing commitment to projects and even better at reneging’ 
(Akokpari 2008, p. 104). This claim, moreover, has been linked to criticisms of 
African leaders’ jealous protection of their national sovereignty and 
unwillingness to cede any authority to supranational institutions (see, for 
example, Oliver and Oliver 2004, p. 355; Dzinesa et al. 2012, p. 17; Mbuende 
2012, p. 52-3).  
 
The suggestion from a number of European officials and other commentators 
interviewed for this thesis was that the seeming lack of commitment to the 
implementation of pledges made on regional integration was the result of poor or 
‘irrational’ leadership.52 By contrast, I argue that the process by which African 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 In a confidential interview, a SADC official cited these ties as a key reason 
why a number of SADC countries had found it so difficult to decide which EPA 
group they would become part of (Interview 25, SADC). 
52 Interview 3 (DG Trade); Interviews 34 and 35 (commentators). 
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elites make commitments to market integration that are never fulfilled, along 
with their unwillingness to cede sovereignty to supranational institutions, 
constitutes a political strategy underpinned by particular ideas about the purpose 
of regionalism.  
 
One explanation of unfulfilled regional commitments links the issue to the 
supposed prevalence of neopatrimonial states in Africa. The argument goes that 
region building is a way of ‘performing’ sovereignty and lending legitimacy to 
weak African states that lack the ‘positive sovereignty’ (Jackson 1990) of 
authority within their borders (Harrison 2004; Sidaway and Gibb 1998; 
Söderbaum 2004a; 2004b). Sidaway and Gibb (1998) suggest  that,  ‘a formal 
commitment to, and participation in, “integration” might be read as part of the set 
of processes by which sovereignty is confirmed’ (p. 178, emphasis in original). 
This confirmation of sovereignty is dependent on formal and symbolic elements 
of regionalism – such as the attendance by leaders at regional summits and the 
production of formal regional integration declarations – rather than the day-to-
day implementation of these commitments. This, it is argued, helps to explain a 
lack of commitment to the nitty gritty of implementing regional agreements. 
 
As such, the precarious nature of state sovereignty in many parts of sub-Saharan 
Africa means that regional institutions become ways of confirming sovereignty 
rather than acting as supra-national organisations in which sovereignty can be 
shared or transferred. Regarding the example of Angola during its civil war, 
Sidaway and Gibb state: 
 
At a SADC summit, Angolan ministers are uncontested embodiments of 
the Angolan government’s sovereignty. But within the geopolitical space 
called Angola, government forces, the insurgent movements of UNITA 
and FLEC, foreign oil companies, mercenaries and, at various times, 
Cuban and South African troops have all invoked sovereign authority 
(Sidaway and Gibb 1998, p. 178-9). 
 
Regional institutions in Southern Africa, then, provide a space in which some 
African elites seek to boost their internal and external legitimacy. This is 
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particularly the case where the legacies of colonial rule – and, in Angola’s case, 
decades of civil war – have led to the creation of very weak state structures. 
 
However, weak and ineffective states that require constant external confirmation 
of their sovereignty are not as prevalent in Southern Africa as elsewhere on the 
continent (Bauer and Taylor 2005, p. 2; Tsie 2001, p. 141). Draper (2012, p. 73) 
suggests that there are at least three states in the region – Botswana, Namibia and 
South Africa – that function reasonably effectively, if not unproblematically. 
However, in the context of broad understandings and mobilisations of sub-
Saharan African regionalism, strong commitments to the principle of national 
sovereignty and non-intervention can be seen as an important feature of the 
political discourse even in those African countries where stronger states have 
emerged. As Gwinyayi Dzinesa and his colleagues (2012, p. 7) point out, many 
of the key states in the SADC region are still governed by parties that led armed 
struggles against colonialism and apartheid. As such, these parties’ ideological 
commitment to sovereignty – having fought hard to secure it – is particularly 
strong. A strong commitment to this particular view of sovereignty as non-
intervention was a theme that emerged in my interviews with officials from 
Namibia and Botswana (two of Draper’s supposedly more effective states).53 
 
Another key to understanding unfulfilled commitments to market integration in 
Southern Africa is the relationship between the external donors and elites in 
Southern African countries. As at the national level, there has been considerable 
pressure from donor countries and organisations on African regions to follow 
market-led development strategies. The turn to market-based integration across 
African regions in the early 1990s has been widely attributed to the influence of 
structural adjustment programmes within member states (Odén 2001) and 
external pressure for market reforms on regions themselves (Buzdugan 2013). 
Various authors have concluded that the role of external donors in African 
regionalism has left these organisations with relatively little policy autonomy 
(see, for example, Buzdugan 2013; Lee 2002).   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Interview 19 (Namibia government); Interview 22 (Botswana government). 
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However, others have argued that African regions have to some extent been able 
to ‘“play” the game’ of market reform by making rhetorical commitments and 
selecting some aspects of market-led regionalism to implement while subverting 
and ignoring others and maintaining the flow of support from donors (Harrison 
2004, p. 243). A pessimistic assessment of this game-playing is that it is driven 
by the self-interested actions of state elites who ‘are prepared to endorse the neo-
liberal strategy as long as it facilitates their personal economic enrichment’ 
(Cheru 1997, p. 239). While this appears to be plausible in some countries,54 it is 
also the case that the partial adoption and subversion of market integration in 
Southern Africa is the result of principled disagreement about the most 
appropriate forms of regionalism in the Southern African context. 
 
In support of this principled opposition, Østergaard (1993) cites a ‘vast literature’ 
that councils against the application of market-driven models of regionalism in 
Africa. Similarly, Lee (2002, p. 1) concludes that this form of regionalism has 
failed miserably on the continent and Tsie (2001, p. 136) argues that neoliberal 
regionalism has ‘little to offer’ Africa in terms of the promotion of 
diversification or the resolution of regional inequalities. Meanwhile, John 
Ravenhill points to the historical legacy of production structures developed under 
colonialism as a barrier to the success of development strategies based on market 
integration. He states: 
 
Benefits from the creation of free trade areas arise only when tariffs have 
been a major impediment to inter-territorial trade. Amongst most LDCs, 
and in Africa in particular, this is rarely the case. The problem is not so 
much a matter of tariff barriers but the inability of states to produce the 
goods which satisfy the import needs of their neighbours (Ravenhill 
1980, cited in Østergaard 1993, p. 33). 
 
That is, African states weighed down by their colonial legacy struggle to see the 
benefits of market integration when they and their neighbours produce goods that 
by and large are not oriented towards local regional markets. There is by no 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 For an exploration of ‘shadow regionalism’ in Southern Africa, see the work 
of Frederik Söderbaum (2004a; 2004b). 
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means, then, an academic, let alone political, consensus that market integration is 
an appropriate form of regionalism in Africa.  
 
While some African leaders (for example Thabo Mbeki, see below) seem to have 
genuinely bought into neoliberal claims about the benefits of market integration, 
this has not been the case across Southern Africa (see Taylor 2011). Stephen 
Buzdugan (2013) collected a set of revealing quotes in an interview with a high-
level SADC official in 2006. These suggested that state-led development policies 
of the ‘newly industrialised countries’ might provide a ‘better alternative’ (p. 
130-1) for regionalism in Southern Africa, but that SADC did not pursue such a 
strategy as a result of the preferences of its international partners for market 
integration. The official argued that market integration was ‘not necessarily [in 
line with strategies for regionalism] perceived in the region’ (Buzdugan 2013, p. 
130-1).  
 
Buzdugan (2013) cites this as evidence of the lack of autonomy of regional 
elites. However, such (partial) acquiescence to donor agendas might also be read 
as a deliberate political strategy designed to appease international donors without 
necessarily implementing liberalisation plans that are viewed as contrary to 
national interests or inimical to a particular view of the role of regionalism in the 
promotion of development. The embeddedness of the patterns of regionalism that 
had emerged over time in Southern Africa had several implications for the EPAs. 
First, the pattern of overlapping regional memberships was much more 
entrenched than the EU’s strategy – which offered only a short amount of time 
for these to be resolved into mutually exclusive regional negotiating 
configurations – had allowed. Second, the EU’s proposal that ACP regions 
should negotiate the EPA as unitary actors took no account of the fact that in 
regions like Southern Africa there simply was not the political will to grant 
supranational negotiating authority to a regional body. This was a situation not 
helped by the absence in the SADC-minus case of any appropriate existing 
regional body that could effectively take on a coordinating role in the 
negotiations (see Chapter Seven). Third, with the exception of the small SACU 
formation, none of the existing regional integration projects in Southern Africa 
had yet successfully completed a customs union, let alone developed the capacity 
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to negotiate and implement agreements on the complex range of regulatory 
issues that the EU hoped to include within the EPAs. Finally, and most 
fundamentally, while regions in Southern Africa had converged upon market 
integration as a central aim during the 1990s, there appeared to remain a distinct 
lack of consensus amongst their constituent members that the sort of liberal 
regional project that the EU sought to promote and extend through the EPAs was 
either appropriate or desirable in the African context. 
 
6.4 Country Development Strategies 
 
This chapter now turns to the individual development strategies and trajectories 
that emerged over time in the countries of the SADC-minus EPA grouping – 
South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland, Angola and 
Mozambique.55 The reason for exploring national as well as regional political 
and economic formations is that in the absence of any supranational negotiating 
machinery for the SADC-minus region, much of the contestation and decision-
making with regard to the EPAs operated at the national level (see Chapter 
Seven). 
 
South African regional dominance provides the backdrop for the country-level 
analyses presented here. While this dominance in terms of economic power is 
clear, it is less so with regard to political and ideational influence. Indeed, one of 
the key points that arises from the analysis in this section concerns the diversity 
of national development strategies and trajectories within the Southern African 
region. These differences are embedded in different colonial histories, material 
resource endowments and geographical sizes and positions. But these differences 
also reflect the contested and normative nature of development strategies pursued 
by reflexive and purposive agents within particular historical and ideational 
contexts (something that is often neglected by materialist accounts of the EPAs). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 These were the countries that were members of the regional group when key 
decisions were made in 2007 about whether or not to sign an interim EPA and 
that continue to be members of the group until the time of writing. South Africa 
joined the group late, in 2006, having initially been excluded from the 
negotiations. Tanzania was an original member of the group but left during 2007 
to join the breakaway EAC EPA grouping. 
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In terms of congruence or fit with the model implicit in the EPAs, some of the 
development visions articulated within Southern African historical trajectories 
were much closer than others. As I will show in Chapter Seven, this was to have 
consequences for the way that contestation of the normative content of the EPAs 
played out in Southern Africa. 
 
The country profiles presented here are necessarily brief. The extent to which the 
role of particular agents, their ideas and actions can be emphasised within this 
context is limited and a nuanced constructivist account of the trajectories of each 
of these countries is unfortunately beyond the scope of this thesis. Given these 
limitations, however, it is possible to suggest that various ideational elements 
were at play within this diverse range of countries. Specifically, the negotiating 
strategies, framing of policy problems and opportunities, and intellectual tools 
used to interpret and respond to thee EPAs (see Chapter Seven), were developed 
in and through quite different policy contexts in which different orientations 
towards the aims and tools of development had been embedded over time. The 
overviews here provide a flavour of this historical and ideational context in 
which the EPA in Southern Africa played out.  
 
I first consider the national and regional dimensions of South Africa’s 
development trajectory before considering each of the smaller SADC-minus 
members in turn. The salient points in relation to each country overview are 
summarised at the end of the section. 
 
South Africa: Industrialising State 
 
South Africa is categorised by Graham Harrison (2004, p. 227) as one of only 
two truly ‘industrialising states’ in sub-Saharan Africa (the other being 
Mauritius). He notes that industrialisation, where it has occurred in sub-Saharan 
Africa, commenced in the 1950s and was driven by the state during the 1960s 
and 1970s under an import-substitution model of industrialisation. This involved 
tight trade controls, investment in infrastructure, and the integration of the 
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development of natural resources with industrial development (Harrison 2004, p. 
228). In addition to this more general trend, industrialisation in South Africa 
under apartheid was driven by a racist and authoritarian state which used 
oppressed black labour to foster the emergence of a significant mineral-industrial 
complex (Harrison 2004, p. 229).  
 
There is not sufficient space here for a detailed review of South Africa’s post-
apartheid development policies and trajectories. Extensive literature on this topic 
is available elsewhere (see, for example, Marais 2001; 2011; Fine 1997). Perhaps 
a first important point to note, however, is the African National Congress’ 
(ANC) conversion to what has widely been described as a neoliberal model of 
development in the two years that followed its rise to power in the first majority 
elections in South Africa in 1994 (Peet 2002; Weeks 1999; Williams and Taylor 
2000). This culminated in the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) 
programme, introduced in 1996. In this, the government adopted an orthodox 
macroeconomic policy comprising tight monetary policy and commitment to 
deficit reduction. This was accompanied by an enthusiastic embrace of trade 
opening, of which South Africa’s Trade Development and Cooperation 
Agreement (TDCA) with the EU was part. 
 
South Africa’s trade relations with the EU up to this point had followed a rather 
different path to that of the rest of the countries in the region. The European 
Community had adopted economic sanctions towards the South African 
apartheid regime in 1986 – including a ban on the import of gold coins, iron and 
steel – and began to lift these in the early 1990s in response to the South African 
government’s moves to dismantle the apartheid regime (Riding 1991).  
 
At this time the EU was the new Republic’s most important trading partner, 
taking more than 40 percent of South African exports (Perry 2000, p. 5). In this 
context, the South African government sought preferential access to the EU 
market through accession to the Lomé Convention’s trade provisions. In 
response, the EU proposed a twin-track approach, under which South Africa 
would be allowed to join Lomé as a ‘qualified’ member, with trade relations to 
be governed under a separate FTA (Perry 2000, p. 7). The EU’s rationale for this 
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was South Africa’s status as a ‘developed’ country under WTO law, and thus the 
possibility that its accession to Lomé’s trade provisions would threaten the 
regime’s legal status. In addition, there was concern that South Africa’s 
accession to Lomé would dilute the benefits that accrued to other ACP members 
(Perry 2000, p. 6), coupled with obvious resistance from import-competing 
European agricultural interests. 
 
The FTA between the EU and South Africa, the TDCA, was eventually 
concluded in 1999 and entered into force in 2004. It has since been characterised 
as a ‘raw deal’ (Greenberg 2000) for South Africa, primarily because 
protectionist interests within Europe had placed limits on the extent of EU 
agricultural market opening. Specifically, 27 percent of South Africa’s 
agricultural exports were excluded from the final deal (Perry 2000, p. 11). At this 
point, however, under the auspices of GEAR, the South African government had 
been relatively happy to undertake reciprocal trade liberalisation in relation to the 
EU.56 
 
A turning point away from South Africa’s neoliberal trajectory under GEAR and 
towards a more interventionist development strategy occurred in December 2007 
when Jacob Zuma won the presidency of the ANC from Thabo Mbeki. Adam 
Habib (2013, p. 108) suggests that under the influence of this policy shift, in the 
final years of Mbeki’s presidency economic policy took a strong neo-Keynesian 
leftward turn that was continued by Zuma. This clearly affected trade policy, 
which became more interventionist from the early 2000s onwards.  
 
In the context of poorer than expected economic performance and continually 
high levels of unemployment, the powerful Congress of South African Trade 
Unions (COSATU) played a key role in forcing the government to consider the 
employment effects of its trade strategy (Hurt 2014, p. 97). Furthermore, 
interviews that I conducted pointed to the negative effect of trade opening, 
particularly with regard to jobs in the garment industry following the conclusion 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Interview 12 (South Africa government). 
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of the WTO’s Uruguay Round. This concern emerged as a key driver of a more 
interventionist turn in South African trade policy.57 
 
This emphasis on employment concerns and trade activism was linked to calls 
for trade policy to be married to a ‘robust industrial policy’ in the Department of 
Trade and Industry’s 2007 policy framework (Department of Trade and Industry 
2007, cited in Hurt 2014, p. 97). More recently, the South African government 
has reiterated its commitment to a ‘developmental’ trade policy in which trade 
instruments are put at the service of a broader industrial strategy designed to 
encourage and upgrade value-added, job-creating industrial production (Vickers 
2014; South African Department of Trade and Industry 2013). Interviewees 
reported that the South African government also adopted a very defensive 
position with regard to trade in services and trade-related issues during this 
period, in spite of calls from some areas of business to adopt a more aggressive 
offensive strategy in this regard.58 
 
In the context of this activist trade policy stance, South African officials came to 
the view that they had given too much away in terms of tariff reduction in the 
TDCA without receiving sufficient access to the EU market in return.59 This 
perception left the South African government keen to extract further market 
access concessions from the EU during the EPA negotiations but reluctant to 
offer any further liberalisation of its own market beyond what had already been 
agreed under the TDCA (see Chapter Seven). 
 
South Africa: Regional Power 
 
The apartheid regime not only undertook the brutal and deliberate destabilisation 
of neighbouring countries during the 1980s but based its entire industrialisation 
strategy on the racially constituted exploitation of oppressed black labour from 
across the region (Harrison 2004, p. 229). To this extent, development for white 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Interviews 15 and 16 (South Africa business/agriculture). 
58 Interviews 15 and 16 (South Africa business/agriculture). 
59 Interview 12 (South Africa government); and interview 16 (South Africa 
business/agriculture).	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citizens of South Africa had been predicated on the underdevelopment and 
exploitation of other parts of the region. Meanwhile, South Africa’s neighbours, 
as part of the organisation of Frontline States, had focussed their efforts on co-
operation in opposition to apartheid South Africa and only began to ‘normalise’ 
relations with South Africa in the 1990s (Simon 1998, p. 4). All of this left a 
stark pattern of economic inequality and to some extent mistrust within the 
region. 
 
South Africa’s economic dominance within Southern Africa is clear. South 
Africa accounts for around 80 percent of the GDP of the wider 15-member 
SADC region (Adebajo et al. 2007a, p. 21). Meanwhile, patterns of trade in 
goods within SADC and particularly between South Africa and the countries of 
the SADC-minus EPA negotiating group – Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, 
Swaziland, Angola and Mozambique60 – are uneven (see Table 6.1). While 
 	  	  
  Proportion of 
Total Exports 
Bound for South 
Africa (%, 2004-
12) 
Proportion Total 
Imports that 
Originate from 
South Africa (%, 
2004-12) 
Proportion of 
South Africa’s 
imports from 
world (%, 2004-
12) 
Proportion of 
South Africa’s 
exports to world 
(%, 2004-12) 
SACU 
Members 
Botswana 12.0 74.1 0.7 5.6 
Lesotho 64.6* 90.2* 0.4* 1.7* 
Namibia 27.8 74.2 1.6 5.4 
Swaziland 45.4† 83.1† 1.1† 2.4† 
Non-SACU 
Members 
Angola 3.2 5.2 1.9 1.2 
Mozambique 16.8 33.2 0.5 1.9 
*limited data available, figures are for 2008-2010	  
†limited data available, figures are for 2004-2007 	  
Table 6.1: South African trade with SADC-minus members (source: author's 
calculation based on data from International Trade Centre 2013) 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Although Tanzania was originally part of the SADC-minus group, it is 
excluded here because it later went on to join the breakaway EAC negotiating 
group. 
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the extent of trade integration with South Africa amongst the SADC-minus 
countries varies, South Africa accounts for upwards of 70 percent of the import 
markets of all of the SACU members – Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and 
Swaziland (BLNS). As the destination for over 18 percent of the country’s total 
exports, the SADC-minus group amounts to a significant export market for South 
Africa, but the trade relationship remains highly uneven.  
 
SACU – the oldest customs union in the world and a longstanding feature of the 
region under apartheid – helps to perpetuate a relationship of dependence 
between South Africa and the region’s smaller members, BLNS. While SACU 
was reformed following the end of apartheid to lessen the inequality of its 
institutional arrangements (see Sidaway and Gibb 1998), BLNS remain heavily 
reliant on the transfer of import revenues from South Africa under SACU’s 
revenue sharing pool. These account for a significant portion of government 
revenue in all of BLNS61 and provide leverage for South Africa in the region. In 
addition, South Africa dominates the region in terms of services and investment. 
It boasts a more developed financial services sector, transport infrastructure, and 
greater capacity for research and development than its neighbours (Gibb 2012, p. 
153; Tsie 2001, p. 134). Moreover, it provides around 85 percent of FDI in the 
SADC region (Nagar 2012, p. 139).  
 
While this pattern of South African economic dominance is clearly significant, I 
argue in this chapter and the next that these material factors did not determine the 
process and outcome of the EPA in any straightforward manner. Instead, I 
suggest that South Africa has often failed to exercise political and ideational 
dominance to match its economic power. Furthermore, its economic dominance 
has at times bred regional mistrust, as was the case during the early part of the 
EPA negotiations (see Chapter Seven). 
 
Following the brutal regional history of the apartheid regime, the first majority 
government of South Africa under the ANC had little choice but to engage with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61  In 2008, the SACU revenue pool provided 69 percent of Swaziland’s 
government revenue, 50 percent of Lesotho’s, 25 percent of Namibia’s and 12 
percent of Botswana’s (Soko 2008, p. 67).	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the region with a degree of humility (Adebajo et al. 2007a; Alden and Soko 
2006; Landsberg 2007; Odén 2001). As President, Nelson Mandela stressed the 
need for peaceful regional cooperation and mutual economic benefit (Simon 
1998, p. 4). Meanwhile, his successor, Thabo Mbeki, emphasised the 
establishment of multilateralism and ‘rules of the game’ for regional engagement 
(Landsberg 2007, p. 195-6). In spite of these affirmations, Mbeki’s key foreign 
policy projects – the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and 
the African Renaissance – were highly controversial. These projects were 
characterised as an attempt by South Africa to export the neoliberal conversion 
that had taken place within the ANC after 1994 to the rest of the region (Adedeji 
2007; Alden and Soko 2006; Landsberg 2007).  
 
Academics and African leaders alike suggested that the prescriptions associated 
with NEPAD and the African Renaissance were more likely to exacerbate 
already large regional inequalities than address them. As Landsberg puts it: 
 
South Africa and Nigeria have borrowed heavily from certain 
conventional, neoliberal economic and political orthodoxies that are 
seriously unpopular in some African quarters, and this has in turn created 
many legitimacy problems for NEPAD and other South-African inspired 
continental initiatives (Landsberg 2007, p. 197). 
 
As well as ideological disagreement with the South African government’s 
neoliberal conversion, there was also concern that the programmes inspired by 
this regional vision were driven by South African self interest, serving as they 
have to spur trade and investment by South African firms on the continent 
(Alden and Soko 2006, p. 21). There has been much suspicion and resentment of 
the activities of South African firms – such as Vodacom, MTN and Shoprite – on 
the rest of the continent and especially in Southern Africa (Adebajo 2007, p. 231; 
Nagar 2012, p. 139). 
 
Additionally, South Africa’s relations with the rest of the region are complicated 
by its huge and continuing internal problems. The ‘developmental’ turn within 
South African trade policy (see above) – spurred by internal pressure – has led to 
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accusations of mercantilism from South Africa’s regional partners. Meanwhile, 
since Mbeki’s departure from office, the regional agenda has tended to be 
overshadowed by domestic concerns (Tsie 2001; Odén 2001).62 There have also 
been suggestions that South Africa’s internal move away from neoliberalism and 
towards a more interventionist approach to economic governance has not been 
matched by a retreat from neoliberalism on the regional front, where South 
African firms stand to gain from further liberalisation (Landsberg 2007, p. 
205).63  
 
Despite attempts by South African leaders and officials to portray their 
engagement with the region as motivated by solidarity and a spirit of mutual 
benefit, they have been accused of both promoting a hegemonic neoliberal 
project and, paradoxically, of pursuing self-interest through their disengagement 
with the region.  
 
Strong opposition to South Africa in the region has led a number of authors to 
question South Africa’s political influence. As Ian Taylor (2011) puts it, ‘the 
idea that South Africa is some sort of “norm entrepreneur” within the region is 
fanciful, to say the least’ (p. 1236; see also Alden and Soko 2006, p. 42-3; Qobo 
2012, p. 260-1; Schoeman and Alden 2003). Taylor (2011, p. 1238) suggests that 
South Africa’s inability to exercise leadership in the region stems from the 
dominance of neopatrimonial state structures within South Africa’s neighbours, 
which by their very nature stand to be undermined by Pretoria’s calls (under 
Mbeki) for good governance, democracy and liberal economics. While this may 
be part of the story, as I suggested above, this chapter questions the argument 
that neopatrimonialism is necessarily the dominant state form in Southern Africa. 
Rather, as Taylor (2011, p. 1233) himself acknowledges, political cultures, 
histories and economic strategies in the region are diverse. While neopatrimonial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Interview 29 (commentator). 
63 Qobo (2012, p. 257), however, suggests that South Africa’s regional policies 
have shifted in a more interventionist direction in line with its internal 
development strategy. This is supported by South Africa’s most recent Industrial 
Policy Action Plan, which articulates a commitment to a ‘developmental regional 
integration agenda’ that seeks to combine and coordinate national industrial 
strategies (South African Department of Trade and Industry 2013, p. 54-5).	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structures may play a part in opposition to South Africa’s engagement with 
regional politics, there also exists principled opposition to the strictures of 
neoliberal development as well as a deep-seated suspicion of South Africa’s 
motives and a sense that the country has not done enough to repay its neighbours 
for their sacrifices in the anti-Apartheid struggle (Adebajo 2007, p. 226; see also 
Adebajo et al. 2007a; Alden and Soko 2006; Odén 2001). 
 
Botswana 
 
Botswana’s economic growth and degree of social and political harmony is 
widely heralded as something of an exception in sub-Saharan Africa (Samatar 
1999; Werbner 2004). These successes have been variously attributed to: 
 
The colonial practice of ‘parallel rule’ and retention of the kgotla and 
other traditional legal institutions after independence, a relative ethnic 
homogeneity, remarkable leadership skills on the part of early presidents 
and a largely (at first) expatriate civil service, the discovery of diamonds 
after independence, and the wise and judicious use of diamond revenues 
by a developmental state (Bauer and Taylor 2011, p. 93). 
 
Whatever the cause, Botswana’s progression from very poor developing country 
at the time of its independence in 1966, to a country with one of the highest 
growth rates in the world during the 1980s (Hwedi 2001, p. 21), is quite 
remarkable.  
 
Botswana historically made significant use of preferential access to the EU 
market, particularly for beef exports. By 2007, however, beef accounted for only 
1.3 percent of Botswana’s exports to the EU and agriculture accounted for only 
2.5 percent of GDP (Stevens et al. 2007a, p. v). Yet, these figures understate the 
ongoing social and cultural importance of beef production in Botswana. The 
capital intensive nature of diamond production means that the country’s 
dominant industry provides few jobs in the formal economy (Taylor and 
Mokhawa 2003, p. 263). Agriculture remains an important source of rural 
	  204	  
employment, and one dominated by the beef sector (Stevens et al. 2007a, p. v). 
Livestock rearing is also of important cultural significance in rural Botswana.64 
For these reasons, the government has expressed a strong commitment to 
maintaining beef production at existing levels (Overseas Development Institute 
2007, p. 12).  
 
Meanwhile the government of Botswana acknowledges that its mineral base 
provides an unsustainable foundation for future development and in 1997 
produced a long-term development strategy, Vision 2016, that sets out the 
country’s ambitious development aims. In order to achieve these, Vision 2016 
asserts that ‘the ongoing liberalisation and deregulation of the economy will have 
to be pursued with more tenacity and vigour’ and calls for the creation of ‘a 
climate of stable and predictable policies’ and a lean public service that is 
‘business friendly and supportive of private enterprise’ (Botswana National 
Vision Council 1997, p. 51).  
 
Central to this strategy is diversification of Botswana’s economy away from 
dependence on the export of diamonds and into manufacturing and services, with 
the particular aim of creating a centre for financial and banking services in the 
region (Botswana National Vision Council 1997, p. 39). In this context, 
Botswana has made investment in public education a priority and has established 
an international financial services centre supervised by the Bank of Botswana as 
well as welcoming a growing number of foreign banks (Johnson 2003). While 
Botswana has been heralded in the academic literature as Africa’s only 
‘developmental state’, its most recent development policy vision appears 
relatively close to the liberalisation agenda advanced by the EU through the 
EPA. 
 
Namibia 
 
Namibia is a ‘settler state’, characterised by a large agricultural sector and by a 
history in which prime areas for farming were controlled by European (later 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Interview 22 (Botswana government). 
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South African) commercial farmers (Harrison 2004, p. 226-7). Namibian 
independence from South Africa came only in 1990 and after protracted armed 
conflict. Under colonial rule, Namibia had been characterised by a ‘dual’ 
structure in which, at independence, 73 percent of farmland was owned by 4,450 
white farmers, while 100,000 communal and primarily subsistence farmers were 
restricted to 27 percent of farmland (Jauch et al. 2011, p. 195; Elkan et al. 1992, 
p. 17).  
 
Mining, commercial agriculture and fishing remain mainstays of the Namibian 
economy (Bauer and Taylor 2011, p. 252). The European Union is a key export 
market for these commodities and Lomé preferences have played an important 
role in maintaining Namibia’s competitiveness in this market. This is particularly 
the case with regard to beef exports, for which Namibia receives a highly 
significant preferential margin. In spite of investment in beef production within 
the northern communal areas of the country (see Stevens et al. 2007b) the beef 
export market continues to be dominated by white commercial farmers (Bauer 
and Taylor 2011, p. 253). 
 
Addressing the colonial legacy of rural inequality has been a central concern for 
the Namibian government. In this context, one of the government’s key aims 
since independence has been to foster diversification of the economy away from 
primary agricultural exports and into manufacturing. In 2004, Namibia’s third 
national development plan, Vision 2030 Namibia, set out the country’s highly 
ambitious plan to become an industrialised upper-income country by 2030 
(Government of Namibia 2004).  
 
One of the main policy tools employed to encourage industrial development has 
been an extensive set of tax incentives to encourage investment in manufacturing 
within export processing zones (World Trade Organization 2009b, p. x). In this 
way, Namibia has sought to take advantage of preferential access to the United 
States market under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and 
succeeded in attracting investment from a number of large Asian-owned textile 
factories in the early 2000s (Bauer and Taylor 2011, p. 252). However, trade 
preferences under this scheme were soon eroded by the end of the Multi Fibre 
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Arrangement in 2004 (see Heron 2013, p. 114) resulting in the closure of 
factories and the loss of thousands of jobs (Mwilima 2007). Namibia’s ambitious 
industrialisation strategy also employs more traditional forms of trade 
intervention, using import tariffs to protect certain agricultural products (World 
Trade Organization 2009b, p. x) and deploying export duties in order to 
encourage value addition prior to export.65 This latter approach to development is 
at odds with the EU’s calls for development via trade liberalisation. 
 
Swaziland 
 
Swaziland and Lesotho are examples of microstates with very small populations 
and, as a consequence of their size, very little autonomy from the global political 
economy (Harrison 2004, p. 232). These countries face the added challenge of 
being engulfed within the boundaries of South Africa, entirely so in the case of 
Lesotho. Table 6.1, above, demonstrates the extensive degree of trade integration 
between these countries and South Africa and their dependence on financial 
transfers via the SACU revenue sharing pool has already been outlined. In this 
context, though, Swaziland and Lesotho have followed quite different 
development trajectories. 
 
Tony Heron (2013, p. 115) notes two key features of the Swazi political 
economy in addition to its high degree of integration with South Africa. First is 
the country’s dependence on agriculture and the highly unequal way in which its 
agriculture is organised, wherein most productive land is set aside under a title 
deed system for capital-intensive agriculture (primarily sugar production). 
Second, manufacturing has played a negligible role in the Swazi economy and 
the country has an ‘historically acute reliance on Lomé preferences, the Sugar 
Protocol specifically’ (Heron 2013, p. 115).  
 
Swaziland’s Vision 2022 development plan, produced in 1997 states a 
commitment to the ‘free-enterprise nature of the Swazi economy’ and puts 
forward a development vision based on ‘sound economic management’ and ‘the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Interview 17 and 18 (Namibia government). 
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creation of an attractive macroeconomic environment to increase investor 
confidence’ (Government of Swaziland 1997, p. 5). Beyond this, the document is 
rather short on details about the precise content of this development strategy. The 
Swazi government has, however, demonstrated some commitment to this liberal 
development model through financial services liberalisation and the opening of 
the telecommunications market to competition (World Trade Organization 
2009b, p. x). 
 
The Swazi government also achieved some success in the early 2000s in 
attracting external investment in the production of garments for export to the 
USA under AGOA. As in Namibia, however, this success proved short lived 
following the end of the Multi Fibre Arrangement and the consequent erosion of 
AGOA preferences (Heron 2013, p. 115-6). Up to the time of the EPA 
negotiations, then, the Swazi economy and development strategy remained 
highly dependent on sugar exports and the preferential access and guaranteed 
prices that it received for these under the Lomé Convention and the Sugar 
Protocol (see Richardson 2009; Richardson-Ngwenya and Richardson 2014). 
While it is classified as a ‘lower-middle-income country’ Swaziland’s small size 
and acute preference dependence made it highly vulnerable to any loss of Lomé-
equivalent preferences in the recasting of Lomé. 
 
More recently, the country has suffered economic crisis and social unrest 
following the decline of financial inflows from the SACU revenue sharing pool 
(England 2011). South Africa approved a bail-out loan in 2011, to which 
conditionalities related to fiscal reforms, democracy and human rights were 
attached (England 2011). Meanwhile, activists suggested that not enough was 
being done by South Africa to put pressure on Swaziland to adopt political 
reforms. Swaziland is Africa’s last absolute monarchy and activists protest that 
King Mswati ‘enjoys a lavish lifestyle and runs his country of about 1M people 
as a fiefdom while many ordinary people struggle with poverty and 
unemployment’ (England 2011). 
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Lesotho 
 
Tony Heron (2013) describes Lesotho as ‘a tiny, mountainous, landlocked 
country blighted by HIV/AIDS with a declining population, falling incomes, few 
natural resources or much in the way of arable land’ (p. 114). As such, it is 
remarkable for the successes it has achieved with its garment manufacturing 
industry. This industry steadily expanded from the early 1980s and came to 
constitute 84 percent of the value of the country’s exports by 1993 (Love 1996, 
p. 75). The garment industry’s growth was driven by the arrival of South African 
– and later Chinese and Taiwanese – companies. These were attracted to Maseru 
by cheap labour and good links to the port at Durban, as well as the opportunity 
to avoid sanctions on exports from South Africa and to take advantage of 
Lesotho’s special exemption from the Lomé Convention’s rules of origin (Heron 
2013, p. 113; Gibbon 2003, p. 316).  
 
This influx of investment was also attracted by active government policy. The 
government of Lesotho had come to the conclusion during the 1980s that the best 
way to promote development within the country was by attracting FDI. It 
therefore pursued an active and very effective strategy to attract external 
investment. This included, marketing the country as a stable and attractive 
investment destination, aggressive investment promotion by the Lesotho 
National Development Corporation, reforms to the granting of visas and business 
licenses, and the introduction of tax incentives for investors (Manoeli 2012, p. 7-
9).  
 
In this context, Lesotho became one of the very few ACP countries to increase its 
share in the EU market for both imports as a whole and for manufactures in the 
period up to 1992 (Imani Development 1998, p. 81). Even before the 
introduction of AGOA, however, the balance of Lesotho’s exports was shifting 
away from Europe and towards the US market (Heron 2013, p. 113). When 
AGOA was introduced in 2000, Lesotho’s garment industry experienced 
explosive expansion (Heron 2013, p. 113-4), while the EU received only 0.2 
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percent of Lesotho’s garment exports by 2005 (Bennet 2006, p. 170).66 Again, a 
large proportion of these trade gains were lost as a result of the end of the Multi 
Fibre Arrangement in 2004.  
 
In its Industrialisation Master Plan of 2007, the government of Lesotho 
acknowledged that the US clothing market was likely to become even more 
competitive, and Lesotho’s preferential access to this market further eroded, in 
the immediate future (Government of Lesotho 2007, p. iv). The Plan, therefore, 
outlines a vision to create an ‘enabling environment’ for development led by the 
private sector (Government of Lesotho 2007, p. iii). Specifically, the plan states 
an aim to redevelop trade with the EU and to use the EPA negotiations to seek 
improved rules of origin for access to the EU market, a crucial issue for the 
export of garments (Government of Lesotho 2007, p. iv). 
 
More recently, the government of Lesotho has given clear indications that it 
wishes to lessen the country’s economic dependence on South Africa. This was 
particularly the case in the context of declining flows from the SACU revenue 
sharing pool and falling remittances from migrant workers in South Africa in the 
wake of the 2008 financial crisis (England 2013a). This left unemployment rates 
within the country at more than 24 percent (England 2013b). On the country’s 
relationship with South Africa, the prime minister, Thomas Thabane, 
commented, ‘I want to be interdependent rather than a one way traffic thing, [… 
the dependency] has to be reduced’ (quoted in England 2013b). 
 
Angola 
 
Following independence in 1975, Angola suffered a long civil war that ended in 
2002. The country’s rich endowment of natural resources – diamonds and, 
primarily, oil – is often cited as a cause of the protracted nature of this conflict, 
providing both an incentive and a source of funds to keep fighting (Bauer and 
Taylor 2011, p. 154; Reno 2000). Since the end of the civil war, Angola has been 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 This can be explained as the result of more restrictive rules of origin that 
governed access under EU preferences compared those under AGOA. 
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able to draw upon its resource wealth to promote steady growth – it is now the 
third biggest sub-Saharan economy (Burgis and White 2012) – but continues to 
face significant economic and governance challenges.  
 
The ruling People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) moved to 
adopt market reforms and accept IMF loans during the 1990s, but following the 
end of the civil war announced that it wanted no more loans from the 
international financial institutions (Bauer and Taylor 2011, p. 177). Rather, the 
country has developed strong oil-export and inward infrastructure-investment 
links with China and India and strong relations with Moscow (White 2012; 
Burgis 2012). Instead of pursuing a neoliberal development strategy based on 
structural adjustment, then, the Angolan government in 2002 formulated a 
reindustrialisation strategy based on import-substitution (World Trade 
Organization 2006, p. viii). As of 2006, the Angolan state continued to operate 
over 50 enterprises in various sectors, including the dominant oil and diamond 
extractive industries (World Trade Organization 2006, p. ix-x). Meanwhile, the 
Angolan government maintains an interventionist trade policy stance and has 
been reluctant to liberalise import tariffs, even in line with those commitments 
made under its participation in SADC regional integration.67  
 
A significant growth in the country’s oil revenues since the end of the civil war 
has largely failed to improve the vast economic inequalities in the country or to 
address the country’s position at the bottom of the scale for most socioeconomic 
indicators (Bauer and Taylor 2011, p. 175-7). According to the Financial Times, 
the elite within Angola ‘rules with a tight grip and has amassed fabulous wealth’ 
while oil ‘breeds corruption and chokes sectors [agriculture and manufacturing] 
that could create growth’ (Burgis and White 2012). In 2012, oil accounted for 97 
percent of exports and 75 percent of government revenues but only employed 
one percent of the workforce (Burgis and White 2012). Meanwhile, in 2012 a 
programme of luxury hotel construction was underway in Luanda – reportedly 
the world’s most expensive city (Redvers 2012) – while three quarters of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Interview 25 (SADC). 
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city’s population continued to live in informal settlements (Burgis and White 
2012). 
 
Mozambique 
 
Since the end of the country’s civil war in 1992, Mozambique has developed a 
reputation – in contrast to fellow former Portuguese colony, Angola – as a 
‘darling’ of western donors, feted for its peace, stability and growth in the post-
conflict period. It should be noted that this praise has come amongst a range of 
criticisms that suggest that the country’s elite have used aid and adjustment 
projects for personal enrichment rather than broad-based development (Bauer 
and Taylor 2011, p. 145; de Renzio and Hanlon 2009).  
 
A WTO Trade Policy Review of Mozambique in 2009 attributed the country’s 
high economic growth in the 2000s to trade and economic governance reforms 
pursued since 2001, as well as growing FDI and public spending financed by 
foreign aid (World Trade Organization 2009a, p. vii). These reforms appear to 
reflect a broadly neoliberal development strategy. They include, a commitment 
to prudent fiscal and monetary policies, efforts to reduce the country’s public 
deficit, the adoption of a restrictive monetary policy with price stability as the 
primary goal, unilateral trade liberalisation, the creation of a general policy on 
competition and new government procurement legislation (World Trade 
Organization 2009a, p. vii-x). 
 
Paolo de Renzio and Joseph Hanlon (2007) suggest that Mozambique has 
managed to attract high levels of aid inflows precisely because members of the 
ruling party, the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), ‘have developed 
advanced skills at managing complex relations with a diverse range of 
international agencies, juggling their different priorities and demands, and 
positively responding to their agendas’ (p. 4). Although there are signs that FDI 
may be beginning to dwarf aid inflows as a result of new mineral finds (Ramdoo 
2012; Financial Times 2014), Mozambique remains highly aid dependent. The 
European Union is a significant contributor of aid to the country, with €634 
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million made available during the period from 2008 to 2013 (Republic of 
Mozambique - European Community 2007). 
 
The significance of all of this for the purposes of the EPA is that Mozambique 
was highly dependent upon aid distributed by the European Union. Not only this, 
but its leaders appeared to receptive to the sort of development agenda – based 
on a comprehensive liberalisation – that the EU sought to promote through the 
EPA.  
 
Summary 
 
By way of a summary of the historically embedded development trajectories and 
strategies in the seven SADC-minus countries, it is possible to conclude the 
following.  
 
Botswana’s development vision, with its emphasis on liberalisation and 
deregulation and especially its aim of building an economy with a strong 
financial services dimension, was probably closest to the view of development 
articulated by the EU in its EPA agenda. The government of Lesotho’s long-term 
commitment to the goal of building a regulatory environment that was attractive 
to foreign investors also seemed relatively compatible with the EU’s emphasis on 
regulatory reform, trade openness and the promotion of competition. 
Mozambique, meanwhile had adopted a development strategy based on aid 
dependence and receptiveness to the neoliberal policy agendas of Western 
donors. Swaziland appeared to be yet to articulate a coherent strategy to move 
beyond its acute dependence on sugar preferences.  This dependence itself, 
however, appeared likely to be enough to secure the country’s signature of an 
EPA. 
 
The compatibility between the EU’s comprehensive liberalisation agenda and the 
embedded development strategies in other countries appeared much more 
problematic. In the case of Namibia, the country’s aim of fostering rapid 
industrialisation, and using interventionist trade policy tools to do so, was at odds 
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with the EU’s trade liberalisation agenda. This was similarly the case in South 
Africa, where the commitment to a ‘developmental’ trade and industrial policy 
agenda appeared to preclude further commitments to the liberalisation of trade in 
goods and services in relation to the EU. In Angola, the disconnect with the EU’s 
development vision was even more stark. Here, extensive state ownership within 
key industrial sectors, high import tariffs, a commitment to import-substitution 
industrialisation and strong links with China and Moscow were completely at 
odds with the EU’s arguments about the importance of trade openness and 
competition for development. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter is the first in a two-part case study of the EPA in the SADC-minus 
region. The overall aim of the case study is to take a more fine-grained approach 
to exploring the process and outcome of the EPA negotiations in a particular 
historical context, and especially the patterns of ideational contestation that 
shaped this process. In this chapter, I focused on the historical dimension of this 
endeavour and aimed to reveal the contested and path-dependent processes of 
regionalism and development within Southern Africa. These provided the 
institutional context – both in terms of formal structures and embedded ideas – 
within which the contestation of the SADC-minus EPA would play out. 
 
I began with some theoretical reflections on the place of African history and 
agency within the broader narrative of this thesis. The point developed here was 
that the questioning of materialist accounts within the thesis requires not only the 
examination of the ideational drivers and articulation of the EU’s EPA project, 
but also the way that this was contested by ACP actors as it was put into action. 
In exploring this contestation within the context of the Southern African case, 
there are obvious linkages with existing literatures on Africa within the 
international system. By way of brief reflection on these linkages, I offered a 
sympathetic critique of the literature on the neopatrimonial state and African 
strategies of extraversion. The key point here was that while I acknowledge the 
presence of neopatrimonial structures within African states, I seek to avoid the 
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tendency within this literature to make generalised and ahistorical assumptions 
about the motivations of African agents. In making this argument, the chapter 
draws out the similarities between the theoretical approach adopted within this 
thesis and a more recent set of literature on African agency. 
 
In the remainder of the chapter, I explored the historically embedded patterns of 
regionalism and development within the Southern African context, with an eye to 
their contested normative content and their implications for the EPA 
negotiations. With respect to regional integration in Southern Africa, the central 
argument was that the historical development of regionalism in this part of the 
world was based on a different set of normative foundations to those articulated 
in relation to regionalism, liberalisation and development within the EPAs. In 
particular, the forms of regional integration in Southern Africa can be explained 
through a set of historical circumstances and contexts (colonial production 
structures, the dominance of apartheid South Africa, civil war and aid 
dependence) and the evolution of deliberate political strategies by differentiated 
and specific Southern African elites within this context.  
 
Over time these forms of regional co-operation have been cemented into a 
system of overlapping regional formations characterised by the uneven 
implementation of their market integration commitments. On the one hand, a 
system of formalised but flexible regionalism has been constructed that allows 
member states to exercise continued sovereignty over their national territories 
while providing symbolic confirmation of this sovereignty and attracting funds 
from donors keen to support regional integration efforts. On the other, a regional 
political economic strategy has emerged – in SADC, at least – in which 
commitments to ‘developmental regionalism’, sector-based regional industrial 
strategies, and overlapping memberships have been placed alongside detailed 
timescales for the completion of customs unions.  
 
As an approach to the political economy of regionalism, these different strategies 
and commitments are fraught with contradiction (see Dzinesa et al. 2012; 
Mbuende 2012; Østergaard 1993; Tsie 2001).  Nevertheless, they reflect a 
strategy designed to secure the ongoing support of donors with a strong 
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preference for market integration and to bolster weak sovereignty while 
accommodating an array of preferences and development strategies being 
pursued within the region.  
 
At the national level, the chapter reveals a wide range of development 
trajectories and policies. These were embedded within particular historical and 
material contexts. Within this, however, the chapter also aims to offer a flavour 
of the range of development ideas that prevailed within Southern African 
countries and that were cemented within their policy orientations. Of course, 
these are somewhat difficult to reveal without a more detailed study of the 
historical paths that these different countries have followed than the constraints 
of this thesis allow. However, my aim was to demonstrate that the policy 
orientations within Southern African countries exhibited considerable variety. 
Furthermore, a number of these – particularly in South Africa, Namibia and 
Angola – reflected a rather more interventionist and state-led development 
prospectus than that articulated and promoted by the EU through the EPAs. 
These contrasting ideas about the appropriate aims and tools of development 
were to be reflected in the contestation that took place within the EPA 
negotiations. 	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Chapter Seven 
Negotiating the SADC-Minus EPA: Material 
Sanctions and Normative Contestation 
 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The negotiations for an EPA between the EU and SADC-minus, until very 
recently, threatened to split the group apart. The group itself was based upon a 
problematic negotiating configuration, which included fewer than half of the 
wider SADC region and was not represented by a supranational negotiating 
machinery. Within this, four countries – Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique and 
Swaziland – were not only relatively enthusiastic about signing an interim EPA, 
but also responded positively to the EU’s comprehensive trade agenda. These 
countries actively pursued negotiation on trade in services and investment, even 
though this was not required in order to reach WTO compatible agreements with 
the EU. The remaining three countries – Angola, South Africa and Namibia – for 
a long time refused to sign the interim EPA and resolutely declined to negotiate 
on trade in services or the other components of the EU’s WTO-plus agenda. 
More recently, following significant concessions from the EU, the region (with 
the exception of Angola) initialled a modified and less comprehensive version of 
the earlier interim EPA. 
 
What is most interesting about the process and outcome of the EPA negotiations 
in SADC-minus is that they are not amenable to materialist explanations in any 
straightforward sense. Specifically, the chapter makes the case that the 
negotiating orientations of the SADC-minus countries, as outlined above, could 
not be read off based on their vulnerability to the loss of EU preferences alone. 
That the region was ultimately able to extract significant concessions from the 
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EU in the context of its relatively weak position within highly asymmetrical 
negotiations represents a further puzzle. 
 
In Chapter Six, I set out the theoretical and historical background for a fine-
grained exploration of the process of contestation that characterised the EPA 
negotiation within the SADC-minus context. Specifically, I drew attention to the 
network of overlapping regional formations in Southern Africa and its 
embeddedness within the particular politics and strategies of regionalism in this 
part of the world. Furthermore, the chapter identified a range of historical 
trajectories and entrenched development strategies within the SADC-minus 
countries, some of which were much closer to the model of economic 
governance promoted by the EU through the EPA than others. In this chapter, I 
pick up this thread and focus on the way in which these historical structures – 
and the actions of agents within them – interacted with the EU’s EPA strategy 
once the negotiations got under way. My claim is that such an approach can help 
to draw new insights about the specificities of the otherwise puzzling process and 
outcome of the SADC-minus EPA, as outlined above. 
 
This chapter lends support to the analysis that I advanced in Chapter Five. My 
argument there was that once the problematic and uneven nature of the EU’s 
legal argument and material leverage had been exposed, the EU’s strategy for 
reaching agreement on the EPAs was dependent on the receptiveness and 
responses of ACP elites to its norm-based case for the agreements. This norm-
based argument had itself been compromised by the elision of the EU’s 
development agenda into its more commercially-oriented Global Europe 
ambitions, at the same time as its espousal of the Singapore issues was 
increasingly at odds with the direction of travel of the WTO. 
 
Here, my focus is on the way in which the tensions within the EU’s EPA rhetoric 
opened up space and, in some cases, provided the tools for a range of critical 
responses and negotiating positions from actors within Southern Africa. And, 
indeed, the way in which some countries within the region reacted relatively 
positively to the EPA in spite of these tensions. Here, what was important was 
the interaction between the EU’s norm-based argument for the EPAs and the 
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ideas through which SADC-minus representatives interpreted, analysed and 
attempted to reconstruct and modify the choices available to them. That is, the 
contextually constrained responses of African agents, situated within the EU’s 
contradictory and controversial negotiating strategy, were important in shaping 
the outcome of the EPA. 
 
There are four parts to this chapter. In the first part, I outline the EPA negotiating 
process in Southern Africa up to 2007, including the process by which a 
problematic regional negotiating configuration was chosen. Second, I set out the 
choices made by the countries in the region at the time of the expiry of the WTO 
waiver in 2007 and examine the puzzles that these raise for conventional 
understandings of ACP motivations in the context of the EPAs. The third part 
draws on the data collected during fieldwork in Brussels and Southern Africa in 
2011 and 2012. I use this to develop a fine-grained analysis of the way in which 
the SADC-minus countries interpreted and responded to the interim EPA in 
2007. The final section traces the role of contestation – particularly by South 
African negotiators – within subsequent developments in the negotiations.  
 
7.2 The formation of the SADC-Minus EPA Group 
 
As I pointed out in Chapter Six, at the start of the EPA negotiations in 2002, 
there were at least seven overlapping regional integration projects – SADC, 
SACU, COMESA, EAC, ECCAS, CEMAC and IOC – that included central, 
eastern and southern African countries. According to the Cotonou Agreement, 
the EPAs aimed to build upon existing regional integration initiatives of ACP 
states and the EPA process was designed to provide capacity-building support for 
national governments and regional institutions in matters of regional integration 
(see Chapter Five). The European Commission (2001) had later specified that in 
order to take part in an EPA negotiation: a regional grouping must be effectively 
engaged in an economic integration process; negotiations must take place in a 
single setting and lead to a single agreement; and countries that were part of 
overlapping regional groupings must choose one group through which to 
negotiate an EPA.  
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Customs unions were considered the preferable basis for EPA negotiations but 
FTAs – as long as they were actively pursuing economic integration – were also 
considered suitable. Where there was a customs union at a more advanced stage 
of integration within a larger FTA – as is commonly the case in African regions68 
– the Commission’s preference seemed to be for negotiating with the wider 
group so long as it met the EU’s other criteria. 
 
While the EPA configurations were ostensibly at the discretion of the ACP 
countries, EU negotiators were keen to ensure that EPA regions were viable in 
terms of their market size and their capacity to negotiate and implement an 
agreement (see Chapter Five). Particularly in Africa, EU officials believed that 
the EPA negotiations could be used to resolve and rationalise overlapping 
memberships.69 The point has already been made that there were considerable 
time constraints on forming regional EPA configurations, imposed by the expiry 
of the WTO Cotonou waiver at the end of 2007. Given the deeply embedded 
nature of overlapping regionalism in Southern Africa, a resolution of these 
patterns probably required more time than was available. Furthermore, it was not 
clear given the complex politics of regionalism within Southern Africa, and the 
range of motivations that encouraged elites to maintain overlapping memberships 
(see Chapter Six), that there was sufficient political will within the region to 
resolve these perceived tensions. 
 
In the end three EPA groups were formed in Southern and Central Africa based 
on SADC, COMESA and ECCAS.70  These three broad overlapping FTAs 
included all of the ACP countries in this region. Those countries that were 
members of more than one of these organisations had to choose an EPA 
configuration in which to be a member.71 While the EPA configurations in  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 For example SACU within SADC, EAC within COMESA, CEMAC within 
ECCAS, and UEMOA within ECOWAS. 
69 Interview 3 (DG Trade). 70	  The EPA configurations that correspond to these regions are known as 
SADCC-minus, Eastern and Southern Africa, and Central Africa, respectively. 
71 Interview 3 (DG Trade).	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Figure 7.1: SADC-minus EPA configuration and overlapping regional 
organisations and trade agreements, 2007 (Source: author’s interpretation).	  	  
Southern and Central Africa did not themselves overlap, neither did they resolve 
the underlying issue of overlapping memberships, nor match up to existing 
regional organisations – as the European Commission had claimed they would. 
Neither did they seem to build in any clear way upon regions ‘effectively 
engaged in an economic integration process’ (European Commission 2001). 
Rather, the EPA configurations were overlaid on top of existing patterns of 
regional integration, which did not, for the most part, make any adjustments in 
membership in order to reflect the new EPA configurations. 
 
In all, the SADC-minus group contained only seven of the 15 SADC members 
(see figure 7.1). Vickers (2011, p. 189) reports that the ‘gravitational pull’ of the 
more organised COMESA Secretariat attracted the governments of a number of 
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anxious smaller SADC countries. Meanwhile, the members of SACU (initially 
with the exception of South Africa, which only joined the negotiations in 2007) 
formed the kernel of the SADC-minus group. Three non-SACU members – 
Angola, Mozambique and Tanzania – also joined SADC-minus. Mozambique 
and Tanzania were not members of COMESA and their governments did not 
want to become members,72 so did not have the option to join the alternative 
grouping based on this region. Tanzania soon left the grouping to join Kenya, 
Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi in the separate EAC configuration. Angolan 
officials, meanwhile, felt closer to the SADC region than COMESA as a result of 
particularly strong historical, political and economic links to South Africa.73  	  
The inclusion of three (later two) non-SACU countries in the SADC-minus 
configuration, along with the fact that over half of the SADC region was 
negotiating in alternative groupings, made representation of the configuration in 
the negotiations and the formation of common positions extremely difficult. The 
non-SACU countries could not be represented by the SACU Secretariat and the 
SADC members refused to fund the negotiations through the SADC Secretariat 
since half of them were negotiating in other configurations. This situation was 
resolved with the creation of a SADC EPA Unit housed within, but formally 
separate to, the SADC Secretariat in Gaborone, Botswana.  
 
This institution was granted only a handful of staff74 and its role was ultimately 
limited to facilitating negotiations and providing technical assistance to the 
SADC-minus member states. 75  This was a reflection of the reluctance of 
members of the SADC-minus group to delegate responsibility for the 
negotiations to a supranational authority, which was in turn an expression of the 
suspicion with which elites within the region regarded any threat to their national 
sovereignty (see Chapter Six). Trade ministers from SADC-minus member 
states, then, retained overall competence for the negotiations. As a result of this, 
the SADC-minus group struggled to form a coherent regional negotiating 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Interview 3 (DG Trade). 
73 Interview 21 (Angola government).	  
74 At the time of the fieldwork for this thesis, the EPA unit had been reduced to 
just one full time employee (Interview 26, SADC). 
75 Interview 26 (SADC). 
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strategy for the EPAs; the negotiations were characterised by intra-regional 
mistrust (Vickers 2011, p. 188); and national strategies prevailed over regional 
considerations, at least until very recently.  
 
The situation in the Caribbean (the only region to have thus far agreed a full 
regional EPA) was very different. Here, the underlying regional organisation, the 
Caribbean Community (CARICOM), was a better fit with the EU’s proposed 
regional negotiating group (with the exception that the former excluded the 
Dominican Republic) and the region also possessed a supranational negotiating 
machinery. Not only this, but also there was relative ideological consensus 
between elites within this machinery and European Commission officials with 
regard to the appropriate aims and tools of regional integration and development 
(Bishop et al. 2013). This greatly facilitated the negotiations and their outcome, 
which was characterised by a much greater degree of regional unity than in 
Southern Africa (Heron 2011; Bishop et al. 2013).76  
 
The key point here is that the EU’s insistence that the EPA could both build on 
and support regional integration in the ACP regions and provide a practical basis 
on which to swiftly bring about WTO compatible FTAs failed to sufficiently take 
into account the poor fit of the EU’s regional prospectus with existing regions in 
Southern Africa. Furthermore, this was not simply a technical or capacity issue. 
The historical trajectory of regionalism within Southern Africa was not based in 
any straightforward way on the commitment to open regionalism and 
comprehensive liberalisation that was enshrined in the EU’s norm-based vision 
for the EPAs. Within this context, regional EPAs offered a poor fit with the 
existing institutional architecture of regionalism within Southern Africa. They 
also clashed with the ideas and political strategies of agents working in and 
through these structures, whose priority was not necessarily to resolve 
overlapping memberships or construct open and effective regional regulatory 
regimes (see Chapter Six). 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Interview 27 (ACP).	  
	   223	  
7.3 SADC-Minus Negotiates Interim EPAs 
 
Once the SADC-minus EPA group had been formalised, albeit in less than 
satisfactory fashion, the negotiations began in earnest in 2004. At the request of a 
joint strategic framework negotiated between the SADC-minus countries, South 
Africa was admitted to the EPA process as a full negotiating party in early 2007, 
with the caveat that it would receive a more limited market access offer from the 
EU than its neighbours. The group’s other demands – for non-reciprocity for the 
three non-SACU LDCs77 and non-binding cooperation on the EU’s WTO-plus 
trade agenda – were rejected by the European Commission (Vickers 2011, p. 
190). The Commission continued to insist that reciprocity was necessary for 
WTO compatibility and that comprehensive EPAs would support ACP 
development aims, even in the case of LDCs.78 By mid 2007, a range of 
controversial issues remained to be negotiated and it was clear that the region 
would not be ready to sign a full EPA before the expiry of the WTO waiver.  
Faced with this reality, the European Commission decided that individual ACP 
countries and sub-regions would be allowed to sign WTO-compatible goods only 
‘interim’ EPAs (see Chapter Five).  
 
The key decision for SADC-minus at this point was whether all or part of the 
region was willing to sign an interim EPA. Reciprocity was not particularly 
controversial for the SACU members. These countries were already de facto 
implementing reciprocity via the TDCA (South Africa’s FTA with the EU, see 
Chapter Six) by virtue of their membership in a customs union with South 
Africa. However, the trade liberalisation required under reciprocity had a bigger 
potential impact for the non-SACU countries: Angola and Mozambique. In 
addition, at issue for all the SADC-minus countries was the EU’s strong 
preference for the inclusion of binding commitments for further negotiations on 
trade in services and the Singapore issues, as well as the inclusion of a range of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 At this time, Tanzania was still included in the SADC-minus configuration. 
78 Interview 12 (South Africa government).	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controversial technical provisions. The latter included an MFN clause,79 a ban on 
export taxes, and texts on infant industry protection and national treatment. 
 
Of course, the EU’s primary lever for encouraging ACP countries to sign at this 
time was the threat of being downgraded to a less generous preference scheme. 
In SADC-minus the threat of lost market access was felt most keenly by 
Botswana, Namibia and Swaziland. These were the non-LDCs that would be 
downgraded to GSP should they refuse to sign an EPA. As I suggested in 
Chapter Six, some of these countries had come to be more reliant on EU trade 
preferences than others over time (see Table 7.1). Namibia and Swaziland were 
particularly vulnerable to any loss of Lomé-equivalent preferences. In the case of 
Namibia, 36 percent of the country’s exports between 2004 and 2012 were 
destined for the EU and of these around 31 percent constituted exports that 
would be affected by a rise in tariffs should Namibia be downgraded to GSP 
status (Overseas Development Institute 2007). In the case of Swaziland, only 6 
percent of the country’s exports in the same period were destined for the EU but 
of these 87 percent were potentially affected by a tariff hike if the country 
refused to sign an EPA (Overseas Development Institute 2007).  
 
On this basis, Botswana seemed somewhat less exposed. Although 67 percent of 
the country’s exports were destined for the EU, these exports were almost 
entirely dominated by diamonds – which did not receive a preferential advantage 
under the old Lomé system. Only 1.5 percent of Botswana’s exports to the EU 
would be affected by a tariff rise if the country were downgraded to GSP. 
Meanwhile, Angola, Mozambique and Lesotho, as LDCs, were eligible for duty-
free access to the EU market through EBA even if they refused to sign an EPA. 
Likewise, South Africa’s preferential access to the EU market under the TDCA 
would be unaffected if it chose not to sign an EPA. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 The MFN clause was designed to prevent ACP countries from offering 
superior preferential access to any of the EU’s major trade rivals, including the 
emerging economies of Brazil, India and China. 
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Country LDC 
Status 
Proportion of 
Exports 
Destined for 
EU, 2004-
2012 (%)* 
Proportion of 
Exports to EU 
subject to a 
tariff rise if 
downgraded to 
GSP treatment 
(%)** 
Key exports to the EU, 
2004-2012 (% of exports 
to EU)* 
Angola Yes 12.8 - Mineral fuels, oils etc 
(94.1%); pearls, precious 
stones etc (4.5%) 
Botswana No 67.0 1.5 Pearls, precious stones etc 
(96.5%); meat and offal 
(1.3%); apparel (1.1%) 
Lesotho Yes 1.0*** - Pearls, precious stones etc 
(76.3%); apparel (16.3%)*** 
Mozambique Yes 44.8 - Aluminium (71.5%); 
tobacco (6.2%); fisheries 
products (4.4%); sugars 
(3.4%) 
Namibia No 35.6 30.5 Pearls, precious stones etc 
(44.2%); zinc (10.3%); 
fisheries products (22.0%); 
copper (6.6%); ores, slag 
and ash (6.6%); salt, 
sulphur, lime, cement etc 
(2.9%); meat and animal 
products (2.1%) 
Swaziland No 6.0 86.6 Sugars (78.3%); 
vegetables, fruits, nuts etc 
(14.2%) 
*Source: International Trade Centre (2013) 
**Source: Overseas Development Institute (2007). Data is only available for non-LDCs. 
***Limited data. Figure covers 2008-2010.  	  
Table 7.1: SADC-minus countries’ exposure to a loss of Lomé-equivalent 
trade preferences 
 
 
Under the intense pressure of the final months of negotiation before the expiry of 
the WTO waiver – and having been unable to transform the terms of the EU’s 
offer into a form acceptable to the region as a whole – the SADC-minus region 
was divided over how to respond. The decisions made by the various countries 
are summarised in Table 7.2. By the end of 2007, the governments of Botswana, 
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Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique and Namibia initialled an interim EPA, the 
latter attaching a statement of its reservations about the agreement (Republic of 
Namibia Ministry of Trade and Industry 2007). This was enough to preserve 
market access for the short term under the EU’s stopgap measure, MAR 1528 
(see Chapter Five). The Namibian government subsequently refused to sign the 
interim EPA when the other four countries that had initialled did so in June 2009. 
South Africa and Angola both refused to initial or sign the EPA. South Africa 
and Namibia opted out of further negotiations on the EU’s proposed WTO-plus 
services and regulatory agenda (Vickers 2011, p. 191), while the four signatory 
countries of the interim EPA made commitments to continued negotiations on 
these issues and were actively involved in negotiations on services and 
investment, at least up to 2009. 
 
What is most significant here is that these choices by SADC-minus countries 
present a puzzle for approaches that consider market access issues as the key 
determinant of EPA compliance (Bilal and Stevens 2009; Stevens 2008). First, 
Namibia’s refusal to sign the agreement that it had initialled in 2007 is striking 	  	  
Country EPA Outcome 
Botswana, 
Lesotho & 
Swaziland 
Initialled interim EPA in 2007, signed in 2009. Committed to further 
negotiations on WTO-plus regulatory issues. Pursued services and 
investment negotiations up to 2009. 
Mozambique Initialled a separate EPA in 2007, signed in 2009. Committed to 
further negotiations on WTO-plus regulatory issues. 
Namibia Initialled interim EPA with letter of reservation in 2007, refused to 
sign in 2009. Opted out of further negotiations on WTO-plus 
regulatory issues. 
 
South Africa  
Refused to initial or sign interim EPA over market access and 
technical concerns. Opted out of further negotiations on WTO-plus 
regulatory issues. 
Angola Refused to initial or sign interim EPA. Peripherally involved in 
ongoing negotiations but unlikely to sign a full or interim EPA. 
Table 7.2: Outcomes of the SADC-minus EPA by country, 2008 (source: 
author’s interpretation). 
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given the country’s dependence on preferences for a number of key exports. This 
is particularly so when the approach of Namibian trade officials is contrasted 
with those from Botswana. The latter were rather more enthusiastic about the 
EPA even though Botswana’s preference-dependent commodities are of 
marginal economic significance compared to those of Namibia. Second, the 
signatures of two of the region’s LDCs – Lesotho and Mozambique – were 
puzzling as these countries were able to secure duty-free market access via EBA. 
Third, the decision by the governments of Botswana, Swaziland, Lesotho and 
Mozambique to commit themselves to further negotiations on trade in services 
and investment is noteworthy. After all, agreement on these issues was not 
necessary for WTO compatibility and these countries could have secured market 
access (at least temporarily) without adopting binding commitments on these 
aspects of the EU’s comprehensive agenda.  
 
The pattern of uptake of the EPAs in SADC-minus, therefore, was not a 
straightforward reflection of the uneven reach of the EU’s levers of material 
conditionality. In Chapter Six, I hinted at the different visions of development 
that were bound up within the existing development trajectories and strategies of 
SADC-minus countries. In this context, I now turn to the detail of how these 
countries interpreted and contested the normative content of the EPAs. 
 
7.4 Contesting the Interim EPA 
 
As I showed in Chapter Five, a number of the more recent contributions to the 
EPA debate have stressed the activism of a coalition of ACP representatives and 
development NGOs in an attempt to explain the surprisingly effective resistance 
of many countries to the EU’s EPA agenda (Del Felice 2012; Hurt et al. 2013; 
Trommer 2013). These contributions have called attention to the ways in which 
this discursive activism was able to exert an influence over the EU’s negotiating 
position. However, they have paid less attention to the interaction between the 
EU’s norm-based and legal argument for the EPAs and the ideas through which 
SADC-minus representatives interpreted, analysed and attempted to modify the 
choices available to them. In Chapter Five, I argued that the opening up of the 
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case for the EPAs to criticism and contestation was linked to weaknesses in the 
EU’s own discursive strategy. Clearly the receptiveness of national and regional 
ACP elites to the claims in this strategy were also important, but so to were the 
analytical frameworks they developed to both understand the EU’s intentions and 
construct and negotiate their aims and preferences within the constraints of a 
marked asymmetry of trade power. 
 
In order to understand the outcome of the EPA negotiation in Southern Africa to 
date it is useful to divide the countries of the SADC-minus region into EPA 
sceptics, including South Africa, Namibia and Angola, and EPA enthusiasts 
(even if this enthusiasm was relative) including Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland 
and Mozambique (see Table 7.3). 	  	  
 Countries Negotiating Position 
 
 
 
EPA Enthusiasts 
 
 
Botswana 
Lesotho 
Mozambique 
Swaziland 
Saw the EPAs as a potential ‘win-win’. To 
some extent bought into the EU’s argument 
that the inclusion of services and investment 
within the EPAs would ‘lock in’ regulatory 
reform and serve to attract inward investment. 
Strong desire to lessen dependence on South 
Africa for trade and investment. Willing to sign 
interim EPA even in the absence of strong 
immediate market access incentives. 
 
 
 
 
EPA Sceptics 
 
 
 
Angola 
Namibia 
South Africa 
Saw the EPAs as a trade off between ‘policy 
space’ and access to the EU market. Did not 
believe that open regionalism, trade 
liberalisation and regulatory harmonisation 
would have the positive development effects 
claimed by the EU. Challenged EU claims that 
its approach to the EPAs was non coercive 
and development oriented. Opposed to 
comprehensive EPA and to inclusion of a 
number of technical issues, including MFN 
clause and ban on export taxes. 
Table 7.3: SADC-minus – EPA sceptics and enthusiasts (source: author’s 
interpretation). 	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Interviews with and documentary evidence from the sceptics suggest that they 
questioned the necessity of the EPAs as a condition of WTO rules and that they 
shared many of the concerns about the EPAs voiced by the transnational group of 
anti-EPA activists. These chiefly revolved around the EU’s perceived coercive 
behaviour in the negotiations, the loss of trade policy autonomy associated with 
the agreements, and the commercial interests that supposedly drove the EU’s 
approach to the negotiations. 
 
The enthusiasts, relative or otherwise, were positive about the developmental 
effects that deep and comprehensive trade agreements would have on their 
economies by opening them to competitive pressures and improving their inward 
investment appeal. For Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland in particular, this had 
much to do with their position of extensive trade and investment dependence on 
the dominant regional figure, South Africa, and their desire to lessen this position 
of dependency. Nonetheless, officials in these countries were of the opinion that 
EPA-based trade liberalisation and regulatory reforms did indeed represent an 
opportunity for diversification into the services sector and the attraction of 
inward investment from beyond South Africa. In these countries, even where 
there was little immediate market access incentive to sign an EPA, there was 
rather more enthusiasm both for the interim agreement and for further 
negotiations on investment and trade in services. 
 
At first blush, the division between EPA sceptics and enthusiasts within the ACP 
regions might appear to reflect plain material interests (Bilal and Stevens 2009; 
Stevens 2008). By contrast, it is important to note that the two groups delineated 
here cut across the lines of market access concerns outlined above. The chapter 
now draws attention to the way that the countries within these groups deployed 
different ideas and development frameworks in order to understand the EU’s 
motivations and develop responses to the EPA that was on offer. 
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EPA Sceptics: Policy Space versus Market Access 
 
South Africa 
It is difficult to understand the outcome of the SADC-minus EPA without 
analysing South Africa’s role as a leading EPA sceptic. Officials from the South 
African Department of Trade and Industry joined a chorus of NGOs and 
commentators (see, inter alia, ActionAid 2004; Elliott 2005; Monbiot 2008; 
Oxfam 2006; 2007; see also Del Felice 2012) in heavily criticising the EU’s 
approach to the EPA negotiations. South African negotiators questioned the 
development motives behind the EPAs and challenged claims by Commission 
officials that there were no offensive European interests at stake in the talks.  
 
The EU’s insistence on the inclusion of the Singapore issues became a focal 
point for such criticisms (see also Chapter Five). Shortly after the interim EPA 
had been initialled by five SADC-minus countries, South African Trade 
Minister, Rob Davies, made public his view that the EU’s WTO-plus agenda was 
linked to ‘global strategies to promote offensive interests of European companies 
around the world’ (Davies 2008a). In confidential interviews, South African 
officials voiced similar views about the EU’s motivations for including the 
Singapore issues in the EPA negotiations and drew links between this and the 
EU’s commercial trade agenda in the WTO and bilateral trade negotiations.80 
 
These claims about the commercial drivers of the EPAs also fed into an 
argument that the EPAs would not support development in the ways claimed by 
the European Commission. South African representatives expressed particular 
concern about the potential for the EPAs to limit development ‘policy space’. By 
this they meant the shutting down of options to use activist trade policy tools and 
to pursue heterodox development strategies.  
 
Given this concern about policy space, South African officials were reluctant to 
be tied to legally binding positions in which trade with Europe would be 
liberalised even further than under the TDCA. This is not surprising as South 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Interview 12 and 13 (South Africa government). 
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Africa’s broad trade strategy at the time combined an activist approach to trade 
governance with a robust industrial policy. Rob Davies (2008b) said, ‘The EPAs 
[…]  contain legal provisions that limit the state’s policy space to promote 
agricultural and industrial development, and to diversify trade relations with 
other key economies.’  
 
Officials were concerned by a number of the technical issues that were 
introduced into the EPA process in late 2007. For example, South Africa has 
considered placing export taxes on diamonds and chrome in order to promote the 
addition of value to these commodities in the domestic economy. Consequently, 
officials did not welcome the news that the EU was including a ban on export 
taxes within the EPA framework.81 This disagreement over the prohibition of 
export taxes in the EPA continued over an extended period of time and South 
Africa’s chief trade negotiator, Xavier Carim, recently reiterated the importance 
of these measures as part of Africa’s development policy mix: 
 
Africa’s overriding economic objective is […] to move off its current 
growth path based on consumption and commodity exports to one of 
sustainable development using the continent’s natural resource base as a 
platform for diversification and industrialisation. African governments 
and leaders have committed to this transformation, which will require a 
range and mix of new policy measures including the possibility to utilise 
export taxes to support industrialisation (Carim 2014, p. 7). 
 
Amongst these technical issues, the MFN clause was also a major sticking point. 
South African officials were concerned that agreeing to this issue would prevent 
the diversification of the country’s export markets, particularly towards emerging 
economies.82 The EU’s inclusion of the MFN clause was also used by South 
African negotiators to suggest that EU positions in the negotiations were driven 
by self interest.83 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Interview 11 (South Africa government). 
82 Interview 12 (South Africa government). 
83 Interview 12, 13 and 14 (South Africa government). 
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The South African government and labour organisations were also strongly 
opposed to negotiations on services and the Singapore issues.84 Negotiators 
expressed concerns that if South Africa signed up to an agreement with the EU 
that included rules on public procurement and investment, the state’s ability to 
pursue key domestic policy aims – including Black Economic Empowerment, a 
key policy in the context of the continued legacy of apartheid – would be 
compromised.85 The official reason given for rejecting negotiations on services 
and other WTO-plus issues was a lack of prior regional agreement on these 
issues and a lack of capacity to negotiate them effectively.86 However, it has also 
been suggested that South Africa was keen to protect its dominant position in the 
regional services market from external competition (see Chapter Six). 87 
Whatever the underlying motivation, the South African government consistently 
expressed scepticism about the claimed benefits of ‘locking in’ trade reform 
through the EPAs, preferring instead to maximise its trade policy autonomy 
while seeking market access gains from the EU. 
 
Existing levels of South African access to the EU market were secure under the 
TDCA but negotiators felt that they could get a better deal under an EPA, 
particularly on agricultural market access, than the one they had negotiated 
several years earlier.88 South Africa’s starting position in the negotiations was a 
request for the same duty free and quota free access to the EU market that was on 
offer to the other ACP countries that chose to sign an EPA (SADC 2006, p. 3). 
As with the earlier TDCA negotiations, European negotiators insisted that South 
Africa was not a typical ACP country and therefore could not receive the same 
level of market access as that on offer to the rest of the ACP group (Vickers 
2011, p. 190). The EU insisted that in order to receive an improvement on the 
terms of the TDCA South Africa would have to reciprocate by offering improved 
market access to EU exporters.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Interview 15 (South Africa business).	  
85 Interview 11 (South Africa government). 
86 Interview 12 (South Africa government). 
87 Interview 3 (DG Trade). 
88 Interview 12 (South Africa government).	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Apart from South Africa’s objections to various technical provisions, and its 
refusal to negotiate on the EU’s WTO-plus measures, issues of market access 
dominated much of the negotiations between South Africa and the EU. Given 
that existing levels of market access are guaranteed under the TDCA, South 
Africa would only consider signing an EPA if it represented a significant 
improvement on these terms at minimal perceived cost. South Africa (along with 
the rest of SACU) and the EU exchanged market access offers in June 2007 but 
could not reach an agreement before the expiry of the WTO waiver at the end of 
that year. In particular, South Africa was not satisfied with the concessions on 
agricultural tariffs offered by the EU, nor was it willing to make concessions in 
relation to most of the agricultural products of interest to the EU.89 Under these 
circumstances, South Africa was not willing to initial the interim EPA at the end 
of 2007. Moreover, in the context of attempts by the EU to force the Singapore 
issues onto the EPA agenda, its aggressive use of the WTO waiver expiry as a 
deadline for the EPAs, and the convergence if its developmental and commercial 
agendas, South African negotiators were able to justify their resistance to the 
EPA on the grounds of claims about the EU’s self-interested and coercive 
behaviour. 
 
Namibia 
Namibian officials shared South African scepticism about the development 
benefits of the proposed EPAs. Interviews revealed that the loss of policy space 
deriving from EPA commitments was a central concern for Namibian officials.90 
They also believed that the EU’s attempts to include the Singapore issues in the 
agreements were a direct reflection of European commercial interest and a 
cynical attempt to bypass the WTO, where these issues had been rejected.91  
 
The reservations expressed by the Namibian Ministry of Trade and Industry 
when it initialled the interim EPA in 2007 included the MFN clause, the freezing 
of export taxes, the abolition of quantitative restrictions on imports, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Interview 24 (SADC). 
90 Interviews 17, 19 and 20 (Namibia government); see also a report by Agritrade 
(2010). 
91 Interview 19 (Namibia government).	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inadequate provisions for infant industry protection (Republic of Namibia 
Ministry of Trade and Industry 2007). Namibian officials believed each of these 
would unduly restrict the country’s ability to pursue an activist industrial 
strategy, the key post-independence aim of which was the creation of wider 
employment opportunities in the context of a divided settler society (see Chapter 
Six). They were particularly concerned that signing an EPA would bring an end 
to strategies currently in play to protect key sectors of the Namibian market from 
external competition and to encourage domestic value-added processes. These 
included export taxes used by the Namibian government to encourage value-
addition and quantitative restrictions on agricultural imports (for example wheat) 
at certain times of the year.92  
 
Within the EPA sceptics group, it was only in Namibia that the EU’s threat to 
downgrade Lomé beneficiaries to the significantly inferior GSP found any 
leverage. The imperative created by the expiry of the WTO waiver forced 
Namibia to initial the interim EPA in order to preserve market access for its 
preference dependent fish, grape and beef exports at the end of 2007. While the 
Namibian government was keen to promote diversification away from 
dependence on commercial beef production (see Chapter Six), this remained a 
mainstay of the economy at that point in time and negotiators made the 
judgement that preferential access to the EU market for this commodity needed 
to be protected.93  
 
Namibian negotiators were also keen to exploit opportunities to challenge the 
EU’s agenda for the EPAs and to avoid signing an agreement that went beyond 
the requirements of WTO compatibility. In confidential interviews, Namibian 
negotiators stressed the degree of flexibility in WTO rules and Namibian 
officials have lobbied the European Parliament to try to persuade the EU to act 
on the basis of this flexibility (on similar tactics in West Africa, see Trommer 
2013).94 For a long time, this tactic drew only small concessions from the EU. 
However, by initialling but not signing the interim EPA in 2007, Namibia 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Interviews 17 and 18 (Namibia government). 
93 Interviews 17 and 18 (Namibia government). 
94 Interviews 17, 18 and 19 (Namibia government).	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managed for several years to retain preferential access to the EU market under 
the EU’s MAR 1528 without making any binding commitment to, or 
implementing, any of the provisions of the EPA that officials believed would 
undermine the country’s strategy for industrialisation.  
 
Angola 
The Angolan government – in a reflection of its import substitution development 
strategy and general reluctance to liberalise its trade regime (see Chapter Six) – 
has expressed similar objections to the EPA. Angolan officials attended EPA 
negotiating meetings but expressed unwillingness to sign any reciprocal FTA, 
instead endorsing an agreement with ‘variable geometry’, which Angola could 
possibly join at a later date.95 Officials gave familiar reasons for this reluctance, 
stressing the need for Angola to retain the ability to implement protectionist trade 
measures in order to ‘create production capacity before we open our markets’.96  
 
For a country like Angola, the decision not to sign an EPA was relatively 
straightforward. Given its status as an LDC with eligibility for EBA and the fact 
that its key export to the EU is oil and is not dependent on any preferential 
margin, Angola had little to gain from an EPA in terms of access to the EU 
market. Officials, therefore, perceived very little incentive to make the apparent 
sacrifices on policy space that would be required by the deal. This was 
particularly the case because, like the rest of the sceptics, the Angolan 
government remained unconvinced that a comprehensive EPA would spur 
economic diversification and development in the ways that the EU claimed. 
 
In general, South African, Namibian and Angolan officials viewed the reforms 
attached to the EPAs as concessions to a self-interested EU agenda that would 
place limits on their development by reducing the policy space for interventionist 
trade measures. Far from the win-win liberalisation narrative expressed by the 
European Commission these countries viewed the EPAs as a process in which 
concessions in terms of policy space were traded off against continued and 
improved access to the EU market. In this light, these countries were suspicious 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Interview 11 (South Africa government); Interview 21 (Angola government). 
96 Interview 21 (Angola government).	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of the claimed development orientation of the EPAs and aimed to challenge this 
by exploiting tensions within the EU’s discursive case for the agreements. In 
particular, they focused attention on the seemingly coercive nature of the EU’s 
negotiating tactics and the apparent convergence between its trade and 
development agendas. As the only one of the sceptics exposed to the EU’s 
material leverage, Namibia also sought to challenge the EU’s claims that 
comprehensive and reciprocal EPAs were the only way that trade preferences for 
non-LDCs could be placed on a firm legal footing under WTO rules. 
 
EPA Enthusiasts: Win-Win Liberalisation 
 
In contrast to EPA sceptics, other countries in the region can be characterised as 
more receptive to the EU’s win-win narrative about the development benefits of 
the EPAs, at least up to the point when they signed the agreement in 2009. The 
aim here is not to divorce the analysis of responses to the EPAs from material 
considerations. Clearly, there were material incentives at play in the case of each 
of these countries: sugar preferences for Swaziland, beef preferences and the 
possibility of gains in the area of trade in services for Botswana, rules of origin 
for garments in the case of Lesotho, and the possibility of accessing EPA-related 
adjustment funds for Mozambique. The point, rather, is that the way that these 
material incentives were perceived was itself contingent on particular 
interpretations of the choices on offer under the EPAs. For example, an 
agreement on services was only perceived as a material incentive by Batswana 
officials because they had committed themselves to a development model that 
privileged diversification into service provision via liberalisation of that sector of 
the economy.  
 
Moreover, notwithstanding these perceived specific material gains, actors within 
these countries were more open to the EU’s proposition that comprehensive 
EPAs, and the liberalisation that these entailed, would bring development 
benefits associated with more competitive markets and greater levels of 
integration into the global economy. Rather than viewing the EPAs as a trade-off 
between market access and concessions to an offensive EU agenda, these 
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countries were more inclined to view the comprehensive liberalisation entailed 
by the EPAs as a boon to development in itself. This was particularly the case in 
the context of a desire amongst these countries – especially Botswana, Lesotho 
and Swaziland – to diversify away from an overreliance on services and 
investment from South Africa. 
 
Botswana 
Trade negotiators from Botswana were the most important advocates of the EPA 
in SADC-minus. Immediately following Botswana’s decision to sign the interim 
EPA, the country’s Trade and Industry Minister, Neo Moroka, asserted that the 
primary motivation for doing so was the protection of Botswana’s immediate 
commercial interests, specifically its preferential market access for beef exports 
(van der Merwe 2009). Preferences for beef exports were also cited as a foremost 
concern by all of the Batswana officials that I interviewed for this thesis.97 As 
already noted above, these amounted to only a very small proportion of the 
country’s exports to the EU. Furthermore, one interviewee conceded that the cost 
of meeting European sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) requirements – 
particularly in the context of frequent outbreaks of foot and mouth disease in the 
region – considerably lessens the value of these preferences.98 Interviewees 
stressed, then, that the decision to sign an EPA in order to protect these beef 
preferences was motivated by a government commitment to maintain beef 
exports at existing levels within the context of an acknowledgement of the 
cultural and social significance of cattle farming, as much as its overall economic 
importance (see Chapter Six).99 
 
In addition, the reasons for Botswana’s enthusiasm for the EPA went beyond 
immediate market access concerns. Indeed, the EU’s argument about the 
development benefits of the EPAs found receptive ears in a Botswana 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Interviews 22 and 23 (Botswana Government); Interview 26 (SADC/former 
Botswana government). 
98  Interview 26 (SADC/former Botswana government). Another interviewee 
claimed that the cost of meeting SPS requirements rendered the benefits of 
preferential access to the EU market negligible (Interview 40, civil society; see 
also Scoones and Wolmer 2008). 
99 Interview 22 (Botswana government). 
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government that was already committed to a liberal development strategy that 
prioritised competitiveness in the international economy and diversification into 
the service sector (see Chapter Six). In explaining why Botswana was keen to 
negotiate an EPA that included not only trade in goods, but also trade in services 
and investment, negotiators from Botswana cited the desire to diversify the 
economy beyond the export of commodities and the belief that a deal on services 
with the EU could help to achieve this.100 A senior official also cited the current 
high cost of electricity, water and transport services in the country and the desire 
to bring down these costs through liberalisation of the services market.101 These 
issues were quite different to those expressed by the EPA sceptics, whose 
primary consideration within the negotiations was the maintenance of space for 
the pursuit of activist and interventionist policy tools. 
 
The regional political and economic dynamics of this part of Southern Africa 
also played a key role in the decision by Botswana – as well as the other 
enthusiasts – to sign the interim EPA and to seek to go beyond the requirements 
of WTO compatibility in the scope of their agreement. A wide range of 
interviewees in Southern Africa cited political tensions between South Africa 
and Botswana as a key dynamic of the EPA negotiations. 102  Interviewees 
reported that members of the Botswana government saw the country as a key 
counterweight to South African power in the region.103 Meanwhile, reports 
suggest that ‘in some South African government quarters Botswana is viewed as 
a Western, particularly British, client’ in the region (Draper and Khumalo 2009). 
Batswana officials were suspicious of South Africa’s desire to avoid the 
liberalisation of the regional services market and saw this as driven by self 
interest. Such suspicions may have contributed to Batswana enthusiasm for the 
EPA and for inclusion of services and investment within the proposed 
agreement.104  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Interviews 22 and 23 (Botswana government). 
101 Interview 23 (Botswana government).	  
102 Inter alia, Interview 29 and 35 (commentator); Interview 9 (EEAS); Interview 
41 (civil society). 
103 Interview 30 and 34 (commentator). 
104 Interview 9 (EEAS).	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Lesotho 
Trade with the EU formed only a tiny part of Lesotho’s export profile (see 
above). While Lesotho was not dependent on existing preferences, however, its 
government had made re-establishing garment exports to Europe a key strategic 
priority following the erosion of preferential margins within the US market (see 
Chapter Six). In this context, then, officials perceived the opportunity to access 
more beneficial rules of origin for access to the EU market under the EPA (in 
comparison to both Lomé and EBA) as a strong material incentive to sign the 
agreement (Walker 2009). Again, while material incentives were clearly at play 
here, they were only such in the context of Lesotho’s particular development 
trajectory and contingent strategic decisions within this setting. 
 
Moreover, like Botswana, Lesotho had made commitments to a development 
strategy based on integration into the global economy and the creation of a 
regulatory environment that would be attractive to external investors (see 
Chapter Six). The EU’s claims about the development benefits of the EPAs were 
relatively compatible with the assumptions that underpinned such a strategy. 
Accordingly, interviews conducted by Tony Heron (2013, p. 128) revealed that a 
comprehensive EPA was seen by Lesotho officials as a means of stimulating 
FDI. Furthermore, as in Botswana, a comprehensive EPA was viewed as a way 
of ‘lessening the Kingdom’s acute dependence on South Africa for the supply of 
goods and services’ (Heron 2013, p. 128), which had become a key policy 
priority in the late 2000s (see Chapter Six). 
 
Swaziland 
Unlike in Botswana and Lesotho, the market access motivation for Swaziland to 
join the EPA was clear cut. The country’s ongoing dependence on sugar exports 
to the EU was acute, as was the threat that the loss of this market access posed 
(Heron 2013; Richardson-Ngwenya and Richardson 2014). However, here too 
Tony Heron (2013, p. 129) found that officials were keen to secure a move away 
from reliance on South Africa and that they saw the EPA as a tool for doing so. 
Swazi representatives even considered negotiating an EPA as part of the Eastern 
and Southern Africa grouping rather than SADC-minus – despite being a full 
member of both SADC and SACU – precisely for the reason that South Africa 
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was not part of this grouping (Heron 2013, p. 129). Furthermore, as in Lesotho, 
interviewees reported that Swazi officials appeared at least to some extent to 
have bought into the logic of the EPA negotiations, as sold by the EU’s 
negotiators.105 They expressed a belief, then, that a comprehensive deal in the 
EPAs would help to secure both a competitive business environment and an 
attractive climate for inward investment. 
 
Mozambique 
While the government of Mozambique was also willing to negotiate on the EU’s 
services and regulatory agenda, its case should be read slightly differently. 
Mozambique’s position was similar in some ways to that of Angola – both being 
non-SACU members and LDCs with considerable resource wealth – yet its 
response to the EPA could not have been more different. Where the Angolan 
government showed very little interest in signing the EPA, officials from 
Mozambique were some of the biggest EPA enthusiasts in the SADC-minus 
region and made one of the most generous market access offers to the EU (Bilal 
and Stevens 2009, p. 172-8). This offer went beyond even the country’s 
commitments to liberalisation in relation to SADC regional integration.106  
 
To an extent, Mozambique’s enthusiasm for a comprehensive EPA can be 
attributed to its status as a ‘donor darling’ and the internalisation of donor-
promoted neoliberal development strategies by key elites within the FRELIMO 
ruling party (see Chapter Six and de Renzio and Hanlon 2009). In the light of 
this broader internalisation of neoliberal development norms, officials from 
Mozambique were more likely to be sympathetic to the EU’s narrative about the 
development benefits of comprehensive trade opening. Mozambique had already 
liberalised protective trade measures in a number of sensitive sectors as a result 
of this strategy and therefore reciprocal liberalisation with the EU held less of a 
threat than it did for other ACP countries. In addition, as one of the most highly 
aid-dependent countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Mozambique was keen to benefit 
from any development assistance that was offered by the EU for EPA 
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implementation.107 While further research is needed to pinpoint the precise 
motivations of officials from Mozambique in signing the EPA, their calculation 
appears to have been that the best way to secure such assistance was to sign up to 
the EU’s agenda for the EPAs at the broadest possible level.108 
 
The decision of these four enthusiasts to initial and later sign the interim EPA 
and to pursue further negotiation on trade in services and investment, is made 
even more remarkable because it came in the context of considerable pressure 
from South Africa to rebut the interim EPA at that time (see below). In fact, the 
dominance of the South African economy in the region and a desire by these 
countries to lessen their reliance on it, appears to have been a strong motivation 
to embrace the kind of comprehensive EPA that the EU had to offer. 
Furthermore, officials from Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland tended to see the 
inclusion of services and investment within the EPAs as something of an 
opportunity for reform and diversification rather than a concession to European 
interests. In this sense, the EPAs were viewed not so much as a trade off between 
offensive and defensive interests, but rather – as the EU claimed – a win-win. 
 
7.5 The Road to a Regional EPA 
 
During the early stages of the negotiations, South Africa’s dominant economic 
position had tended to work against the emergence of a common regional 
negotiating position, precisely because this dominance was a problem for other 
members of SADC-minus. However, in the period after the expiry of the WTO 
waiver, and particularly after the interim EPA was signed by four countries in 
2009, the South African government more strongly exerted its regional leverage 
and leadership. That it was able to do so was not a straightforward function of 
South Africa’s economic dominance. Rather this was a contingent outcome 
based on South African agents’ ability to rhetorically invoke the integrity of 
SACU and the developmental needs of its smaller regional partners in order to 
undermine the EU’s EPA ambitions. 	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As outlined above, in the context of South Africa’s activist trade and industrial 
policy, its primary aim for the EPAs was to gain concessions from the EU on 
agricultural market access while making few liberalisation commitments in 
return. The South African government also had no desire to negotiate on the 
WTO-plus elements of the EU’s comprehensive agenda and wished to expel 
controversial technical issues such as the MFN clause and the ban on export 
taxes from the final EPA text. Commensurate with this, South Africa’s strategy 
following its refusal to initial the interim agreement in 2007 was to persuade 
European negotiators that they would not be able to conclude any EPA in 
Southern Africa without making concessions to South Africa’s agenda on market 
access.109 
 
Central to South African negotiators’ strategy for doing this was their rhetorical 
invocation of the integrity of SACU and of the EU’s own stated commitment to 
the promotion of regional integration and development through the EPAs. 
Following the initialling of the interim EPA in 2007, officials from the South 
African Ministry of Finance held various discussions with counterparts in 
Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland in which these officials mooted the possible 
break-up of SACU in the event that the region remained divided over the EPA.110 
When these countries went ahead and signed the agreement in 2009, South 
Africa stepped up this tactic.  South African trade officials threatened to 
reinforce border checks on goods coming from those countries that had signed 
the EPA and fuelled media speculation that the EPA would lead to the breakup 
of SACU (Ensor and Le Roux 2009; Le Roux 2009). The effect of this strategy 
was twofold.  
 
First, South African negotiators were able to place pressure on the other SACU 
members not to go ahead with the ratification of the interim EPA. They did this 
by suggesting that the integrity of SACU’s common external tariff – and 
therefore the lucrative SACU customs pool (see Chapter Six) – would be 
threatened by the ratification of the agreement as it currently stood. Immediately 	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following the signing of the interim EPA in 2009, South Africa’s chief trade 
negotiator, Xavier Carim, said:  
 
The impact of this has not been thought through yet, but there could be 
implications for the customs pool and the way customs revenue is shared, 
because the pool functions on the assumption that the common external 
tariff is intact (quoted in Ensor and Le Roux 2009). 
 
This thinly veiled threat was based on a somewhat selective commitment on the 
part of South Africa to the integrity of the SACU common external tariff. South 
Africa had, after all, signed the TDCA with the EU ten years earlier without 
consulting or seeking the approval its fellow SACU members (Grant 2006). In 
this context, even resolute EPA enthusiast Botswana notified the EU that it 
would not begin implementation of the interim agreement without the support of 
its regional partners.111 In this sense, then, South Africa did appear to be flexing 
its economic muscles in the region. This, however, does not fully explain how 
South Africa was able to extract concessions from the EU in order to reach 
agreement on a watered-down regional EPA. 
 
Second and more importantly, then, South Africa was able to rhetorically invoke 
both the integrity of SACU and the development needs of its regional partners in 
order to contest the EU’s negotiating strategy. South African negotiators were 
keen to stress that regional division was the result of the EU’s comprehensive 
agenda and high-pressure negotiating tactics. For example, Trade Minister Rob 
Davies stated: 
 
The region reached substantial agreement with the EU on the substance 
of a schedule for reciprocal liberalisation of trade in goods […] well 
ahead of the deadline last year. In the SADC region, the major problems 
have in fact arisen from the EU’s ambitions to move the EPAs beyond 
WTO compatible free trade agreements. […In this context] two 
[countries] have not signed on at all to an arrangement, which, it must not 	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be forgotten, is supposed in the first instance to enhance regional 
integration (Davies 2008a). 
 
Insiders suggest that no such agreement on trade in goods had in fact been 
reached,112 but the point of this statement was to mobilise a counterargument to 
the EPAs that highlighted the contradictions between the EU’s claimed 
commitment to regional integration and its apparently aggressive and divisive 
negotiating agenda and tactics. If the EU was to honour its stated commitment to 
supporting ACP regional initiatives, it seemed it would have to make 
concessions to South Africa on market access and on the technical clauses to 
which South Africa objected. 
 
Furthermore, South African negotiators expressed concern for the fate of their 
regional partners should a satisfactory agreement not be reached. Davies, 
commenting on the imperative to reach an agreement, said: 
 
It would be an unfriendly anti-developmental act if anybody would block 
Namibian access to the EU. Hopefully that would not happen (quoted in 
Sauer 2009).  
 
The intimation here was that the failure to reach a regional agreement would 
have serious implications for preference dependent countries within the region. 
In this context, as highlighted above, South African negotiators suggested that it 
was the EU’s aggressive negotiating tactics and ambitious agenda that was 
preventing such an agreement from being reached. In fact, South Africa itself 
was also placing pressure on its regional partners to refuse to ratify the interim 
EPA without further concessions from the EU. Again, the point here was to 
expose a contradiction between the EU’s claimed commitment to development 
and its aggressive negotiating tactics. 
 
South African negotiators, then, took the position that they would only sign the 
EPA following concessions from the EU on market access and various technical 	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issues, while doing their best to also prevent other countries in the region from 
ratifying the agreement in the absence of these concessions. At the same time, 
they made consistent rhetorical appeals to the EU’s commitments to 
development and regional integration and the tensions between these and the 
EU’s negotiating strategy. In this way, South African negotiators were able to 
exploit tensions within the EU’s discursive case for the EPAs in pursuit of their 
own perceived interests within the negotiations. 
 
In July 2014, a regional EPA between the EU and SADC-minus (excluding 
Angola) was initialled. At the time of writing, the full details of the agreement 
are yet to be released and a fuller analysis is beyond the scope of the thesis. It is 
notable, however, that first assessments of this agreement indicate that it is less 
comprehensive than even the interim deal that was agreed in 2007.  
 
South Africa’s chief negotiator indicated shortly before the agreement was 
signed that the EU had agreed that an EPA could be finalised without binding 
commitments on services and the rest of the EU’s WTO-plus agenda (Carim 
2014). Meanwhile, the Namibian Minister of Trade and Industry stressed that the 
agreement had come in the wake of a range of significant concessions from the 
EU including a reversal of the ban on export taxes and improved agricultural 
safeguard mechanisms (Tjihenuna 2014). In addition, the EU made concessions 
on the MFN clause, which meant that treatment offered to third parties in 
separate trade negotiations would no longer be automatically extended to the EU 
(Tjihenuna 2014). A press release from the South African Department of Trade 
and Industry trumpeted the market access concessions that the EU had offered in 
relation to 32 agricultural products, including wine, sugar and ethanol (DTI 
Republic of South Africa 2014). These were granted in exchange for an 
agreement on Geographical Indications on the part of South Africa (DTI 
Republic of South Africa 2014).  
 
The South African government’s invocation of the EU’s commitment to regional 
integration ultimately, and somewhat ironically, served to water down the 
content of the final agreement that was reached in SADC-minus. Furthermore, 
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even those countries that were more enthusiastic about the EPA were prevented 
from signing up to the EU’s comprehensive liberalisation agenda. 
 
7.6 Conclusion 
 
My main aim in this chapter was been to trace in detail the way that the EPA 
negotiations played out in and were affected by the specificities of the Southern 
African region. While my argument in earlier chapters regarding contradictions 
in the EU’s EPA policy helps to explain a generalised pattern in which the EPAs 
found limited purchase, it does not explain in detail the differentiation in 
country- and region-specific responses to the EPAs. My focus here was on the 
range of critical responses and negotiating positions that were developed by 
historically situated agents within Southern Africa in response to the EU’s case 
for the EPAs. 
 
I first traced the consequences of tensions between the existing regional 
institutions within Southern Africa and the model of comprehensive regional 
integration and liberalisation promoted through the EPA. Within this context, 
Southern African governments took a set of decisions that resulted in a highly 
problematic regional EPA configuration. Specifically, this configuration 
reflected the membership of neither the smaller SACU region nor the larger 
SADC, and provided no supranational regional negotiating machinery. 
 
In this context, governmental actors within the region developed different 
understandings of the threats and opportunities posed by a range of EPA options, 
as well as different critical responses to the EU’s case for the agreements. In 
order to illustrate this dynamic, the chapter made the somewhat crude but 
analytically useful distinction between EPA sceptics and enthusiasts within the 
SADC-minus region. The responses from these countries to the interim EPA 
ranged from outright rejection of the deal by Angola, demands for greater market 
access in exchange for fewer concessions from South Africa, Namibia’s decision 
to initial but later refuse to sign the interim EPA, to Botswana, Lesotho, 
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Swaziland and Mozambique’s choice to sign the interim agreement and pursue 
further negotiation on services and investment. 
 
In the context of these divided preferences, the dominant position of South 
Africa in the early stages of the negotiations tended to militate against regional 
unity, precisely because its dominance was a source of concern for its smaller 
regional partners. That it was able to later exert its leadership to prevent the 
emergence of a comprehensive WTO-plus EPA that was clearly favoured by 
some members of the group, is testament less to South Africa’s economic might 
and more to the discursive strategy with which it contested the EU’s position in 
the negotiations. In effect, South Africa’s appeal to the sanctity of regional unity 
and development aims over the EU’s WTO-plus agenda was to rather hoist the 
EU with its own petard. 
 
The responses to the EPA in the SADC-minus region are clearly the result of 
very specific regional arrangements and material and ideational forces and 
capabilities. However, it is also possible to link the limited and uneven reach of 
the EPA process back to that broader set of tensions within the EU’s formulation 
of its policy aims and tools for the EPA negotiations, as elucidated in earlier 
chapters of this thesis. It was within the context of these tensions that those 
countries sceptical of the development benefits of a comprehensive EPA – and 
especially South Africa – were ultimately able to rebut the more controversial 
elements of the EU’s trade and development prospectus. 
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Chapter Eight 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
8.1 Aims and Research Puzzles 
 
I began this thesis by highlighting a shift in the contours of EU trade and 
development policy towards the ACP countries in the 1990s. At this time, the 
principle of political neutrality that had characterised the previous EU-ACP 
regime was replaced with an increasing emphasis on the promotion of neoliberal 
development norms – in particular comprehensive trade opening – pursued via 
policy conditionalities attached to EU market access. This shift culminated in the 
Cotonou Agreement of 2000 and the launch of negotiations for EPAs with 
regional groups of ACP countries in 2002.  
 
In relation to this development – and the subsequent exposure of the limitations 
in the EU’s ability to effectively deploy policy conditionality in this way – the 
thesis posed two related research puzzles. First, the EU’s decision to seek to 
recast its relationship with the ACP countries in WTO-compatible form in the 
mid 1990s constituted a marked departure from its earlier defence of the legality 
of the Lomé Convention. Not only this, but the EU proceeded to propose and 
pursue EPAs that went far beyond the requirements of WTO rules in their 
content and regional scope. This ambitious policy agenda appeared out of kilter 
with the EU’s declining strategic and commercial interests in the ACP countries. 
The question for this thesis, then, was why the EU chose not only to abandon its 
legal defence of Lomé’s non-reciprocal trade preferences, but also to pursue a 
new relationship with the ACP countries that went significantly beyond the 
minimum requirements of WTO compatibility. 
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Second, the non-reciprocal nature of the Lomé Convention’s trade provisions 
meant that the ACP countries had accumulated significant dependence on EU 
preferences, but had little leverage over the EU with which to counteract this 
dependence. The EU’s superior market, financial and diplomatic resources 
appeared to guarantee that it would be able to shape the successor to the Lomé 
Convention as it saw fit. This was not, however, how the EPA negotiations 
played out. My second research question asked why the EU was able to achieve 
only limited and uneven success in reaching agreement with ACP countries on 
comprehensive EPAs. 
 
My aim in this thesis was to explore these puzzles using a logic of explanation 
that combines constructivist and historical strands of institutionalism. This 
approach challenges rationalist understandings of EU external economic 
policymaking; seeks to develop a more thoroughly historicised understanding of 
the EU as a global actor, and aims to draw analytical linkages between the 
internal drivers of the EU’s global projections and their external reach and 
contestation. 
 
In these concluding remarks, I offer an outline of the central conclusions from 
each chapter. I then summarise these conclusions in relation to the research 
puzzles outlined above, highlight the wider theoretical contribution of the thesis, 
and consider how its insights might be deployed in relation to a set of emerging 
research agendas. 
 
8.2 Chapter Outline 
 
 
In Chapters Two and Three, I prepared the theoretical and analytical ground from 
which to conduct the empirical enquiries to address the thesis’ two central 
puzzles. In Chapter Two, I proposed a way to move beyond rationalist accounts 
of the drivers of EU external economic policymaking. In so doing, I argued for 
an approach that gave greater prominence to the role of ideas and historically 
embedded institutions in accounts of EU external economic policymaking. In 
order to do this, I developed a logic of explanation that consisted of the following 
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central elements: path dependent but ambiguous institutional structures; reflexive 
and purposive agents; an emphasis on contingency and the role of ideas in 
shaping action within institutional contexts; and an evolutionary and endogenous 
conception of institutional change. 
 
The key implications of this logic of explanation are twofold. First, the 
interaction between reflexive agents and indeterminate path-dependent 
institutions – located in the context of the wider and changing social system – 
gives rise to complexity, contradictions and tensions within these institutional 
structures and policy outputs over time. Second, actors operating in an uncertain 
environment can and do use discursive practices strategically. That is, they use 
them as part of an ends-oriented strategy in pursuit of particular goals based on 
their perceived interests. One such discursive strategy is to make rhetorical 
appeals to institutional structures in order to make a desired policy or action 
appear necessary in the context of this institutional constraint. This latter 
strategy, however, may become a hostage to institutional path dependencies that 
undermine its effectiveness. 
 
In Chapter Three, I critically examined two sets of EU-related literature. These 
literatures discuss the role of the EU as an external actor and EU policy transfer 
and diffusion. Taking the existing social constructivist literature on the EU as a 
global actor as a starting point, I suggested that EU external relations neither 
reflect straightforward universal norms nor some unitary neoliberal set of ideas. 
Instead, they have emerged from the actions of identifiable actors, with particular 
ideas about the desirable outcomes of EU external relations, working within and 
through the constraints of EU institutions and past policies. My argument in 
Chapter Three, then, criticised the analytical separation of internal EU policy 
processes from their diffusion and implementation. By contrast, it advocated an 
approach that treated the EU’s external projections as historically embedded and 
politically contingent.  I argued that such an approach helped to bridge the gap 
between understanding the internal drivers and external impact of the EU’s 
global actions. In particular, I suggested that the tensions and contradictions that 
arose as agents pursued their preferences within path-dependent institutional 
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structures helped to account for the limited and uneven reach of certain EU 
external projections.  
 
Chapter Four outlined the historical development and antecedents of the EU’s 
Economic Partnership Agreements, from the Treaty of Rome in 1957 to the 
Cotonou Agreement in 2000. In particular, I sought here to understand the 
motivations behind the recasting of the EU-ACP relationship through the 
Cotonou Agreement into a set of complex and comprehensive interregional 
relationships in place of the Lomé arrangement. As such, I analysed the complex 
processes of incremental historical change that characterised the evolution of the 
EU’s relations with the ACP countries and the roles of path dependency and 
contingency in these processes. Taking account of this complexity allowed for a 
more nuanced understanding of the forces that shaped the content of the Cotonou 
Agreement and the subsequent EPA negotiations.  
 
I argued that by the early 1990s, attitudes within the European Commission had 
hardened against the model of development assistance typified by the Lomé 
Convention. A consensus was emerging that Lomé had failed; that the primary 
obstacles to ACP development were endogenous; and that trade liberalisation 
and regional integration were the necessary elements to ensure the integration of 
ACP markets into the international economy. GATT and WTO challenges to the 
EU’s banana preferences, and by extension to the Lomé region, provided an 
opportunity to set in motion the dramatic reform of the EU-ACP relationship. 
Following the banana rulings, the Lomé status quo was arguably no longer 
sustainable. The EU, however, used the rulings as a pretext to deploy WTO rules 
– Article XXIV of the GATT in particular – as an imperative for ACP trade 
opening. Furthermore, the EU’s proposal for comprehensive and interregional 
FTAs went far beyond the requirements of WTO rules. The decision to pursue 
the EPAs, then, reflected a more or less independent set of EU policy preferences 
for comprehensive, regional and differentiated ACP trade opening. The way that 
these preferences were translated into a concrete policy agenda was, however, 
shaped by the strategic invocation of WTO rules as well as path-dependent 
features of past EU-ACP relations. 
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In Chapter Five, I examined the tensions that emerged from an historical and 
practical incompatibility between EU policymakers’ ideas and preferences and 
existing WTO rules. These included the difficulty of reconciling differentiation 
with WTO compatibility; the tension between WTO-compatibility and historical 
patterns of ACP regionalism; and the divergence over time between the EU’s 
ambitious agenda for the EPAs and the trajectory of WTO negotiations. These 
tensions opened up space for sustained contestation of the EU’s EPA narrative. 
This was carried out by a coalition of actors that included large international 
NGOs, national and regional social movements, and ACP states and regions. 
These actors were able to mount their own discursive strategies that exposed 
weaknesses in the EU’s case for the EPAs, instead portraying the EU as a self-
interested and coercive actor mobilising its overwhelming market power to force 
the ACP countries to liberalise their economies.  
 
The account that I presented here challenged a purely materialist reading of the 
outcome of EU attempts to install a liberal and regional model of economic 
governance in the ACP countries. In particular, I contested the idea that the EPA 
decisions of ACP countries could be straightforwardly read off from the 
vulnerability of particular countries to the loss of trade preferences. Rather, the 
tensions within the EU’s EPA strategy provided space for a variety of critical 
responses from reflexive and historically situated ACP agents.  
 
Chapters Six and Seven focused on the process and outcomes of EPA 
negotiations in Southern Africa. In Chapter Six, I brought to the fore and 
analysed the distance between the EU’s EPA model based on an assumed link 
between regionalism, economic liberalism and development, and the evolution of 
regional integration and national development strategies over time in Southern 
Africa. I argued that regional initiatives in Southern Africa had developed in 
such a way as to support a range of contradictory and contested political aims. 
These included the accommodation of a range of liberal and state-led 
development strategies; bolstering jealously guarded state sovereignty; and 
attracting external funding through the projection of a commitment to 
compliance with donor policy agendas. 
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Within the parameters of broad Southern African regionalism, development 
trajectories and strategies at the national level also varied markedly. These 
differences arose from and were embedded in the brute facts of resource 
endowments, geographical size and diverse colonial histories. These included 
factors such as colonial production structures, the dominance of apartheid South 
Africa, civil war and aid dependence. These differences also, however, stemmed 
from the deliberate and contested strategies and actions of reflexive and 
purposive Southern African elites. Chapter Six concluded that while regions in 
Southern Africa had converged upon market integration as a central aim during 
the 1990s, there was a distinct lack of consensus amongst their constituent 
members with regard to the set of neoliberal assumptions embedded within the 
EU’s EPA project. 
 
In Chapter Seven, I examined the negotiations for an EPA between the EU and 
the SADC-minus regional grouping. In doing so, I made the somewhat crude but 
analytically useful distinction between SADC-minus EPA sceptics and 
enthusiasts. These countries had very different interpretations of the costs and 
benefits of an EPA. This in turn interacted with skewed material incentives to 
produce a diverse set of responses to the EPAs. Responses ranged from outright 
rejection of the deal by Angola, demands for greater market access in exchange 
for fewer concessions from South Africa, Namibia’s decision to initial but later 
refuse to sign the interim EPA, to Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and 
Mozambique’s choice to sign the interim agreement and pursue further 
negotiation on services and investment. The lack of any regional coordinating 
machinery which might have been able to promulgate and lead a shared vision 
and interpretation of the EPA process made this range of incentives and 
preferences even harder to reconcile into a regional agreement.  
 
South Africa’s economic dominance in the region worked against the emergence 
of a common position and understanding in the early stages of the negotiations 
precisely because its dominance was a concern for other members of SADC 
minus. I argued that its negotiators’ ability to bring about agreement on a 
watered-down EPA later in the negotiations was testimony less to South Africa’s 
economic dominance and more to its ability to rhetorically invoke the integrity of 
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SACU and the development needs of its partners in order to undermine the EU’s 
EPA ambitions and rhetoric.  
 
8.3 The Conclusions of the Thesis 
 
Returning to the two research questions that this thesis posed, I propose two 
broad sets of conclusions. First the EU’s decision to abandon its legal defence of 
the Lomé Convention and recast the ACP relationship in the form of 
comprehensive regional FTAs was shaped by the emergence of a new set of 
ideas amongst European trade and development policymakers. Broadly speaking, 
the belief within the European Commission in the development model that 
underpinned the Lomé Convention had been replaced by a neoliberal consensus 
that emphasised exposure to the exigencies the global economy as essential for 
development and located the cause of development failures within domestic 
policies. A specifically European dimension to this neoliberal consensus stressed 
the importance of regionalism as a stepping stone to full integration into the 
global economy and the EU’s unique qualifications for overseeing and 
promoting this. European actors were also committed to the principle of 
differentiation and the idea that development assistance should be targeted based 
on objective development criteria. In this context, the Lomé Convention was 
adjudged – even before a series of adverse rulings under the GATT and WTO – 
to be not only a failure but an obstruction to ACP development. 
 
These GATT/WTO legal challenges were undoubtedly at the forefront of the 
minds of EU policymakers when they made the decision to recast the Lomé 
relationship. The EU’s commitment to multilateralism was in itself a reflection 
of the changing ideological underpinnings of EU external relations. However, the 
way that the EU deployed strategic appeals to WTO rules – particularly Article 
XXIV of the GATT – in the recasting of the Lomé relationship was underpinned 
by EU policymakers’ more or less independent commitment to promoting trade 
opening in order to further ACP development. The later expansion of the EU’s 
agenda for the EPAs to include trade in services and various other WTO-plus 
measures was associated with a commitment to European ‘competitiveness’ that 
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underpinned the Lisbon Agenda and the EU’s Global Europe trade policy 
initiative. While this shift coincided with the EU’s more commercial trade 
agenda, the promotion of WTO-plus measures within the EPA appeared to be 
driven by the idea that European competitiveness and ACP development were 
two sides of the same coin. Both of these aims, policymakers believed, would be 
supported by ACP trade opening. 
 
Second, the EU achieved only limited and uneven success in reaching 
agreements with ACP regional groupings on the EPA agenda because of a range 
of tensions that emerged in the way the EU articulated its aims and tools for the 
EPAs. The EU was caught between the path-dependent trajectories of two 
separate institutional arrangements. These were, on the one hand, historical 
preferential commitments to the ACP countries as former colonies and, on the 
other, the EU’s commitment to multilateralism and the idiosyncratic rules that 
had developed via the GATT and WTO’s governance of increasingly free trade. 
In designing an EPA strategy that attempted to reconcile and strategically deploy 
these institutional imperatives in support of the new development policy 
consensus amongst European policymakers, EU actors generated a series of 
contradictions.  
 
First, there was no way in which the principle of differentiation could be 
incorporated within WTO-compatible interregional FTAs. This rendered the 
EU’s material leverage uneven and hampered attempts to persuade LDCs to join 
the EPAs. Second, in designing and implementing its EPA policy, the EU failed 
to take sufficient account of the particularity of different understandings and 
practices of development and regionalism in the ACP countries. Its timeline for 
the EPAs – dictated by its invocation of the expiry of the WTO waiver – also 
failed to take account of the embeddedness of ACP regional structures that were 
not amenable to the swift conclusion of interregional FTAs. Third, by pressing 
for the inclusion of trade in services and rules on competition, investment, public 
procurement and trade facilitation, the EU went against the direction of travel in 
WTO negotiations. This undermined its claim that the EPAs were driven by the 
exigencies of WTO rules. As a result of all of the above, the EU’s strategy was 
riven with contradictions and tensions that allowed ACP countries, regional 
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representatives and NGO activists to mount successful campaigns of contestation 
and resistance to the EPA policy. 
 
Overall then, the thesis concludes that while the EU occupies a position of 
structural power within the global economy – particularly in relation to the 
Global South – the way that it deploys this power in pursuit of particular external 
economic policy aims is highly contingent. Specifically, the EU’s external 
economic policy aims and tools – both material and discursive – are the product 
of the strategic actions of purposive European policymakers acting within the 
context of path-dependent institutional structures and patterns of past relations 
with the outside world. As such, the reach and limitations of EU external 
economic actions are contingent upon the historical processes through which 
they are constructed and the understandings, strategies and alternatives that 
external partners bring to the negotiating table. 
 
8.4 Theoretical Contribution 
 
In this thesis, one of my central aims was to contribute to constructivist 
approaches to European trade policymaking. I did this by developing a logic of 
explanation that combines elements of ideational and historical institutionalist 
approaches. The main features of this logic of explanation are as follows. Human 
agents create institutions – organisations, rules, norms, shared understandings 
and patterns of behaviour – in order to lend order to an uncertain social world. 
These institutions, in turn, exhibit a path-dependent logic in which they structure 
the context of action for future agents in ways unintended by their original 
creators. Institutional contexts are also themselves ambiguous and leave space 
for various responses from purposive and reflexive human agents. It is the 
interaction between indeterminate institutional structures and human agents that 
produces contingent and evolutionary change over time. 
 
This logic of explanation mounts a challenge, along with much constructivist 
theorising, to rational choice institutionalism as the dominant approach to 
understanding EU external economic policy. In doing this, it recognises that 
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while rational choice approaches are good at modelling the outcomes of rational 
behaviour within given contexts, their ability to account for complex processes 
of policy change are hampered by their reductionist assumptions about actor 
behaviour and their appeal to structural and exogenous determinants of change. 
The logic of explanation developed in the thesis is an incremental but important 
addition to existing constructivist approaches. I believe the logic of explanation 
developed here adds to the existing constructivist institutionalist and political 
economy literatures in two ways. 
 
First, it highlights the way in which interactions between indeterminate but path-
dependent institutional structures and purposive agents can produce 
contradictions within those institutions and their associated policy outputs over 
time. These are the product of tensions between actors’ preferences, the path 
dependent trajectory of institutions, and the unexpected outcomes of actors’ 
choices within a complex and ambiguous institutional environment.  
 
Second, it operationalises the analytical distinction between strategic and 
reflexive discourse (Rosamond 2000b; Hay and Rosamond 2002) and explores 
the way in which particular discursive strategies can be more or less plausible in 
persuading actors to accept particular policies or actions as legitimate or 
necessary. Such strategic discursive appeals are more likely to succeed where the 
actors in question invoke shared institutional norms, rules or understandings as 
congruous with their desired outcome.  
 
However, these insights combine to suggest that such discursive strategies can be 
and often are problematic. Whilst they may initially be projected in an apparently 
coherent and plausible way, appeals to institutional imperatives can all too easily 
fail to take account of path dependencies that shape eventual policy outputs in 
unintended and contradictory ways.  
 
The insights developed above suggest new ways of looking at EU policy 
implementation, transfer and diffusion. In particular I draw attention to linkages 
between internal policy formation processes and their external impact. The thesis 
takes much from existing constructivist approaches to EU external action. I 
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suggest, however, that the contingent historical processes through which the 
EU’s external projections are produced, operationalised and change over time 
need to be subject to greater interrogation and analysis. Similarly, the policy 
diffusion and transfer literature, whilst productive of insights about the impact of 
different types of EU policy mechanisms, tends to regard these as unproblematic 
rather than the product of contested processes of construction by historically 
embedded agents. Likewise, the contingent and often-contested nature of 
processes of policy implementation are often sidelined within the existing policy 
diffusion literature, particularly its rationalist variants. I have argued in this thesis 
that a theoretical approach that emphasises path dependence, contingency, 
agency and the role of ideas can produce more incisive accounts of policymaking 
processes and the consequent limitations of EU external action. 
 
8.5 Future Research Agendas 
 
The conclusions of this thesis suggest further research in the following broad 
areas: (a) empirical and analytical extensions of the research; and (b) refining 
and developing the theoretical tools employed within the thesis. I briefly outline 
some possible research agendas in these two areas below. 
 
Empirical and Analytical Extensions 	  
Recent calls have been made for studies of EU trade and development relations 
with the Global South to move beyond a narrow focus on the EPAs and the ACP 
countries (see Carbone and Orbie 2014). Insights delivered in this thesis may be 
useful in shaping and furthering this broader research agenda. Specifically, future 
research might take the existing constructivist literature on EU external action as 
a starting point and seek to interrogate the intellectual underpinnings of the 
model of liberal economic governance promoted by the EU through its external 
relations with the Global South and the evolution of this model and its associated 
policy outputs over time.  
 
A comparative approach might be most interesting here. This would seek to draw 
out the tensions and complexities within the EU’s approach to relations with the 
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wider the Global South and their implications for the external reach of the EU’s 
policy projections. As I have suggested in this thesis, the EU’s external relations 
are characterised by a variety of overlapping and potentially contradictory norm-
based arguments, material conditionalities an institutional imperatives. Further, 
the EU’s external projections are embedded within the particular historical 
trajectory of European integration. A comparative approach would aim to bring 
out the different ways that these tensions and contradictions are resolved within 
different aspects of EU relations with the Global South and to investigate the 
implications of this for the EU’s ability to bring about policy and institutional 
changes in partner countries and regions. Specifically, future research might seek 
to compare the way in which the EU’s external projections are articulated and 
pursued within a variety of contexts, including (a) different institutional 
configurations within the European Commission and different regional desks 
within the External Action Service; and (b) relations with different external 
partner countries and regions. This comparison could span a range of key EU 
partnerships, including EU-ACP relations, EU-Africa relations, the European 
Neighbourhood Policy, EU relations with the Horn of Africa, the Sahel and the 
Gulf of Guinea, and bilateral relations with key regional partners like South 
Africa and Nigeria (ECDPM 2013, p. 16). 
 
In order to build upon the insights gleaned from my detailed case study of the 
SADC-minus EPA negotiations, such a comparative study might also consider 
the development trajectories and purposive decisions of agents in counterpart 
countries and regions. Further studies might ask what sort of discursive 
techniques and material incentives promote policy diffusion in these different 
contexts. As well as the discursive invocation of external institutional 
constraints, then, it might be useful to consider whether effective discursive 
action on the part of the EU requires its policymakers to tell stories that represent 
a good ‘fit’ with development trajectories and preferences in particular contexts 
within the Global South (see Broome and Seabrooke 2007; 2012). 
 
On the other side of the equation, the theoretical insights developed in this thesis 
could be used to develop a contribution to the emerging literature on African 
agency (see Chapter Six). The findings of this thesis suggest that even in 
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situations characterised by a high degree of structural asymmetry, the actions of 
historically embedded African agents can have an important bearing on the 
outcome of international political processes. Further study might seek to extend 
this insight by comparing the strategies that African agents pursue in situations 
characterised by greater and lesser extremes of structural inequality and the 
outcomes that these produce. The focus of such a study would be upon (a) the 
implications of different historically embedded institutional structures within 
developing countries for these processes of international engagement, and (b) the 
strategies employed by strategic and purposive developing country agents and 
their success or otherwise. 
 
In addition, the insights generated by this thesis might make a contribution to an 
important strand of research within EU studies and political economy that 
focuses on the impact of the global financial crisis of 2008, in particular in 
relation to the intellectual foundations of the European project. My argument in 
this thesis made little reference to the financial crisis, since the process by which 
the EU’s agenda for the EPAs was challenged and undermined began before the 
crisis and seemed to operate somewhat independently of it. However, in the light 
of my suggestion that a neoliberal development model underpinned the recasting 
of the Lomé Convention, it would be interesting to investigate the extent to 
which this neoliberal paradigm still underpins the EU’s external economic 
relations with the ACP countries and the broader Global South after the crisis. In 
this sense, we might provide a test of Colin Crouch’s (2011) ‘strange non-death 
of neoliberalism’ thesis in relation to EU external relations. This stands in 
contrast to most research on the resilience of European neoliberalism, which 
concentrates on Europe’s internal political economy and policy directions (see, 
for example, Schmidt and Thatcher 2013; for an exception, see Orbie and De 
Ville 2014).  
 
Two important challenges to the neoliberal underpinnings of EU external 
relations after the crisis might be identified. First, the crisis exposed a number of 
frailties within the European model of economic governance and provoked 
doubts about its appropriateness as a template for economic governance 
elsewhere in the world. This is particularly the case with regard to the crisis in 
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the Eurozone and the doubts that this has cast over a number of African regions’ 
plans to pursue European-style currency union (see, for example, Mbogo 2010). 
Second, the changing global distribution of power means that the EU faces 
increasing competition for influence in the Global South from countries that are 
potentially much more sympathetic to, or permissive of, heterodox development 
strategies. My discussion of the EPA negotiations after 2007 suggests a more 
pragmatic stance from the EU in this period, in that it was willing to grant 
concessions to ACP countries in order to draw a line under the EPA negotiations 
and bring them to a conclusion. However, interviews also suggested a continued 
European belief in the development benefits of comprehensive ACP 
liberalisation via the EPAs.113 Further research might centre on the European 
Commission’s (2011) Agenda for Change development strategy, launched in 
2011. This – despite its name – suggests a number of continuities in the EU’s 
attempts to use trade, aid and diplomacy to promote a liberal model of economic 
governance beyond its borders. 
 
Beyond empirical research aimed at extending the scope of the literature on the 
persistence of neoliberalism as a policy paradigm after the crisis, my theoretical 
insights might provide a wider contribution to this debate. Existing 
institutionalist accounts of the persistence of neoliberalism treat institutions 
primarily as a constraint on actor behaviour, preventing agents from exploring 
the alternatives to neoliberalism. My approach, by contrast sees institutional 
structures not only as path-dependent constraints, but also as ambiguous 
structures that might be deployed as a strategic discursive resource. In the case of 
the resilience of neoliberalism, we might consider the ways in which agents with 
a (perceived) interest in the continuation of neoliberalism as the dominant policy 
paradigm deployed strategic references to institutional structures in order to 
effectively make the case for the persistence of neoliberal policies. It would also 
be interesting to investigate tensions that might arise within such discursive 
strategies and thus possibilities that these create for the contestation of neoliberal 
practices, ideas and policies. One obvious issue-area where the merits of such an 
approach to understanding the resilience of neoliberalism might be explored is in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 Interviews 1 and 3 (DG Trade); Interview 5 (DG DEVCO); Interview 8 
(EEAS).  
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trade policy. Here, commitments to free trade have remained surprisingly robust 
in the face of the crisis (see Siles-Brügge 2014b) and it might be useful to 
consider the role of strategic appeals to WTO rules in bringing about this 
resilience. 
 
Theoretical Extensions 
 
In this thesis, I sought to build upon existing constructivist theoretical 
approaches by articulating a logic of analysis that combined insights from 
historical and ideational branches of institutionalist thought. This is an emerging 
research agenda and there is certainly more that could be done to refine and 
expand the theoretical insights and methodological approaches offered here. 
 
For example, in the thesis I suggested that social institutions – rules, norms, 
shared understandings – are ambiguous and open to different interpretations and 
responses from purposive agents. It is clear, however, that some of these 
institutions are more taken for granted and cemented within intersubjective 
understandings than others. A future theoretical agenda might seek to further 
investigate the conditions under which shared understandings are amenable to 
interpretation and contestation and the conditions under which they acquire more 
fact-like and immutable status. 
 
The addition of further intermediate analytical structures might contribute to the 
creation of a more nuanced and articulated analysis of the role of ideas and 
ideational elements in social process than that advanced through this thesis. 
According to Parsons’ (2007, p. 96), ideational elements include practices, 
symbols, norms, grammars, models, beliefs, ideas, and/or identities. This thesis 
has referred very broadly to agents’ ideas and has sought to highlight their role in 
policymaking processes. This focus on ideas might be disaggregated into a more 
subtle analysis of different ideational elements and their different roles in the 
construction and articulation of policy projections. 
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Finally, conducting this research has also demonstrated very clearly to me some 
of the challenges of ‘showing ideas as causes’ (Parsons 2002) within empirical 
political analysis. I sought in this thesis to go beyond existing constructivist 
analyses of ideas such as ‘neoliberalism’, ‘globalisation’ and ‘competitiveness’ 
at a very broad level of abstraction. Instead my aim was to investigate the 
concrete processes through which real actors deployed specific ideas within a 
complex policymaking process. I outlined in the introduction a range of 
methodological strategies for doing this. I hope that I have used these methods to 
successfully demonstrate that ideas played an important role in the design of the 
aims and tools of the EPA project and its contestation by ACP agents. However, 
the breadth of the empirical enquiry and material within this thesis (from the 
various Directorates involved in EU policymaking to the regional politics of 
Southern Africa) made it a challenge at times to focus in on the micro-level of 
ideational analysis. The continuing challenge for constructivist scholars, then, is 
to develop ways of tracing ‘ideas in action’ and their use by specific individual 
and collective actors, without losing sight of broader political processes and 
dynamics. 
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Appendix: List of Interviews 	  
Interview 
Number 
Description of Interviewees Place Date 
European Commission – DG Trade 
1 DG Trade officials (x2) Brussels 17 Oct 2011 
2 Former DG Trade official Gaborone 13 Mar 2012 
3 Former DG Trade senior official Brussels 10 May 2012 
4 DG Trade officials (x2) Brussels 10 May 2012 
European Commission – DG DEVCO 
5 DG DEVCO officials (x3) Brussels 25 Oct 2011 
European Commission - EEAS 
6 EEAS official Brussels 20 Oct 2011 
7 EEAS official Brussels 24 Oct 2011 
8 EEAS officials, EU delegation (x2) Gaborone 16 Mar 2012 
9 EEAS official, EU delegation Pretoria 20 Mar 2012 
South Africa government 
10 SA Department of Trade and Industry 
senior official 
Brussels 11 May 2012 
11 SA Department of International Relations 
and Cooperation senior official 
Pretoria 27 Mar 2012 
12 SA Department of Trade and Industry 
senior official 
Pretoria 20 Mar 2012 
13 SA Department of Trade and Industry 
senior official 
Pretoria 20 Mar 2012 
14 SA Embassy official Brussels 19 Oct 2011 
South Africa business/agriculture 
15 Business Unity South Africa official Johannesburg 23 Mar 2012 
16 Member of Agriculture Trade Forum Cape Town 
(by phone) 
2 Apr 2012 
Namibia government 
17 Namibia trade official Brussels 21 Oct 2012 
18 Namibia trade official Brussels 21 Oct 2012 
19 Namibia Embassy official Brussels 8 May 2012 
20 SADC official and former Namibian trade 
official 
Gaborone 12 Mar 2012 
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Angola government 
21 Angola Embassy senior official Brussels 11 May 2012 
Botswana government 
22 Botswana Embassy official Brussels 27 Oct 2011 
23 Botswana Ministry of Trade and Industry 
senior official 
Gaborone 16 Mar 2012 
SADC 
24 Former SADC official By email 25 Sep 2012 
25 SADC official Gaborone 15 Mar 2012 
26 SADC official and former Botswana trade 
official 
Gaborone 14 Mar 2012 
ACP 
27 Former senior ACP representative Brussels 24 Oct 2011 
28 ACP Secretariat official Brussels 9 May 2012 
Commentators 
29 EPA experts – think tank (x2) Brussels 10 May 2012 
30 EPA expert – University of Cape Town Cape Town 4 Apr 2012 
31 Southern Africa expert – University of 
Cape Town 
Cape Town 3 Apr 2012 
32 EPA expert – think tank Pretoria 26 Mar 2012 
33 EPA expert – think tank Pretoria 22 Mar 2012 
34 EPA expert – think tank Cape Town 27 Feb 2012 
35 EPA expert – think tank Cape Town 23 Feb 2012 
Civil society 
36 Civil society representative Brussels 18 Oct 2011 
37 Civil society representative Brussels 19 Oct 2011 
38 Civil society representative Brussels 27 Oct 2011 
39 Civil society representative Cape Town 5 Mar 2012 
40 Civil society representative Gaborone 16 Mar 2012 
41 Civil society representative Brussels 2 Apr 2012 
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List of Abbreviations 	  
AAMS 
ACP 
AGOA 
ANC 
ASEAN 
BLNS 
CARICOM 
CARIFORUM 
CEN-SAD 
CEMAC 
COMESA 
COSATU 
DG 
DEVCO 
EAC 
EBA 
ECCAS 
ECOWAS 
EDF 
EEAS 
EPA 
EU 
EEC 
ESA 
FDI 
FRELIMO 
FTA 
GATS 
GATT 
GEAR 
GSP 
IGAD 
IMF 
Associated African and Malagasy States 
African, Caribbean and Pacific (group of countries) 
African Growth and Opportunity Act 
African National Congress 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland 
Caribbean Community 
Caribbean Forum 
Community of Sahel-Saharan States Economic	  and	  Monetary	  Community	  of	  Central	  Africa 
Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa 
Congress of South African Trade Unions 
Directorate General (of the European Commission) 
(DG) Development and Cooperation 
East African Community 
Everything but Arms 
Economic Community of Central African States 
Economic Community of West African States 
European Development Fund 
European External Action Service 
Economic Partnership Agreement 
European Union 
European Economic Community 
Eastern and Southern Africa (EPA grouping) 
foreign direct investment 
Mozambique Liberation Front 
free trade agreement 
General Agreement on Trade in Services 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
Growth, Employment and Redistribution (programme) 
Generalised System of Preferences 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
International Monetary Fund 
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IOC 
LDC 
Mercosur 
MFN 
MPLA 
NEPAD 
NGO 
NIEO 
OPEC 
REC 
SACU 
SADC 
SADCC 
SADC-minus 
TDCA 
UMA 
UNCTAD 
WTO 
Indian Ocean Commission 
Least Developed Country (UN classification) 
Common Market of the South 
Most Favoured Nation 
People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola 
New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
non-governmental organisation 
new international economic order 
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
Regional Economic Community (of the African Union) 
Southern African Customs Union 
Southern African Development Community 
Southern African Development Coordination Conference 
Southern African Development Community (EPA grouping) 
Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement 
Arab Maghreb Union 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
World Trade Organisation 
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